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Preface and Acknowledgements 
 
Some of the most common fictions of comparative politica  research concern case 
selection, descriptions of which almost always have n air of post hoc rationalization.  
The truth is that all the comparativists I know chose their countries before choosing the 
subject of their research.  I am no exception—thoug I do believe that Mexico is well-
suited to a study of disenchantment with politics in new democracies.     
I first visited the interior of Mexico in 1992 when i  May I went on vacation to 
Mexico City to visit a friend, Alec Gershberg.  Four months later, with my last paycheck 
from a job at a San Francisco law firm, two suitcases, and a box of CD’s and books, I 
went down to Mexico for a year to practice Spanish and learn the culture.  One thing led 
to another—I found work, friends, intellectual and cultural stimulation—and a year 
turned into two, two into three, and three into seven.   
The 1990’s were extraordinary times in Mexico.  It is difficult, especially with the 
drabness (or worse) presently afflicting Mexican politics, to convey the exhilaration of 
those days.  There was uncertainty—the Zapatista uprising on New Year’s Day in 1994, 
the assassination of presidential candidate for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) 
Luis Donaldo Colosio in March of that year—but, at the same time, the promise of long 
deferred but deeply desired change.  I immersed myself in that heady atmosphere, 
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devouring books about Mexico’s modern history, weekly news magazines, and scholarly 
articles on politics.  Mostly, though, I met people, lots of people, from political parties 
and civil society organizations (CSOs, though they w re called NGOs, non-governmental 
organizations, when I met those people) who were, in their way, artificers of the change 
that would culminate the decade:  members of the “red set” (as the Chileans call it), 
supporters of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) who had attended summer 
camp in Havana and Odessa, joined such earlier incanations of the left as the Unified 
Mexican Socialist Party, PSUM, and cut their teeth on the student strike of 1987 in the 
National University of Mexico (UNAM); National Action Party (PAN) members, 
committed to the principles of free markets and free elections with equal fervor, heirs to a 
grand tradition of opposition since 1938; reformers within the PRI itself, who saw 
internal party democratization as imperative; and, on the civil society side, members of 
NGOs devoted to labor and free trade, like the Authen ic Labor Front (Frente Auténtico 
de Trabajo, FAT) and the Mexican Free Trade Action Network (Red Mexicana de Acción 
ante el Libre Comercio), and election reform, like Alianza Cívica and Movimiento 
Ciudadano por la Democracia (MCD); Jesuits from the Center for Theological 
Reflection; parish priests and laity alike in the Diocese of San Cristobal’s Mexico City 
office; and many more.  In 1994, some of these friends would invite me to collaborate in 
the NGO Fronteras Comunes as co-author of a bilingual, weekly electronic column on 
Mexican politics and society, which we dubbed El Pulso de México / The Heartbeat of 
Mexico, of which Javier Medina and I published some 200 numbers.   
The explosion of civic society paralleled, and perhaps precipitated, a similarly 
seismic shift in electoral politics.  In 1997, the PRI lost its stranglehold on the Congress 
for the first time ever, relinquishing power to a coalition of opposition parties, and in 
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2000 it ceded the presidency for the first time ever, to a plain-spoken rancher from the 
conservative central Mexican state of Guanajuato, Vicente Fox.   
Democratization during the 1990’s resulted in a desire to know what people 
thought on issues of the day, how they evaluated politicians and policies, and, especially, 
whom they intended to vote for.  Correspondingly, public opinion polling got off the 
ground in earnest.  Spearheaded by such pioneers as Enrique Alduncin, Edmundo 
Berumen, with his Michigan training, and Ulíses Beltrán in the Office of the Presidency 
under Salinas producing data sets now archived at the Centro de Investigación y 
Docencia Económicas (CIDE), pollsters produced abundant, high quality data, a trend 
that accelerated during the first decade of this century and shows no signs of slowing 
down.   
On the eve of the new decade and of Vicente Fox’s election, I decided to 
systematize the deep contextual knowledge I had gained and entered the University of 
Texas at Austin.  At UT Austin, I would meet my wife, Georgina Rojas García, of 
Tulcingo, Puebla, by way of Mexico City, which would ultimately lead to two sons, two 
compadres, two comadres, a mother-in-law whose mole is incomparable, several 
brothers- and sisters-in-law, many uncles, aunts, ad cousins in Tulcingo, and, of course, 
even deeper ties with Mexico.   
As I learned the principles of comparative politics and the techniques of 
quantitative analysis and survey research at UT Austin, my interest in Mexico and its 
politics continued unabated.  I was an official election observer in both 2000 and 2003, 
and visited Mexico frequently while in Austin.  I moved to Mexico City again in 2004 to 
join my wife and first-born son, and observed first-hand what I had glimpsed from afar.  
The effervescence of the 1990’s was fizzling rapidly and the country, settling back into 
its mold of almost congenital skepticism.   
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Why?  My attempt to answer that question resulted in th s study.  Certainly, the 
Fox presidency had disappointed many.  But the disillusionment seemed to run deeper 
than that which the foibles of one man could produce.  Fox had identified himself as the 
candidate of change (his administration even referrd to itself as the “Government of 
Change” on public works announcements), and those who voted for him did so because 
they wanted change.  But what sort of change?  Merely a change of parties in power, or 
something more profound?  I began to intuit that the c ange to which Mexicans aspired 
was more than simple turnover in government; citizens invested the concept of change 
with hopes of betterment—particularly socioeconomic betterment.  Disenchantment, it 
occurred to me, owed to a deep chasm between what people expected of democracy and 
what it was delivering.  This dissertation elaborates on and tests empirically the 
impression that had gradually formed in me.   
To the extent the dissertation does so successfully, it is because of the generous 
support and sage counsel, both professional and personal, I received from many, many 
people along the way.  I extend my most heartfelt thanks to the members of my 
dissertation committee:  my supervisor, Bob Luskin, who has been, by turns, teacher, 
trusted advisor, employer, and cheerleader, and whose encouragement helped sustain me 
through the troughs of graduate school; Peter Ward an Victoria Rodríguez, early 
champions of my work, whose passion for Mexico is as inspiring as their knowledge of it 
is deep, and whose wry wit and graciousness leavened my time at UT Austin; Ken 
Greene, who spent long hours critiquing the survey instrument before I went into the 
field, helping me make sense of numbers when it seemed I was drowning in them, and 
poring over the dissertation; and Raul Madrid, who pr dded me early in my graduate 
career to switch from Latin American Studies to Government, and whose advice, 
backing, and big-heartedness have meant much to me.  Kurt Weyland also played a major 
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role in shaping the dissertation as teacher, critic, and mentor.  Mel Hinich, Tse-min Lin, 
and Dan Powers helped expand and refine my understanding of quantitative methods.   
Many academics and pollsters in Mexico lent their support to this project.  
Foremost among them is Edmundo Berumen, of Berumen y Asociados, who gave me 
work, collected data at a generously discounted price, and, in his endearingly gruff 
manner, imparted valuable business lessons.  The Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios 
Superiores de Antrolopología Social (CIESAS) hosted me for two years as a visiting 
scholar from July, 2006, to July, 2008, generously offering me office space, a computer, 
access to its library and, more importantly, to its community of scholarship.  In particular, 
I would like to thank Alberto Aziz Nassif for his sponsorship and critique of my 
dissertation, and Ernesto Isunza for his sharp observations.   
In 2004, during the formative stage of the project, I interviewed a number of 
academicians and public opinion professionals whose in ights helped me generate and 
refine hypotheses.  I list them here (with their institutional affiliations at that time):  
Jacqueline Peschard (UNAM, Ciencias Políticas y Sociales), Yolanda Meyenberg 
Léycegui (UNAM, Office of the Presidency), Víctor Manuel Durand Ponte (UNAM, 
Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales), Alejandro Moreno (Reforma, Instituto Tecnológico 
Autónomo de México, ITAM), Federico Estevez (ITAM), Jorge Buendía Laredo (ITAM, 
Geo-Issa), Benito Nacif (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, CIDE), José 
Antonio Crespo (CIDE), Allyson Benton (CIDE), Mauricio Merino (CIDE), Ulíses 
Beltrán (CIDE, BGC), Alejandro Poiré (Instituto Federal Electoral, IFE), Silvia Gómez-
Tagle (Colegio de México, Colmex), Soledad Loaeza (Colmex), Fernanda Somuano 
(Colmex), Ilán Bizberg (Colmex), Enrique Alduncin (Alduncin y Asociados), Carlos 
Ordóñez (El Universal), and Roy Campos (Consulta Mitofsky).  Carlos Ordóñez and 
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Alejandro Moreno were especially kind to furnish mewith data sets collected by their 
respective dailies.   
After data collection, in December, 2006, I enlisted several academics and 
consultants from Guadalajara to help interpret the results:  Juan Manuel Ramírez Saez 
(Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores de Occidente, ITESO), Rossana Reguillo 
(ITESO), Jorge Alonso Sánchez (CIESAS Occidente), Jsús Gómez Esquivel (RVOX), 
José Sosa (Revista de Administración Pública), Salvador Peniche Camps (Universidad de 
Guadalajara, UdeG), Leonardo Gática (UdeG), Patricia Murrieta Cummings (UdeG), 
Jaijme Preciado Coronado (UdeG), Jorge Regalado Santillán (UdeG), and Érika Loyo 
Beristain (UdeG).  Special thanks are due to Érika Loyo for her facilitating contacts with 
the academic community in la Perla de Occidente.   
Several institutions financed data collection and travel to Mexico.  I gratefully 
acknowledge support from the National Science Foundation (Dissertation Research 
Improvement Grant SES 0519262), the Tinker Foundation, and UT Austin’s Public 
Policy Institute, and the UT Austin Mexican Center, which bankrolled electoral 
observation during the tenures of William Glade andPeter Ward.     
On a more intimate note, I humbly express my gratitude to friends and family 
who have, over the years, piqued and indulged my enthusiasm for Mexico and its politics.  
I lovingly blame Alec Gershberg for having invited to Mexico City in 1992.  I thank my 
colleagues and friends at Fronteras Comunes, the Mexico City NGO where I worked 
from 1994 to 1998:  Víctor Osorio, Patricia Férnandez Chase, Azucena Franco, and, 
especially, Javier Medina Ibarra, my guide through the labyrinth of Mexican politics and 
accomplice in writing El Pulso de México.  Argentinian-born Mexican philosopher 
Horacio Cerutti Goldberg oriented me in the intricac es of Latin American ontology and 
political thought.  To Peruvian-born Mexican historian Norma Mogrovejo I owe my 
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knowledge of Latin American feminist-lesbian thought.  Alejandro González Arreola and 
Juan René Químbar, former Alianza Cívica workers and flat-mates, offered insight and 
camaraderie over dominoes and Pacífico.  Two other friends bookend extended periods 
of living in Mexico:  Folko Mueller, whose companioship greatly enlivened my first 
year in Mexico, and Clarisa Pérez-Armendáriz, colleague at UT Austin, collaborator, 
brilliant scholar, and trusted friend during my last few years in the country.   
Finally, I wish to thank Linda and Terry Brown, my mother and second father; 
Brad Crow, my father; and my brothers Jonathan, Jimand Devo and sister Kelly.  I’m 
not sure my parents ever fully understood my passion for Mexican culture and politics or 
my decision to move there, but they always accepted it and encouraged me to follow my 
heart.  And all my family is positively thrilled with my life partner, Georgina Rojas 
García—a direct result of my interest in Mexico—and the two sons, Ben and Danny, we 
have produced.  Georgina’s patience, while not limitless, is greater than I deserve.   
Without her love and support I would be lost.  I dedicate this dissertation to her, in love, 
gratitude, and admiration, and to our two sons, in the hope that they claim their place in 
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In July, 2000, Mexico ended seven decades of single-party rule with the election 
of Vicente Fox as president, culminating its gran fiesta democrática of the 1990’s.  Less 
than a decade later, though, the party’s over.  Citizen disenchantment with politics is 
widespread:  Mexicans profoundly distrust parties, politicians, and parliament.  Mexico is 
hardly unique.  Satisfaction with democracy is low, declining, or both in 72 new (or older, 
poor) democracies in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa.   
This dissertation analyzes the causes and consequences of the current Mexican 
malaise—and of discontentment with democracy around the world.  It addresses two 
groups of questions.  First, what causes dissatisfac on with democracy?  Does it attach to 
specific politicians or institutions, or to poor evaluations of government performance?  Or 
does it bespeak a deeper frustration with democracy and its inability to meet citizens’ 
expectations—particularly socioeconomic ones?  Second, what does disillusionment bode 
for political participation?  Do dissatisfied citizens quit voting?  Do they become 
alienated or turn to confrontational participation?   
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I argue that a main cause of political dissatisfaction is a citizen concept of 
democracy, “substantive” democracy, emphasizing economic improvement and social 
equity, combined with poor government performance in just those respects.  This 
combination poses challenges for democracy in many countries, not just Mexico.  
Though citizens in apparently ineffective democracies are more disposed to entertain 
authoritarian alternatives—which have already toppled some wavering democracies—
most new democracies, including Mexico, have hung on.  
Widespread and deep dissatisfaction with democracy ma  jeopardize the survival 
of some new democracies, but the more immediate concern raised by dissatisfaction is its 
detrimental impact on political participation—and, ultimately, the quality of democracy.  
For citizens who conceive of democracy as an instrument of economic equality, their 
governments’ failure to ameliorate poverty leads to disengagement from politics.  These 
citizens vote and engage in institutional participation less often.  Dissatisfaction also 
predisposes a small but significant minority of citizens to contentious political 
participation.  Political dissatisfaction makes new democracies more likely to consolidate 
as what scholars have described as “semi-”, “partial”, or “illiberal” democracies.   
 xiv 
Table of Contents 
 
List of Tables ............................................................................................. xvi 
List of Figures ........................................................................................... xvii 
CHAPTER 1 THE PARTY ’S OVER:  DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS (AND 
MALCONTENTS )  1 
Post-Transition Malaise in Mexico .................................................................2 
Socioeconomic Expectations and Political Satisfaction in New Democracies4 
The Citizen Disenchantment in Mexico Survey ..............................................8 
Road Map .............................................................................................9 
CHAPTER 2 CITIZEN CONCEPTS:  A NEW THEORY OF DISENCHANTMENT W ITH 
DEMOCRACY  13 
Contesting the Meaning of “Satisfaction with Democracy” .........................13 
Explaining Dissatisfaction with Democracy .................................................17 
Conceptions of Democracy ...........................................................................18 
Complementarity or Contradiction?  A Model of Citizen Concepts of 
Democracy .....................................................................................26 
Citizen Conceptions of Democracy as a Cause of Disenchantment .............28 
The Consequences of Disenchantment:  Political Participa ion ...................37 
CHAPTER 3     DISENCHANTMENT WITH DEMOCRACY IN MEXICO AND OTHER NEW 
DEMOCRACIES  42 
Satisfaction with Democracy in Mexico .......................................................42 
Satisfaction with Democracy in New Democracies Worldwide ...................48 
Country-level Causes of Disenchantment .....................................................57 
CHAPTER 4     CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY IN MEXICO  74 
The Idea of Democracy in Mexico .........................................................76 
Mexicans’ Conceptions of Democracy Today .......................................86 
Where do These Views of Democracy Come From? ........ .....................95 
 xv 
CHAPTER 5 THE CAUSES:  WHY MEXICANS ARE DISSATISFIED WITH (THEIR ) 
DEMOCRACY  97 
Concepts of Democracy and Disenchantment in Mexico:  Hypotheses .......99 
Other Explanations of Satisfaction with Democracy:  Retrospective   
Evaluations and Personal Resources ..................................................118 
Thickening the Satisfaction Indicator ...................................................127 
Concepts of Democracy and Disenchantment in Mexico:  Evidence .........129 
Conclusions ......................................................................................140 
CHAPTER  6 THE CONSEQUENCES:  DISSATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY AND 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN MEXICO  142 
Political Participation in Mexico:  Between Instituons and Contention ...143 
Beyond Consolidation Theory:  From Democratic Survival to the              
Quality of Democracy ...................................................................147 
Political Participation and the Quality of Democracy ................................149 
Satisfaction with Democracy and Political Participation............................154 
Modelling Political Participation:  Variables and Hypotheses ...................158 
Results:  Satisfaction with Democracy and Political P rticipation in         
Mexico ..........................................................................................163 
Conclusions ......................................................................................175 
CHAPTER  7     DO THE LESSONS FROM MEXICO GENERALIZE TO NEW 
DEMOCRACIES WORLDWIDE ? 179 
Beyond Mexico:  Concepts of Democracy and Satisfaction Worldwide ...180 
Satisfaction with Democracy and Political Participation in New       
Democracies .................................................................................185 
How Prevalent is the Substantive Conception of Democracy? ..................188 
Future Research ...............................................................................193 
What Have We Learned? .....................................................................194 
References .......................................................................................................199 
Vita .. ..........................................................................................................210 
 
 xvi 
List of Tables 
Table 3.1:  Levels and Trends in Satisfaction with Democracy around the World, 
1990-2007. .........................................................................................54 
Table 3.2:  Summary of Satisfaction with Democracy in New and Low-Income 
Democracies around the World, 1990-2006. ................................................58 
Table 5.1:  Cross Classification of Level of Democracy and Satisfaction with 
Democracy (Observed Cell Counts with Counts Expected Under 
Independence in Parentheses) .....................................................................128 
Table 5.2:  Hierarchical Linear Model Regression on Satisfaction with Democracy. ....133 
Table 6.1:  Ordinal Logistic Regression of Self-Reported Intention to Vote on 
Satisfaction with Democracy and Other Variables (with Cluster-
Adjusted Standard Errors)...........................................................................164 
Table 6.2:  Random Effects Logit Regressions of Self-R ported Presidential, 
Gubernatorial, and State Deputy Votes on Satisfaction with Democracy. .167 
Table 6.3:  Random Effects Logistic Regression of Individual Participation on 
Satisfaction with Democracy ................................................................169 
Table 6.4:  Random Effects Logit Regression of Petition-Signing on Satisfaction with 
Democracy. ......................................................................................171 
Table 6.5:  Logistic Regression of Protest on Satisfaction with Democracy (with 
Cluster-Adjusted Standard Errors). .............................................................173 
Table 6.6:  Ordinal Logistic Regression of Contentious Participation on Satisfaction 
with Democracy and Other Variables (with Cluster-Adjusted Standard 
Errors). ..............................................................................................174 
Table 7.1:  Regressions of Satisfaction with Democracy on Conceptions of 
Democracy in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa, 1998-
2006........................................................................................................184 
Table 7.2:  Effect of Satisfaction on Political Participation in Latin American, Eastern 
Europe, Asia, and Africa, 1998-2006. ........................................................187 
 xvii  
List of Figures 
Figure 2.1:  Objects of Political Attitudes on Scale of Abstractness. ................................14 
Figure 2.2:  Diagram of Theory on Causes and Consequences of Satisfaction with 
Democracy. ........................................................................................40 
Figure 3.1:  Satisfaction with Democracy in Mexico, 1997-2008. ....................................43 
Figure 3.2:  Trends in Satisfaction with Democracy by Region, 1990-2007. ...................72 
Figure 4.1:  Means for Liberal Democracy Items. ..... ..................................................89 
Figure 4.2:  Means for Electoral Democracy Items. ....... .............................................90 
Figure 4.3:  Means for Substantive Democracy Items. ..................................................91 
Figure 4.4:  Distribution of Concepts of Democracy mong Mexicans. ...........................93 
Figure 4.5:  Three-Dimensional Scatterplot of Mexicans’ Definitions of Democracy 
in Conceptual Space. ..........................................................................94 
Figure 5.1:   Freedom of the Press Rankings (Freedom H use and Reporters sans 
Frontières) for Mexico and Latin America, 2000-2008. ............................109 
Figure 5.2:  Voter Turnout in Mexican and U.S. Federal Elections, 1991-2006. ............115 
Figure 5.3:  Hypothesized Satisfaction with Democracy by Conceptions of 
Democracy. ......................................................................................117 
Figure 5.4:  Mexicans’ Evaluations of Selected Government Services, 2006. ................122 
Figure 5.5:  Mexicans’ Approval of Selected Incumbents, 2006. ...................................124 
Figure 5.6:  Distribution of Partisan Identification in Mexico, 2006. ..............................127 
Figure 5.7:  Comparison of Mean Satisfaction with Democracy by Concept of 
Democracy. ......................................................................................130 
Figure 7.1:  Percentages of Substantive vs. Electoral Democrats in Latin America, 
Eastern Europe, and Africa, 1998-2006. ..............................................190 
Figure 7.2:  Average Self-Placement on a Substantive-Liberal Democracy Scale in 
Post-Communist, Developing, and Industrial Democracies, 1996-2002. ...192 
 1 
CHAPTER 1 
The Party’s Over:  Democracy and its Discontents (and Malcontents) 
In July, 1997, Mexican voters loosened the grip of the long-ruling Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) on power, depriving the party of its congressional majority for 
the first time ever in that year’s midterm elections.  Then-President Ernesto Zedillo, 
putting a good face on what was for his party a bad situation called the elections a “gran 
fiesta democrática.”  The epithet was an apt description of not only the 1997 by-elections 
but the entire decade of the 1990’s.  Opposition parties began winning state and local 
elections.  Groups of intellectuals united in calling for political reform.  Civic 
organizations flourished as citizens revelled in a ewfound sense of their own potential.  
Congress responded by passing reform bills that culminated in a major 1996 overhaul of 
campaign rules and the federal election board.  That reform, together with an increasingly 
strong opposition and empowered civil society, set th  tableau for the momentous 1997 
elections.   
Finally the 2000 presidential election brought National Action Party (PAN) 
candidate Vicente Fox to the presidency, ending the PRI’s seven-decade hold on power.  
Celebrations erupted in the streets of Mexico’s capital, its cities and towns, as citizens 
chanted the new president’s nickname in unison—“Chente!  Chente!”—and waved the 
giant “V” for “ ¡Victoria!” foam hands more typically seen at sporting events.  Indeed, the 
joyous scene being played out in public thoroughfares across the country resembled a 
still-only-dreamt-of Mexican World Cup championship more than a post-electoral 
victory.  The democratic fiesta was in full swing and the whole country, those who did 
not vote for Fox included, was living it up.   
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POST-TRANSITION MALAISE IN MEXICO  
Scarcely a decade later, the party’s over.  Citizen disenchantment with politics is 
widespread.  Fox’s presidency disappointed most Mexicans.  He remained personally 
popular throughout his six-year term but was ineffectiv  at getting his legislative agenda 
through Congress.  Beset by divided government and a recalcitrant majority coalition of 
opposition parties, Fox’s political operatives proved incapable of steering his budgets, 
fiscal and energy reform proposals, and other bills through Congress.  Allegations of 
corruption and influence peddling swirled around the first lady and the president’s 
stepsons.   
But the disillusionment went deeper than frustration with Fox.  The 2003 midterm 
election turnout was 41%, down from 58% and 61% in the two previous by-elections, in 
1997 and 1991.  Satisfaction with democracy similarly declined.  Only 17% of Mexicans 
reported themselves “satisfied with democracy in Mexico” in 2004, down from 45% in 
1997.  In 2008, the figure hovered around 23%.1  Surveys consistently reveal Mexicans’ 
deep distrust of parties, parliament, and politicians.  Even after completing the transition 
to democracy, Mexicans believe, business elites continue to monopolize political power.  
Even the hitherto incontestably bright spot of Mexican democracy—free and fair 
elections—has been tarnished.  The controversial 2006 election that returned the PAN to 
the presidency was riddled with irregularities (Crespo 2008).  Two years later, a third of 
all voting-age Mexicans continue to believe that the 2006 election was fraudulent, 
including 40.7% of those identifying themselves as PRI supporters and 14.2% of those 
identifying with the PAN.2  In sum, a process of disenchantment that had unfolded over 
decades in older, industrial democracies was condensed to a decade or less in Mexico.    
                                                
1 All figures are from the Latinobarometer 2007 and 2008 reports (www.latinobarometer.org).  
2 Consulta Mitofsky, “Dos años después de la elección presidencial”, 
(http://72.52.156.225/Descargar.aspx?q=ArchivoEstudio&a=9 [accessed April 21, 2009).   
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The Mexican story is sadly familiar.  Some if its elements find echoes, often 
amplified, in other new democracies, whose stories also add to the litany of woes faced 
by countries that have emerged from authoritarianism.  Ineffectual, mediocre, and corrupt 
leadership has plagued many of the new democracies.  F w have been blessed with men 
and women of Nelson Mandela’s or Lech Walesa’s moral solvency, or Adolfo Suarez’s 
commitment to inclusiveness, to shepherd their countries from dictatorship to democracy.  
Electoral irregularities and outright fraud all too frequently undermine citizens’ right to 
choose their leaders.  Human rights violations persist, at times seemingly impervious to 
democracy’s entreaties.  Oligarchs continue to castlong shadows over politicians, in 
whom they often find eager accomplices.  And democracy appears to have done little to 
mitigate long-standing social ills that spring from poverty and inequality.   
This study analyzes the causes and consequences of the current Mexican 
malaise—and of discontent with democracy around the world.  It addresses two main 
groups of questions.  First, what, exactly, causes dis atisfaction with democracy?  Does 
dissatisfaction attach to individual politicians or specific institutions?  Does it owe to 
poor evaluations of government performance?  Or does it bespeak a deeper frustration 
with democracy and its ability to meet citizens’ exp ctations—particularly their 
socioeconomic expectations?  Second, what does disillusionment bode for political 
participation?  Do dissatisfied citizens sit out an election or two?  If so, do they remain 
alienated or turn to more confrontational forms of participation?   
I argue that a main cause of political dissatisfaction is a conception of democracy 
emphasizing economic improvement and social equity, combined with poor government 
performance in just those respects.  This combinatio  poses challenges for democracy in 
many countries, not just Mexico.  Citizens in apparently ineffective democracies are more 
disposed to entertain authoritarian alternatives, which have already toppled teetering 
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democracies in Russia, Belarus, Thailand, Bangladesh, and elsewhere.3  It is conceivable 
that citizen dissatisfaction helped pave the way for the return of autarchs and generals.   
But most new democracies have hung on so far.  As widespread and deep as 
dissatisfaction with democracy may be, it has not je pardized the survival of democracy 
in most cases.  A more certain consequence of dissatisfaction is its detrimental impact on 
political participation and, ultimately, the quality of democracy.  For citizens who 
conceive of democracy as an instrument of economic prosperity and social justice, their 
governments’ failure to ameliorate poverty leads not only to discontent with politicians, 
parties, and parliaments but to alienation from the political system.  Dissatisfaction also 
predisposes a small but significant minority of citizens to contentious political 
participation.  Thus, as I will argue, political dissatisfaction makes new democracies more 
likely to consolidate as “semi-” or “partial democra ies.”   
SOCIOECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS AND POLITICAL SATISFACTION IN NEW 
DEMOCRACIES  
Many of the challenges now facing emerging democracies are similar to those 
faced by the industrial democracies several decades go.  Widespread disgust with 
politicians, parties, and parliaments, generally seen as venal and unresponsive, led to 
worries that democracy, during the late 1960’s and mi -1970’s, was “in crisis” (see, e.g., 
                                                
3 For example, a 2004 United Nations Development Programme study asserts, “For many Latin American 
citizens, development is so important an aspiration that they would be willing to support an authoritarian 
regime if it could guarantee their well-being” (PNUD 2004: 34).  The report classified 26.5% of Latin 
Americans as “non-democratic” and another 30.5% as “ambivalent”, finding that non-democrats, on 
average, had experienced downward social mobility (2004: 140-143).  In Mexico, Beltrán (1996) 
(especially Flores’s contribution to that volume), Flores and Meyenberg (2000), Peschard (2002), and 
Meyenberg (2002) have all found that though most Mexicans how exhibit a “civic” citizen culture (in  
Almond and Verba’s terms), perhaps as many as a third hew to the old, authoritarian political culture typical 
of “subjects”.  Rose and Mishler (1994) examine lingering authoritarian sentiment in the former Eastern 
bloc, where democrats form a “bare majority” of thecitizenry.   
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Crozier et al. 1975).  Observing a drastic decline in trust in the U.S. government from 
1964 to 1970, Arthur Miller wrote:   
 
A democratic political system cannot survive for long without the support 
of a majority of its citizens.  When such support wanes, underlying 
discontent is the necessary result, and the potential for revolutionary 
alteration of the political and social system is enha ced. . . .  [E]xtended 
periods of widespread political malaise suggest that t e normal means by 
which conflict is managed [ ] are not fully operative.  (1970: 951)  
 
Such talk turned out to be overblown.  Although citizens in Europe, the United States, 
and elsewhere sharply questioned the quality of their d mocracies, the “revolutionary 
alterations” never materialized.  Decreasing trust in the U.S. government reflected 
frustration with specific policies and disapproval of the president rather than long-term 
cynicism (Citrin 1974, Hetherington 1998), implying that new policies and leadership 
could reverse the trend.4   
Citizens responded to democracy’s failed promises by “tuning out” or 
participating outside traditional channels, far more than by radicalizing.  The trend 
toward apathy and alienation, though apparently enduri g and global, has not upended 
any of the old democracies.  When Pharr and Putnam (2000) asked the question, “What’s 
troubling the trilateral countries?” they had to admit, “Not much.”  Other citizens 
responded to discontent by redoubling their efforts to influence public policy, chiefly 
through issue-oriented public interest groups.  Dalton has argued that declining electoral 
turnout and party activism in the United States, Britain, France, and Germany has been 
                                                
4 In fact, political trust in the U.S. nearly regained its early 1960’s levels at the beginning of the Reagan 
administration and in the middle of the Clinton administration.   
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offset by a countertrend of increased participation in “communal” political activity (1996: 
51-54).   
Some dissatisfaction with democracy, moreover, may be healthy.  Norris (1999) 
asserts that waning support for “actually existing democracy” has not decreased 
allegiance to democracy as an ideal form of governmnt.  Rather, the tension between 
ideal and reality produced “critical citizens” or “dissatisfied democrats,” both devoted to 
the values of liberal democracy and (partly because of that) exceedingly distrustful of 
political institutions (see also Inglehart 1999).  Looking back, Dalton observed, “If 
democracy was in crisis, it was a crisis of institutions and not the spirit of democracy and 
its participants” (1996: xi).   
But does dissatisfaction with democracy have more pernicious consequences in 
new democracies like Mexico’s—i.e., those of Huntington’s (1991) “third wave” of 
democratization that began in 1974?  The older democracies enjoy at least two 
advantages that attenuate the harmful effects of dissatisfaction.  First, the old 
democracies’ long, uninterrupted experiences with electoral democracy generate in their 
citizenries a sort of pro-democratic inertia that enables even highly imperfect 
democracies to weather temporary spells of apathy and confrontation.  In a cross-national 
study of European, “European-heritage”, and Latin American countries, Muller and 
Seligson (1994) found that the longer democratic institutions endure, the more citizens 
adopt civic values.  Democracy, they say, engenders “civic culture” more than it is 
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engendered by it.  Citizens in emerging democracies have much less of this institutional 
legacy.5   
Second, the older democracies emerged out of relativ y prosperous, egalitarian 
societies, whereas the new or renewed democracies in Eastern Europe, Latin America, 
Asia, and Africa were born into varying combinations of persistent poverty, stark 
inequality, and economic crisis.  Most wealthy countries had already become democratic 
by the mid-1970’s, leaving mostly poorer countries in the pool of countries eligible for 
third-wave democratization.  Half or more of Mexico’s population lives in poverty.  In 
addition, economic crisis often has a hand in bringing down authoritarian regimes.   
Thus institutional trust and evaluations of democracy ppear to depend more on 
socioeconomic performance in emerging democracies.6  In Latin America, many citizens 
have an “immediate” conceptualization of politics (as von Mettenheim [1990] wrote of 
Brazilians).  They “perceive and judge political objects and issues by exclusive reference 
to a substantive democratic meaning, without the mediating influences or rationale 
supplied by party, ideology, or group interest” (1990: 29).  The 2004 Latinobarómetro 
survey intimates that low satisfaction with democracy is related to discontent with the 
market economy:  only 29% of Latin Americans report being satisfied with democracy, 
and a paltry 19% report a positive evaluation of the economy (Latinobarómetro 2004: 
38).  Camp et al. find that whereas Costa Ricans, living in Latin America’s oldest 
                                                
5 See also Converse (1969) on party identification’s role in maintaining political stability and its 
development over time, as citizens gain experience with democracy.   
6 See, e.g., McDonough et al. on Spain (1986: 453-454); von Mettenheim on Brazil (1990: 29, 41); Miller 
et al. on Russia, Lithuania, and the Ukraine (1994: 409); Mishler and Rose on Eastern Europe (1997: 436); 
Powers and Cox on Poland (1997: 627); and Vassilev on Bulgaria (2004: 119). 
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democracy, “see democracy largely in political terms, … Mexicans and Chileans, who are 
likely to be more representative of Latin Americans from other countries, view 
democracy in social and economic, not political, terms” (Camp 2001: 11, 15-16).   In 
older democracies, frustrated socioeconomic aspirations typically produce changes of 
government.  In emerging ones, such frustration maycause citizens to exchange newly 
democratic regimes for authoritarian ones.   
To be sure, most new democracies have survived their economic crises so far, 
and—diminishing—majorities of their citizens continue to back democratic ideals.  On 
the other hand, as I show in Chapter 7, most new democracies remain stuck in the 
“partially free” category, according to the widely used Freedom House Index.  Relatively 
few become fully “free”, and a handful backslides into authoritarianism.  In brief, 
dissatisfaction does not appear to put democratic survival or long-term quality at risk in 
old democracies, but may do so in new ones.   
THE CITIZEN DISENCHANTMENT IN MEXICO SURVEY 
The empirical analysis in this study rests primarily on Desencanto Ciudadano en 
México (Citizen Disenchantment in Mexico), an original national survey conducted June 
16-26, 2006—shortly before the July 2 presidential election—by the experienced market 
research firm Berumen y Asociados.  The respondents were 650 voting-age Mexican 
citizens, randomly sampled in a nationwide, three-stage process.  The primary sampling 
unit was the “electoral section”, analogous to a polling precinct in the United States, 
followed by households at the second stage and individuals at the third.  Sixty-five 
electoral sections were selected at random out of around 134,000 nationwide.  Within 
 9 
each section, ten households were chosen at random and one individual was chosen in 
each household by the “last birthday method,” in which interviewers ask to speak to the 
adult who last had a birthday (a widely used approximation of random selection).  Since 
only one person was interviewed in each household, this sampling design effectively 
gave rise to a two-tiered data structure in which all individuals are “nested” in electoral 
sections; that is, each individual belongs to one, a d only one, electoral section.   
I complement the Citizen Disenchantment survey with data from other national 
and cross-national surveys.  In particular, my analysis of disenchantment in Mexico relies 
on the Mexican National Survey of Political Culture (Encuesta Nacional de Cultura 
Política, ENCUP), Latinobarometer, and the National Evaluation of Democracy surveys 
undertaken by the Mexican daily El Universal.  For my cross-national analyses, I turned 
to the World Values Survey (WVS) and several regional polls:  Latinobarometer, the 
Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), the Consolidation of Democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CDCEE) survey, AsiaBarometer, and Afrobarometer.   
To analyze these data, I employ standard descriptive statistics and multivariate, 
maximum likelihood regression.  Where data exhibited he nested structure described 
above, I used hierarchical models to remedy possible violations of certain statistical 
assumptions—particularly, that of independence among bservations—wrought by 
geographical clustering of interviewees.   
ROAD MAP  
I proceed as follows:     
Chapter 2 sets forth a new explanation of disenchantme t for democracy.  I assert 
that an important, but generally ignored, explanation for dissatisfaction is the disconnect 
between what citizens expect of democracy and what it ctually delivers.  In new 
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democracies, I theorize, citizens believe democracy entails greater prosperity and social 
equality—something that new democracies, by and large, are not delivering.  I identify 
three basic conceptions of democracy.  Electoral democrats view free and fair elections 
as a sufficient condition for democracy.  Liberal democrats emphasize freedoms and 
rights as immanent in democracy.  Finally, substantive democrats view greater 
socioeconomic equality as a necessary component or consequence of democracy.  
Substantive democrats are, on average, most disenchanted precisely because new 
democracies are largely failing to bring about what citizens need and demand most:  
greater socioeconomic equality.   
In Chapter 3, I quantify disenchantment with democracy in Mexico and in 72 new 
(and low-income) democracies around the world.  In ge eral, citizens in these countries 
are dissatisfied with their democracies and becoming more so over time.  I outline some 
country-level conditions that could help shape averg  satisfaction, including economic 
crisis, elections and post-electoral conflict, inter ational and civil strife, and ethnic and 
religious tensions, among others.   
The next three chapters turn to Mexico in greater detail.  Drawing on the three-
fold typology of citizen conceptions of democracy presented in Chapter 2, Chapter 4 
presents a brief history of the idea of democracy in Mexico.  I show that each of the three 
views of democracy (liberal, electoral, and substantive) has deep roots in Mexico.  Data 
from the Citizen Disenchantment survey reveal that the substantive idea of democracy 
predominates among Mexicans today.   
Chapter 5 tests in Mexico my theory on the causes of disenchantment.  I explain 
the impact each conception of democracy is likely to have on satisfaction.  Mexican 
democracy has done a reasonable job of ensuring trustworthy elections (up until 2006, 
anyway), so I theorize that electoral democrats are likely to be most satisfied.  But 
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Mexicans remained mired in poverty, and deep social inequality continues to afflict the 
country.  So substantive democrats should be least s tisfied.  Since the Mexican 
government has a mixed record on rights, liberal democrats’ satisfaction should lie 
somewhere in the middle.  My analysis shows this is the case.  Even controlling for 
evaluations of government economic and political performance and sociodemographic 
conditions, conceptions of democracy influence satisf ction.  Ideas count.   
In Chapter 6, I explore the consequences of dissatisfac on with democracy.  Data 
from the Citizen Disenchantment survey, as well as from the ENCUP, demonstrate that 
dissatisfied citizens engage in institutional political participation (voting and other forms 
of civic engagement) less—and in contentious activity (protest), more—than satisfied 
ones.  Contrary to much of the thinking in the “democratic consolidation” paradigm, 
dissatisfaction does not necessarily lead to politica  instability and, in the final instance, 
democratic breakdown.  Rather, low-quality, semi-democracy appears to be a stable 
equilibrium.  Dissatisfaction reduces the quality of democracy by reducing political 
participation, which is itself an aspect of the quality of democracy and an influence on 
other aspects, including accountability and representation.   
The concluding Chapter 7 validates the Mexican analysis internationally, testing 
hypotheses on the causes and consequences of disenchantment using data from Latin 
America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa.  The dynamic of disenchantment and 
alienation from institutional politics at work in Mexico appears to operate worldwide.  
The medium-term prognosis for democratic progress, therefore, is less than encouraging:  
it is difficult for the many new and low-income democracies that are only “partially free” 
to escape that status.  But it is not impossible.  Citizens can tone down their expectations 
of democracy and refuse to succumb to apathy when faced with inevitable 
disappointments.   For their part, governments can induce citizens to place greater 
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emphasis on the vote and liberal values with well-dsigned civic education programs.  
Improving the specifically political components of democracy—free elections and 
respect for human rights—will go a long way in making up for economic shortcomings.  
But new democracies must eventually address citizens’ socioeconomic demands with 
policies that spread opportunity more equitably.   
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CHAPTER 2   
Citizen Concepts:  A New Theory of Disenchantment with Democracy  
Citizens in Mexico—and, as we shall see, in the vast majority of newly-
democratic countries—are disenchanted with their democracies.  Why is that?  And why 
does it matter?  This chapter examines the causes and consequences of disenchantment, 
both dependent and independent variable here.  My explanation focuses on a cause that 
has received virtually no scholarly attention:  citizen concepts of democracy.  Among the 
possible consequences, I focus on those for political participation, which appear to be 
particularly widespread.  Disenchantment, I show, both reduces conventional 
participation like voting and contacting legislators and increases contentious political 
action like street demonstrations—both worrisome results for the quality of democracy.   
CONTESTING THE MEANING OF “SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY ” 
I begin by describing my measure of disenchantment, a commonly-asked survey 
item that inquires about “satisfaction with democracy.”  More precisely, the item asks, 
“How satisfied are you with democracy in [your country]?”7  Respondents may answer 
“very” (muy), “somewhat” (algo), “not very” (poco), or “not at all” (nada)—and 
sometimes “neither satisfied nor dissatisfied” as a fifth, intermediate category.  
Researchers typically combine the percentages of survey respondents falling into the two 
highest response categories to obtain an overall country satisfaction rating.   
 
                                                
7 Other common variants are, “How satisfied are you with the way democracy is working in [your 
country]?” and “How satisfied are you with the way democracy is developing in [your country]?”  The 
latter formulation is used especially on questionnaires administered in new democracies since they    
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But what does it mean to say that one is “satisfied with democracy”?  Democracy 
comprises many elements, including incumbent politicians, policy outputs, government 
institutions, normative principles, and so on.  Political psychologists have arrayed these 
“attitude objects” along a scale of abstractness (see, e.g., Almond and Verba 1963, Easton 
1965, Klingemann 1999).  At one extreme lie the most immediate, concrete objects:  
people (“incumbents”) and policies (“outputs”).  Atthe other is the most intangible, the 
“political community,” or country.  These poles correspond roughly to the Eastonian 
concepts of “specific” and “diffuse” support (Easton 1965).  Between the extremes sit 
political institutions and democratic principles.  Figure 2.1 is a graphical depiction of the 
concrete-abstract dimension of attitude objects.   
 
Figure 2.1:  Objects of Political Attitudes on Scale of Abstractness.   
 
So when survey interviewees are asked to evaluate “democracy”, which of these 













have in mind when they think about democracy, the political system as a whole or some 
particular part of it?  What are these attitudes about?   
Attempts to answer this question have generated considerable debate among 
students of comparative public opinion. Some have argued that satisfaction with 
democracy refers to incumbent authorities and policy outputs (Dalton 1999, Merkl 
1998)—the two most concrete political objects on the abstractness scale in Figure 2.1.  
Others have interpreted satisfaction as an indicator of “mid-level system support”, 
somewhere between incumbents and democracy as an ide l (Anderson and Guillory 
1997).  The item would thus include assessments of the economic and political 
performance of the democratic regime (over several governments) and of regime 
institutions, placing it on the lower-middle part of the scale between “incumbents” and 
“regime principles”.  Still others argue that the it m is a “summary indicator” of overall 
satisfaction embracing the entire gamut of political objects (Clarke et al. 1993), from the 
most concrete to the most abstract.  At the extreme, some have averred that the 
“satisfaction with democracy” survey item is essentially meaningless.  Canache et al. 
(2001) argue that its polysemy—having different meanings for different people—renders 
it invalid for use in comparative research. 
It is worth a brief detour to evaluate Canache et al.’s claim, for if they are correct 
then most (or all) research on satisfaction with democracy, including mine, is of dubious 
value.  The authors identify three possible referents of “satisfaction with democracy”:  1) 
“support for authorities,” or incumbent officeholders; 2) “system support” of 
governmental institutions such as armed forces, police, courts, central governments, and 
legislatures; and 3) “support for democracy”, measured by the standard “Churchillian” 
question that asks whether respondents prefer democracy to other forms of government, 
despite its imperfections.  Using data from separate Romanian, Salvadorian, and Latin 
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American surveys, the study presents bivariate correlations between satisfaction and each 
of these three referents as well as multivariate regressions of each referent on satisfaction 
and the other two referents (to partial out the effects of correlations between the 
referents).  The values of the correlations and coeffi ient estimates differ across the 
putative referents of satisfaction in Romania, across levels of political knowledge in El 
Salvador, and across countries in the Latin American survey.  For example, the 
relationship between support for authorities and satisfaction with democracy is much 
stronger for Salvadorians with little political knowledge (an estimated regression 
coefficient of 2.01) than for their more knowledgeable counterparts (1.15).  Similarly, 
system support weighs more heavily in Uruguayans’ concept of satisfaction with 
democracy (coefficient of 2.89) than in Venezuelans’ (.99).  These differences, conclude 
Canache et al., imply that the satisfaction item’s “substantive content … is [not] constant 
across observations” (2001: 507).  If the question measures something different for 
different respondents, findings about the causes or consequences of satisfaction with 
democracy are bound to be unreliable.   
This argument is unpersuasive for at least two reasons.  First, the numbers 
Canache et al. present do not generally support their claims.  They note that the
correlations between satisfaction with democracy and its conceptual referents (and the 
regression coefficients of satisfaction on the referents) are, for the most part, statistically 
distinguishable from zero.  But they do not test for differences between parameters, a test 
critical to sustain their claim that satisfaction with democracy means different things to 
different people.  In the vast majority of cases, the estimates do not different significantly 
from one another.  Furthermore, the low correlations between satisfaction and each of its 
three potentially equivalent concepts suggest that noneof the three could be taken as an 
observed indicator of a latent satisfaction with democracy construct.  Rather, each would 
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appear to be a factor that shapes satisfaction—consistent with the view of satisfaction as 
a “summary indicator.” 
Second, and more important, even if the correlations a d regression coefficients 
do differ across the referents of satisfaction with democracy, this does not necessarily 
mean that the concept’s substantive content varies across groups of respondents.  
Satisfaction can be conceived of as a weighted sum of any components (as in Clarke et 
al. 1993).  There is no reason to suppose that these components should contribute equally 
to respondents’ overall satisfaction with democracy.  That is, it is perfectly possible—and 
reasonable—for satisfaction’s constituent components to have regression weights that 
differ from one another.  Furthermore, the relative emphases among these elements may 
be the same for all respondents, or may differ by subgroup.  In either case, satisfaction 
retains the same substantive content:  survey respondents include the same elements in 
their concept of satisfaction, but emphasize some over thers.8    
EXPLAINING DISSATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY  
After examining what satisfaction with democracy is, I turn to the problem of 
what causes it.  Scholarship on individual-level determinants of satisfaction with 
democracy has emphasized either citizens’ retrospective evaluations of political and 
economic conditions, or their socioeconomic circumstances and psychological 
dispositions and resources.9  I argue here that these variables are only part of the story—
                                                
8 For an excellent, more thorough rejoinder to Canache et al., see Anderson (2002).   
 
9 Another set of influences is institutional, where institutions are understood as the rules and organizations 
that structure interaction between political actors.  For example, Guillory and Anderson (1997) find that 
electoral systems affect satisfaction with democracy:  citizens in proportional representation (PR) systems 
are more satisfied than those in majoritarian system  because PR is better at compensating losers of 
elections.  I do not consider institutions’ effects here because my data do not permit it.  My survey covers 
Mexico at a single moment in time, and subnational government structures and electoral systems, requird 
in Mexico to be homologous with those at the federal l vel, do not vary geographically either.     
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that disenchantment also rests in good measure on a disconnect between how citizens 
conceive of democracy and what they expect of it, on the one hand, and what their 
governments are actually delivering, on the other.  In new democracies (and old but low-
income ones), I argue, the prevalence of a “substantive” view of democracy as greater 
socioeconomic equality, combined with most neo-democratic governments’ failure to 
achieve this, significantly dampens enthusiasm for democracy.   
Here, then, are the variables I believe account for individual-level variation in 
satisfaction with democracy, starting with those I am introducing here: 
Conceptions of Democracy 
The continuing debate over the nature of democracy h s produced a bewildering 
array of definitions.  One study counted over 550 varieties of democracy (Diamond 1996: 
21, referring to an earlier version of Collier and Levitsky 1997).  I suggest, however, that 
all these many definitions can be grouped into three broad categories:  electoral (clean 
elections), liberal (respect for political rights and civil liberties).  These different 
definitions may coexist—in a given culture, in the minds of given individuals—but my 
key contention here is that the relative emphases th y receive should affect citizens’ 
expectations of, and therefore their satisfaction with, democracy.   
Let us consider these three sorts of definitions more closely.   
Electoral democracy holds that democracy is a set of rules for choosing political 
representatives in competitive contests.  This view thus rejects notions of direct 
democracy, in which citizens themselves make law, in favor of representative democracy, 
in which citizens choose others to make law.10  Because of its emphasis on the laws and 
institutions that govern competition, this variety of democracy has been referred to 
                                                
10 Dahl argues that the sheer scale of modern societies makes representative democracy inevitable for the 
vast majority of collective decisions (1989).   
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(sometimes disdainfully by advocates of “thick” democracy) as “formal” or “procedural” 
democracy.  Electoral democracy has also been tagged “minimalist”, since it constricts 
democracy’s ambit to political authority, explicitly excluding social and economic 
considerations.   
Perhaps the best-known exponent of this view is Joseph Schumpeter, whose 
famous formulation characterized democracy as an “institutional arrangement for arriving 
at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a 
competitive struggle for the people's vote.”  Schumpeter was quite clear in limiting 
democracy’s scope, further writing that “[d]emocracy means only that the people have 
the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them” (1942: 284-285).  
For his part, Huntington and others have explicitly hewed to this minimalist definition, 
arguing that it is both conceptually and operatively advantageous (Huntington 1991).  It 
is conceptually clearer than other, “thicker” definitions of democracy:  elections are a 
bright-line test that separates democracies from autocracies, avoiding the subjective 
difficulty in measuring more abstract phenomena like rights and freedoms (Huntington 
1991).  Practically, too much democracy might result in a profusion of demands that 
under-institutionalized governments are incapable of handling, threatening the stability of 
fledgling democracies (Huntington 1968).  Certainly, much empirical comparative work 
seeking to explain democratization or democratic consolidation uses elections almost 
exclusively in classifying regimes as democracies or non-democracies (see Przeworski et 
al. 2000, Boix and Stokes 2002, Epstein t al. 2006).   
But, as a number of theorists have recognized, since many autocratic regimes also 
hold elections, democratic elections must fulfill requirements beyond carrying out the 
balloting process (Dahl 1971, 1989).  For electoral competition to be real, countries 
should guarantee minimal freedoms (including those f expression and association) 
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without which elections are merely a hollow shell devoid of democratic content.  Voters 
must choose freely, with no coercion or buying of vtes.  More than one party should 
contend so that voters have a genuine choice.  And the competitors must vie for office 
under minimally equitable conditions, which include th  ability to convey their programs 
and proposals to potential supporters unfettered by censorship.  Schmitter and Karl 
dubbed the idea that elections alone make for a democracy the “fallacy of electoralism” 
(1991: 78).  Even competitive elections may be insufficient for democracy if some social 
sectors are denied the right to voice their interests or if important decision-making 
powers are kept out of the hands of elected officials and maintained in “reserved 
domains” of unaccountable authorities, such as the military or technocratic elites (see 
Linz and Stepan 1996).   
This conceptual “precising”, or “expanded procedural” definition of democracy, 
leads us beyond the frontiers of electoral democracy nd into the terrain of liberal 
democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Diamond 1999).  The essence of liberal 
democracy is, as inheres in the name itself, liberty—that is, freedom of thought and 
action, especially vis-à-vis government intrusion.  Liberty, in turn, implies other 
principles valued and practiced by governments and publics alike, including tolerance of 
dissent, pluralism (the existence of many social actors autonomous from the state), and 
active participation of the citizenry in politics.  Upholding liberties requires constraints 
on governmental power (both “vertically” between the ruled to rulers and “horizontally” 
between governmental institutions).  Unchecked, governments propend toward curtailing 
freedom.  Finally, effective political participation in public decisions requires the free 
circulation of ideas and information about governmet activities.   
The list of liberal democracy’s attributes becomes quite extensive.  Diamond, for 
instance, enumerates nine indispensable traits for liberal democracies:  1) elected officials 
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have real power to effect policy changes; 2) governme tal institutions restrain executive 
power and are “horizontally accountable” to one another; 3) parties alternate in power 
over time and all have the right to form and participate in elections; 4) cultural, ethnic, 
and religious minorities are free to express their interests; 5) citizens have means besides 
elections for influencing decision-making, including civic associations and interest 
groups; 6) there are independent sources of information; 7) individuals have extensive 
freedoms, including speech, belief, assembly, and petition; 8) an independent judiciary 
enforces political equality under the law; and 9) the rule of law guarantees freedom from 
arbitrary government attempts to inhibit liberty (1996: 22-23).   
Theoreticians in the Anglo-American tradition of Locke and Adam Smith would 
add property rights to this list, perhaps implicit in the ninth attribute above.  That is, 
citizens have the right to enjoy the fruits of labors, be secure in their material possessions, 
and acquire and alienate property as they wish.  Thoug  income and wealth may be 
subject to reasonable levels of taxation—and commercial activity, to regulation—state 
intervention is inimical to property rights in this view.   
Obviously, this collection of rights goes well beyond holding periodic elections.  
Some scholars have noted broad “convergence”, especially among U.S. academics, on 
limiting democracy to a system of political authority and leaving social and economic 
features outside of the definition (see Diamond 1996: 20).  But some elements of liberal 
democracy clearly entail social practices not necessarily related to elections or attempts to 
sway political authority.  For example, the free exercise of religious beliefs may demand 
translation of faith-oriented values into public policy, but is not primarily a political act.  
Likewise, effecting business transactions is an economic act that may have political 
consequences, but whose main purpose is not political.  Notwithstanding academic 
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agreement to exclude the social from democracy, clarifi tion of even the electoral 
definition of democracy remits us to broader social oncerns.   
Furthermore, the current scholarly consensus on democracy as political rather 
than social or economic can perhaps be viewed as an oscillation of a definitional 
pendulum that swings back and forth between minimalist and thick definitions of 
democracy—and may be swinging back toward thick definitions after two decades or so 
at the opposite end of the spectrum.  In the 1960’s and 1970’s, for example, the New 
Left’s touchstone was “participatory” democracy, the idea that citizens should participate 
directly not just at election time, and not just in political decisions, but also in the 
universities, the workplace, the family, and so on. Today, international development 
organizations are emphasizing the need for economic i provement to accompany 
political democratization.  As I demonstrate in Chapter 4, the Mexican public patently 
does not share the academic consensus that would limit democracy strictly to the sphere 
of political authority, but believes that democracy has economic ramifications.     
Substantive democracy has at least two meanings:  political participation beyond 
elections and greater socioeconomic equality.  Thoug  I use the second definition in this 
work it is worth commenting on the first as well, and on the relationship between the two.  
Participatory democracy views voting as a highly reduced form of political participation 
and insists on the need for mechanisms to influence policy between elections.  In this 
view, a well-developed civil society—that is, a dens  network of civic associations and 
high levels of social engagement—are necessary to make democracy effective (Barber 
1984).  A number of studies have emphasized the influe ce of public opinion and interest 
group activity on decision-making as indicators of substantive democracy.11  The ability 
                                                
11 See Jacobs and Shapiro (1994) for an excellent review of the evidence that what the public thinks does 
indeed matter to policy makers in the United States.   
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of citizens to assert their interests between elections, and policy-makers’ responsiveness 
to these expressions of preferences, are crucial components of substantive democracy.  
Furthermore, substantive democrats (in the first sense) also favor measures of direct 
democracy, such as plebiscites, revocation of legislative mandates, citizen initiatives, and 
so on.   
The second thread of substantive democracy, “social democracy”, rests on the 
foundation of what T. H. Marshall (1950) called “social citizenship”, the right of all 
citizens to share in the benefits of society.  Participating in society requires a minimal 
material platform of economic security and well-being.  For example, to get a good job, 
one needs an education.  To get an education, one needs a way to get to school, clothes to 
wear in the classroom and on the playground, food to sustain physical and mental 
activity, etc.  Thus, substantive democracy expands the panoply of rights to include 
education, health, work, and so on, creating a corresponding general obligation of the 
state (or, more precisely, the welfare state) to provide these goods to citizens who are 
unable to do so for themselves.  Where material conditi s truncate citizenship for some 
citizens, “[S]ocial democracy concerns itself with [rectifying] asymmetries produced by 
exploitative social relationships”, in the words of Mexican political philosopher Carlos 
Pereyra (1990: 97). 
Many thinkers, including Guillermo O’Donnell, have explicitly embraced an 
expanded version of democracy based on “social citizenship” as necessary for Latin 
America (PNUD 2004: 27-31).  They reject the notion that elections are sufficient for 
democracy since “imbalances in resources and political power frequently undermine the 
‘one-person, one-vote’ principle, and the purpose of democratic institutions” (PNUD 
2002: 4).   
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These two versions of substantive democracy are complementary, in some views.  
More popular participation would, in theory, lead to greater socioeconomic equality.12  
Public pressure could induce redistributionist economic policy, government intervention 
on behalf of society’s less privileged, and more government investment in goods like 
health and education.  And if citizens’ ability to influence policy is proportional to the 
material resources they possess, a more equitable distribution of goods among citizens 
also spreads possibilities for effective political participation more evenly.  As Pereyra 
puts it:   
   In capitalist societies, democracy cannot achieve full popular sovereignty 
because an ineradicable socioeconomic inequality of producers underlies the 
supposed legal-political equality of citizens, which definitively hinders strict 
equality among citizens.  (1990: 32)   
In this view, participatory and social democracy are mutually reinforcing—as is their 
absence.   
However, opponents of substantive democracy aver that the combination of direct 
and social democracy can result in illiberal governme t.  According to this critique, 
populist leaders—exemplified by Paz Estenssoro in Bolivia, Velasco in Peru, Chávez in 
Venezuela, and others—attempt to bypass representative institutions seen as captive of 
special interests.  Such leaders ground their support in direct appeals to the “people”.  
The resulting plebiscitary government delegates virtually unchecked power to the 
executive, who often abuses this power by truncating the rights of political opponents.   
                                                
12 This may not always be the case, however.  For example, Latin American publics initially awarded solid 
electoral support to politicians who espoused “neolib ral” economic reform that exacerbated social 
inequality (see, e.g., Weyland 1998).   
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Is Socioeconomic Equality Part of Democracy?   
Of course, adherents to the electoral and liberal views of democracy might object 
that while greater socioeconomic equality may be desirable, it is not an indispensable 
element of democracy per se.  Democracy, they might reason, is compatible with many 
different forms of economic organization and degrees of state intervention in the 
economy.  It does not guarantee any social outcome.  To insist on social democracy as the 
true definition of democracy is, according to this line of argumentation, to impose 
unreasonably stringent requisites on democracy.   
This objection is misplaced for at least two reasons.  First and most important, my 
objective here is not to argue for any definition of democracy as correct.  Rather, I am 
concerned with how Mexicans and citizens of other countries themselves conceptualize 
democracy, and how these conceptualizations affect their satisfaction with democracy 
and political participation.  For many scholars, especially in the Anglo-American 
tradition, substantive democracy may not be a legitimate definition of democracy.  But it 
is a common—and consequential—conceptualization of democracy in Mexico and other 
new democracies (and in older social democracies, for that matter).   
Second, there are theoretical and empirical reasons f r expecting citizen 
conceptualizations of democracy to encompass greater social equality.  Spatial theories of 
politics and the median voter theorem teach us that the candidate with policy preferences 
closest to those of the average citizen will win elections most frequently (see Downs 
1957; Enelow and Hinich 1984).  In every society, most people earn less than the 
“average” income, since mean income is invariably above median income.  Thus, the 
“median” voter has an incentive to vote for politicians who support income redistribution.  
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In fact, democratic countries engage in more social spending than authoritarian regimes 
(Brown and Hunter 1999).13   
COMPLEMENTARITY OR CONTRADICTION ?  A MODEL OF CITIZEN CONCEPTS OF 
DEMOCRACY  
Are these three concepts of democracy mutually exclusive?  Some of their key 
elements clash.  For instance, historical liberalism opposed universal suffrage because of 
concerns (unwarranted, as it turned out) that newly enfranchised citizens would vote in 
representatives who threatened private property (see P reyra 1990: 84).  Przeworksi 
(1992a) notes that Marx favored universal suffrage, and Ricardo opposed it, for precisely 
this reason.  Liberalism’s emphasis on property rights also enters into tension with 
substantive democracy’s redistributive tendencies and emphasis on social equality (see, 
e.g., Thomassen 1995: 388).   
Electoral and substantive democracy conflict over the extent of political 
participation feasible (or desirable) in a democracy.  Electoralism would limit 
participation to the periodic contests for power among political parties, whereas 
substantive democrats demand the right to make their voices heard in between 
elections.14   
Liberal and electoral democracy diverge over minority rights and the permissible 
scope of the majority’s power.  For liberals, certain rights are immanent to human 
existence and, thus, beyond the legislative reach of a majority.  They are “inalienable”, in 
                                                
13 For the contrary argument  that regime type’s impact on economic policy is vastly overstated, see 
Remmer (1990).   
14 In Mexico, the discord between these two views of democracy played out in the taco stand and barroom 
discussions over the myriad “citizen consultations” carried out by PRD governments in Mexico City on 
whether, for example, the government should construct double-decker freeways.  Some felt that the non-
binding consultations gave citizens a chance for at least some direct input into policy.  Others, annoyed, 
would argue, “That’s what we elect representatives for—to make decisions!” 
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one famous formulation, and cannot be taken away legislators.  For electoral democrats, 
the cardinal principle is majority rule.  Electoral democrats are fearful of potential 
authoritarianism latent in putting some policy domains beyond the people’s elected 
representatives.  They adduce the self-correcting capa ity of majoritarian democracy to 
counter liberals’ fears of the majority running roughshod over minority rights.   
And constellations of ideas typically associated with one another shift over time.  
In the 19th Century, defense of property rights and anti-clerialism were both pillars of 
the liberal pantheon of ideas.  In the 20th Century, however, Christian Democratic parties 
(including the PAN in Mexico) are laissez-faire and confessional.  Liberalism’s erstwhile 
Jacobinism, it appears, got religion.   
Yet these concepts can also coexist.  Few, even of those who advocate more direct 
democracy, would propose scuttling representative institutions.  Virtually all definitions 
of democracy include free and fair election of political leadership.  Similarly, substantive 
democrats’ insistence on greater socioeconomic equality does not exclude freedoms like 
those of speech and association, indeed may even depen  on them.  Nor should greater 
socioeconomic equality obviate the procedural mainst ys of democracy.  Pereyra chides 
his fellow leftists for their disdain of formal democracy:  “Democracy is always political 
… always formal … always representative … always pluralist” (1990: 85-86, original 
emphasis).   
The core elements of all three views may figure, to some degree or another, in 
each individual citizen’s idea of democracy.  Concepts of democracy are a question of 
emphasis.  Some aspects of democracy are more salient than others in each individual’s 
image of democracy, and this mix varies from person to person.  Which concepts stand 
out to which people is important because, as I demonstrate in Chapter 5, how one views 
democracy is critical for how one evaluates it.   
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Thus adherence to any one conception a matter of degree, not inconsistent with 
adhering to the others in some degree as well.  Indeed, as I show below, adherence to 
each conception is independent of adherence to the thers.  An individual can be, to a 
high degree, an electoral democrat, a liberal democrat, and a substantive democrat—or 
any one or two of them, or none at all.  These three conceptions of democracy occupy a 
three-dimensional “conceptual space” in which each conception may be represented by 
an axis and each individual’s mix of conceptions, by a point in the conceptual space.15   
CITIZEN CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY AS A CAUSE OF DISENCHANTMENT  
The causal relationship between conceptions of democracy and satisfaction with it 
is both under-theorized and under-explored empirically.  Only a handful of prior analyses 
hint at this relationship.  Conceptions of democracy nd satisfaction have been examined 
independently, but not in combination.  Exploring definitions of democracy in three Latin 
American countries, Camp (2001) has established that Mexicans tend to view democracy 
in socioeconomic terms but does not relate this view to Mexicans’ evaluations of 
democratic performance.  On the other hand, explanations of why citizens have soured on 
democratic politics virtually ignore the role that definitions of democracy play.  Scholars 
have focused on explanations that fall into the categories of “retrospective evaluations” 
and “personal resources”, including regime performance and institutional trust (Seligson, 
Booth, and Gómez 2006), local government performance under decentralization (Hiskey 
and Seligson 2003), education and electoral competitiveness (Moreno 2003), and 
attitudinal holdovers from authoritarianism (Klesner 2001), among other causes.   
Here, I tie together two threads of scholarship—conceptions of democracy and 
satisfaction with it—and assert that conceptions are n important, largely overlooked, 
                                                
15 Figure 4.5 (in Chapter 4) presents a three-dimensional scatterplot of conceptions of democracy based on 
data from the Citizen Disenchantment survey.   
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ingredient in explaining disenchantment in Mexico and elsewhere.  I construct an account 
of how the three broad conceptions of democracy—electoral, liberal, and substantive—
affect satisfaction with democracy.  This account involves both a general argument and a 
specific realization of it in the Mexican case.  The general argument states that 
conceptions of democracy will influence satisfaction in all countries.  The specific 
realization of the argument in Mexico—and in all countries—says the precise way in 
which conceptions of democracy influence satisfaction differs according to the historical 
peculiarities and present socioeconomic circumstances of each country.   
Each conception of democracy entails expectations about what life in a 
democratic society should be like, and satisfaction with democracy is greater when these 
expectations are met.  On the other hand, when people perceive a gap between what they 
expect and what they are actually getting, they may conclude that democracy is not 
working in their country—and, in the extreme, that democracy may not be a suitable form 
of government for their society.   
This is true in both developed and developing democracies.  In their study of 
public conceptions of democracy in Canada, Kornberg and Clarke argue that congruence 
between “beliefs about democracy” and “the realities of political life in their country” 
result in favorable evaluations of democracy’s functioning (1994: 538).  Identifying four 
broad dimensions along which Canadians array their beliefs about democracy, the authors 
find that those who viewed democracy as equality betwe n social groups were most 
satisfied, given Canada’s multi-cultural character.  On the other hand, Canadians hewing 
to a minimalist definition of democracy as elections coupled with capitalism were least 
satisfied, given the country’s redistributive bent.   
Of more relevance to the Mexican case, perhaps, are views of democracy in 
emerging democratic polities.  Russians and Ukrainians who conceived of democracy as 
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a set of freedoms had better-than-average evaluations of regime performance (Miller, 
Hesli, and Reisinger 1997).  In contrast, citizens who emphasized the rule of law had 
worse-than-average evaluations of the current regims, as did those who expected that 
democracy would increase economic prosperity.  Miller et al. explain the relationship 
between views of democracy and backing of democratization as a function of the 
perceived “fit” between citizen ideals and governmet xecution of those ideals:  “[I]f 
[citizens] believe that the present regime is not fulfilling their expectations of [their] ideal 
of democracy, then they will be less supportive of current attempts at democratization” 
(1997: 185) 
These cases illustrate the general proposition thathow citizens conceive of 
democracy drives how they evaluate its performance.  There are many types of 
democracies, and the idea of democracy comprises many elements.  When individual 
citizens think about democracy, they typically emphasize one of these constituent 
elements at the expense of others, creating specific expectations about what democratic 
governments should do, and what political and economic life should be like under 
democracy.  They then judge the performance of their particular democratic regime by 
how well it lives up to these expectations.   
Other Influences  
The rest of the story, though more familiar, cannot be left out.  Established 
explanations might be classified under the rubrics of “retrospective evaluations” and 
“personal resources”.  The first perspective attribu es satisfaction primarily to the public’s 
assessments of incumbents, policy outputs, and government political and economic 
performance.  For scholars who hold that retrospectiv  evaluations mostly determine 
satisfaction with democracy, satisfaction results from an essentially rational process in 
which citizens size up the economy and polity, and determine how to ascribe blame—or 
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credit—for the present state of affairs.  “Personal resources” encompass material 
conditions (e.g., income and education) and personal ch racteristics (e.g., cognitive 
abilities and party identification) that shape one’s attitudes toward the political system.  
According to this second point of view group attachments like social class, as well as 
psychological predispositions toward the political system and those who embody it, are 
the main determinants of satisfaction with democracy.   
Retrospective Evaluations 
A robust line of research establishes that citizen evaluations of past regime 
economic and political performance, as well as evaluations of politicians and the policies 
they make, condition satisfaction with democracy (see, e.g., Norris 1999).  Performance 
comprises many dimensions, including economic policy, political development, provision 
of services, and approval of incumbents politicians.  Positive judgments in each of these 
areas carry over to democracy considered in the abstract, whereas negative evaluations 
may cause citizens to question democracy as a form of government.   
Economic Performance 
Citizens’ judgments about specific aspects of government performance affect 
satisfaction with democracy.  Scholars have repeatedly focused attention on economic 
performance, which shapes citizens’ views of democratic governments in both 
established and emerging democracies.  In the United S ates a long tradition of research 
links perceptions of economic performance to presidential approval ratings.  Positive 
evaluations of the economy have increased satisfaction with democracy in Canada 
(Clarke and Kornberg 1992, Kornberg and Clark 1994) and Western Europe (Anderson 
and Guillory 1997).   
 32 
Evaluations of government depend even more on economic performance in new 
democracies.  Since wealthy countries mostly democratized before the third wave, new 
democracies are poorer.  And since economic crisis often precipitates democratic 
transition, new democracies typically face economic pressure from the beginning.  Thus,  
Mishler and Rose observe that “[e]conomic considerations are likely to be especially 
relevant in post-Communist societies because economic problems are profound” (1997: 
436).  Trust in political institutions depends greatly upon current and prospective 
macroeconomic evaluations and, to a lesser extent, upon perceptions of one’s own family 
finances.  In Spain, high hopes that democratic governments will deliver economic 
benefits and social justice “carry an evident potential for disillusion and conflict” 
(McDonough et al. 1986: 454-55).  Perceptions of general economic performance and the 
government’s handling of the economy were the most important determinants of support 
for Felipe González’s Socialist government (1986: 45).  The relationship between 
economic performance and political support has also been widely noted in Latin America 
(see the studies cited supra, in Chapter 1 of this volume).    
Political Performance:  Respect for Rights 
Of course, citizens in new democracies expect things other than economic 
improvement from their governments.  They also insist that governments uphold hard-
won rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, and belief, and deal with citizens 
equitably, enforcing the rule of law regardless of social position and political 
connections.  In other words, denizens of emerging democracies make specifically 
political demands on government.   
In post-Communist Europe, political performance is about as important as 
economic performance in generating trust in political nstitutions.  Citizens who believe 
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that their governments had bettered their Communist a tecessors in “providing individual 
freedom” and “treat[ing] everyone more fairly” had much more confidence in political 
institutions than those who had experienced no difference (Mishler and Rose 1994: 441).   
Political Performance:  Elections 
Another important aspect of political performance, specially in new 
democracies, is the government’s ability to hold free and fair elections.  Several scholars 
have found that citizens’ evaluations of electoral processes are highly correlated with 
their satisfaction with democracy.  Assessing evidence from over 30 countries included in 
the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) survey, Henderson found high 
bivariate measures of association between “satisfacon with democracy” and the 
“conduct of the previous election” (2004: 5).  Similarly, Kornberg and Clarke found that 
“electoral process evaluations” were significant determinants of satisfaction with 
democracy.  Their effect was roughly of the same magnitude as that of “government 
performance evaluations”, and larger than that of income and age.   
Given the importance of overcoming a weighty history f election fraud in 
Mexico, I expect that evaluations of electoral processes will figure prominently in 
assessments of Mexican democracy.  This expectation is concordant with previous 
research on turnout in Mexico.  Moreno found that voters who believe that elections are 
rigged and harbor suspicions about electoral authorities’ impartiality are, understandably, 
less likely to vote (Moreno 2003: 320).  In their analysis of the 2000 presidential election, 
Buendía and Somuano found it troubling “that political attitudes developed in the ancien 
régime continue to have such a large impact on participation rates” (2003: 318).   
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Government Services 
Citizens also expect their government to provide basic services and infrastructure, 
including roads, schools, and electricity, among many others.  These demands are not 
specifically democratic, but citizens in a democracy re in theory better positioned than 
subjects of authoritarian rule to influence the provision and distribution of these services.  
Thus, citizen evaluations of these services may constitute a de facto indicator of how 
responsive politicians and governments are to citizen demands—in other words, of how 
well democracy is working.   
Approval of Incumbents 
As Figure 2.1’s typology of attitude objects demonstrates, citizens may have 
different things in mind when they think about democracy.  They may be thinking about 
things as abstract as rules and institutions, or as concrete as current officeholders.  In the 
established democracies, satisfaction with democracy is related to assessments of 
incumbent politicians.  Studying public opinion in four old democracies, for example, 
Dalton notes “clear evidence of a general erosion in support for politicians in most 
advanced industrial democracies,” finding that this mistrust had broadened to include 
political regimes and institutions (1999: 63, 74).   
If approval of incumbents shapes satisfaction with democracy in the industrial 
democracies, this should be true a fortiori of new democracies.  There, institutional roles 
such as the presidency or legislature may be virtually indistinguishable from the 
“incumbents of those roles”, in Almond and Verba’s l nguage (1963).  This is especially 
so in Mexico, where the experience of electoral democracy has been virtually 
synonymous with Vicente Fox.   
 35 
Personal Resources 
 A second theoretical current holds that individuals’ material circumstances, 
cognitive abilities, and psychological dispositions—what might be termed collectively 
“personal resources”—affect satisfaction with democracy.  Studies on voting and 
participation in the U.S. and abroad emphasize “citizen competency” (the ability to make 
informed, reasoned political choices) and “personal efficacy” (the belief that one can 
effectively influence political decisions) as important determinants of other political 
attitudes and behavior.16  More politically efficacious citizens may be more satisfied with 
democracy.  Furthermore, emotional identification with the political system and its 
components—particularly political parties—also bolster satisfaction with democracy.   
Income 
Income is a material resource that shapes one’s ability to influence public 
decisions.  It also helps shape a sense of connectio  to (or alienation from) the political 
system.  Furthermore, higher income may be more satisfied with life in general.  They 
may conclude that democracy is working well for them, and so should exhibit greater 
political satisfaction.  Beyond the spillover effects of life satisfaction to politics, money 
increases the specifically political resources thatcitizens have at their disposal.  It gives 
them (potentially) greater access to government institutions and more information about 
government activities.  In short, higher income should result in greater satisfaction with 
democracy.   
Education 
Similarly, greater education should also result in favorable evaluations of 
democracy (Moreno 2001:  35-36).  At the system level, higher education levels give rise 
                                                
16 The classic studies are Campbell et al.’s The American Voter (1960) and Almond and Verba’s The Civic 
Culture (1963).  See also Converse (1964).   
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to a middle class that ameliorates redistributive battles, favoring the growth of democracy 
(Lipset 1959). At the individual level, education gives citizens the cognitive skills—
“internal political efficacy” or “citizen competency” (Almond and Verba 1963)—that 
enable them to participate meaningfully in politics.  In their study of societies as diverse 
as the United States, Costa Rica, and Turkey, Muller et al. discovered that education 
contributed most to “enhancing commitment to democrati  institutions and procedures” 
(1987: 23).  Education plays an important role in socializing democratic norms such as 
tolerance for diverse points of view and increased d mand for individual freedom.   
Age 
As a proxy for experience and wisdom, age is another resource that might 
influence satisfaction with democracy.  In Mexico (and other new democracies), older 
survey respondents may be more satisfied with democracy, since they have direct 
memories of authoritarianism.  Older respondents are also likelier to have more stable 
incomes and social positions.  On the other hand, youth are notorious detractors from 
politics in general.  Also, their other preoccupations (completing their studies, finding 
work, seeking a mate, and so on) may preclude them fro  high levels interest in 
politics—a variable potentially associated with political satisfaction.   
Gender 
Gender is a personal resource in at least two sense.  First, it conditions access to 
political networks.  Despite relative gains by women in parliamentary representation and 
cabinet appointments over the past decade or so, politics in Mexico continues to be 
mostly a boy’s game.  Second, gender shapes how men and women think about politics.  
Adherence to traditional gender roles Mexico means the public sphere is thought of as the 
province of men, whereas the domestic ambit is “feminized”.  Even where women are 
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active in leading social movements and civic organiz tions, they may not see this 
participation as especially “political”.   
Partisanship 
Membership in a political party, or affective affinity with one, contributes to 
satisfaction with democracy.  Democratic elections produce winners and losers, and 
“people who voted for a governing party … are almost by definition more likely to 
believe that the government is interested in and responsive to their needs” (Anderson and 
Guillory 1997: 68).  The party becomes a synecdoche for democracy, and judgments 
about a specific component of the political system generalize to the whole system.   
THE CONSEQUENCES OF DISENCHANTMENT :  POLITICAL PARTICIPATION  
Why should slipping satisfaction with democracy concer  us?  After all, 
democracies routinely feature citizens who criticize politicians, parties, and policies but 
who nonetheless support democratic ideals deeply.  Fears in the late 1960’s and early 
1970’s that enduring political dissatisfaction would erode support for democratic ideals—
possibly paving the way for recrudescent authoritarianism—proved greatly exaggerated.    
But political dissatisfaction in new democracies may h ve fundamentally different 
causes and meanings than it does in old ones (Anderson 2001, Torcal 2003).  
Dissatisfaction’s consequences may be more pernicious in new democracies, given their 
frailer institutions and less-deeply rooted democrati  values.  The most obvious and 
dramatic consequence is an elevated probability of democratic breakdown—that is, of a 
return to frankly authoritarian government after a democratic spell.  This was the main 
concern of early exponents of “consolidation theory” (see, e.g., Huntington 1991, 
O’Donnell et al. 1986, and Whitehead 1989).  Some of the third wave democracies 
(Russia, Belarus, Pakistan, Thailand, Kenya, and others) have broken down, but most 
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remain at least minimally democratic.  Declining satisf ction with democracy may have 
played a role in some cases of democratic collapse, but it also may have reflected (rather 
than caused) a progressive lapse back into authoritarianism.   
Disenchantment’s potential contribution to democrati  breakdown is its most 
drastic effect, but not its most widespread.  Here, I xamine other consequences, also 
important, more widespread, and more readily examined:  the effects of dissatisfaction on 
political behavior—specifically, on voting, individual non-voting participation, and 
protest.  As Chapter 6 argues, dissatisfaction’s impact on participation differs according 
to the type of participation involved.  I hypothesize (and find) that dissatisfaction reduces 
institutional political action and increases contentious behavior.  Disenchanted citizens 
perceive their governments as unresponsive, and the ballot (as well as other institutional 
mechanisms of representation) as futile.  Discouraged, they vote and participate 
otherwise less often.  A handful, however, resort t contentious action to goad the 
government into responding.   
Dissatisfaction, then, most often results in lower quality of democracy, not its 
demise.  The sub-discipline of “transitology” generally foresaw two potential, opposite 
outcomes of democratic transition:  breakdown or consolidation into an enduring, liberal 
democracy.  But Mexico and many other new democracies have steered a middle course, 
congealing into low-quality “illiberal”, “partial”, or “semi-democracies”.  They continue 
to hold multi-party elections (often plagued by irregularities), while continuing to violate 
human rights and suppress liberties.  Contrary to the democratic consolidation paradigm, 
then, illiberal democracy is a stable equilibrium somewhere in between breakdown and 
full consolidation—an equilibrium that less instituonal citizen participation and greater 
conflict help perpetuate.   
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Figure 2.2 is a diagram that represents of this theory of dissatisfaction with 
democracy.  Recapitulating, the liberal, electoral, nd substantive conceptions of 
democracy (represented in the upper left-hand box) influence satisfaction with 
democracy.  They complement existing explanations based on retrospective evaluations 
of government performance (handling of the economy, respect for rights, provision of 
services, incumbent approval), personal resources (income, education, age, gender, party 
identification), and institutions (such as the electoral system)—represented in the three 
boxes below conceptions of democracy.   
How satisfied one is with democracy, in turn, influences the type and extent of 
political participation in which citizens engage.  I distinguish between two broad classes 
of political participation, which Chapter 6 spells out in greater detail:  institutional 
(voting and other forms of conventional participation, represented in the rightmost top 
box) and contentious (various forms of protest, represented in the rightmost bottom box).  
Dissatisfaction will decrease institutional participation, and increase contention.   
The diagram shows only the direct effects of conceptions of democracy (and other 
independent variables) on satisfaction with democracy, nd of satisfaction on political 
participation—seemingly implying that conceptions of democracy affect participation 
only indirectly.  That is, conceptions of democracy influence satisfaction, which, in turn, 
influences participation.  Nonetheless, conceptions f democracy (and other independent 
variables) may influence political behavior directly.  Thus readers should imagine a series 
of arrows, omitted here for the sake of clarity, from each of the four boxes representing 
causes of satisfaction to each of the two boxes repres nting types of political 
participation.  
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In the statistical model of satisfaction developed in Chapter 5, the independent 
variables combine linearly and additively to predict satisfaction.17  Of course, 
conceptions of democracy could shape satisfaction interactively with evaluations of 
government performance.  The impact of these evaluations on satisfaction would differ 
for different types of democrats:  economic performance would matter more for 
substantive democrats; respect for rights, for liberal democrats; and elections, for 
electoral democrats.  As I explain in Chapter 5, the evidence reveals no such interactive 








Figure 2.2:  Diagram of Theory on Causes and Consequences of Satisfaction with 
Democracy.   
 
 
In short, my theory of dissatisfaction with democracy posits that citizen 
conceptions of democracy are an important but virtually unexplored factor shaping 
assessments of democracy.  The theory also stresses the concrete behavioral ramifications 
                                                
17 Since Chapter 6 operationalizes different forms of political participation as categorical variables, the














of dissatisfaction with democracy, often overshadowed by weighty concerns of 
democratic collapse.  In the next chapter, I document the extent of disenchantment in 
Mexico and new democracies around the world.  Chapters 4, 5, and 6 flesh out the 
specific realization of Chapter 2’s general theory in the Mexican case and test my theory 
against the evidence.  The concluding chapter returns to the wider world.   
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CHAPTER 3 
Disenchantment with Democracy in Mexico and Other New 
Democracies 
Citizens in Mexico—and, as we shall see, in the vast majority of newly-
democratic countries—are disenchanted with their democracies.  But just how 
disillusioned are they?  In the previous chapter, I essayed an explanation for 
disenchantment:  unmet socioeconomic expectations of democracy.  This chapter puts 
numbers on levels of disenchantment in Mexico and around the world.  First, I explore 
trends in satisfaction with Mexican democracy over th  past decade, placing them in the 
context of salient political events.  Satisfaction has declined significantly in Mexico from 
1997 to the present, though with fluctuations contingent upon the general political 
environment at the time of the survey.    
Of course, Mexicans are not alone in their increasingly pessimistic judgments 
about democracy.  I present descriptive data on satisfaction with democracy in some 72 
new and/or low-income democracies (most are both) in Latin America, Eastern Europe, 
Asia, Africa, and Western Europe.  The data show satisfaction to be low or falling in the 
great majority of these.  This chapter’s main goal is to quantify, rather than explain, 
disenchantment in these 72 countries.  I do, however, outline some possible country-level 
causes that influence aggregate disenchantment, includ g post-election violence, 
economic crisis, and domestic and international strife.    
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN MEXICO  
Satisfaction with democracy in Mexico has declined since its apogee in 1997.  
Figure 3.1 presents data taken from three cross-sectional series carried out between 1997 
and 2008.  The Mexico City daily El Universal, one of two with in-house survey analysis 
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units (the other is Reforma), conducted six national evaluations of democracy from 
November, 2002, to May, 2006.  The Mexican Interior Ministry (Gobernación) 
sponsored three editions of the National Survey on Political Culture (ENCUP, in 
Spanish), carried out in 2001, 2003, and 2005.  Finally, the Latinobarometer organization, 
with headquarters in Santiago, Chile, has carried out (almost) yearly regional surveys in 
Latin America since 1995.   
 
Figure 3.1:  Satisfaction with Democracy in Mexico, 1997-2008.   
The data reveal several interesting patterns.  First, satisfaction with democracy in 
Mexico has been consistently low over the last deca.  In none of the three series are 
more than half of Mexicans satisfied with their democracy.  The highest rate of 
satisfaction in any survey, 45%, occurs in 1997, at the very beginning of the period under 
observation.  On only three occasions after (of 19 remaining data points) does satisfaction 



































the times the question was asked (12 of 20 measurements occasions), less than a third of 
Mexicans professed satisfaction with their democracy.  The Latinobarometer series 
registers an average satisfaction rate of 28%, much closer to its low point of 17% than to 
the maximum of 45%.  Similarly, satisfaction in the ENCUP surveys averages 32% 
(nearer the minimum of 26% than the maximum of 41%) and the El Universal polls put 
mean satisfaction at 35%.   
Moreover, satisfaction has, on the whole, fallen over the last decade.  The longest 
series available, Latinobarometer, shows that satisfac on in Mexico dropped from a high 
point of 45% in 1997, when the PRI lost its congressional majority for the first time ever, 
to around 17% in 2003 to 2005.  It rose significantly in the run-up to the 2006 general 
election, only to fall sharply afterwards.  More generally, in all series the high point 
antecedes the low point.  Intervals in which satisfction declined outnumber those in 
which it rose by nine to seven.  Quantifying, satisf ction plummeted by an average of 
3.2% per year over the three ENCUP surveys (an average decrease of 7.5% between 
measurement occasions) for a total decrease of 15% between 2001 and 2005.  In the same 
vein, satisfaction fell yearly by 1.6%, on average, in the El Universal series, summing 
-5.5% over all six polls, and by half a percent annually in the Latinobarometer series, 
yielding a net drop of 6%.   
Finally, within the general panorama of low, falling satisfaction the level of 
satisfaction with democracy fluctuates considerably.  The satisfaction rate appears highly 
sensitive to the general political context at the time the surveys were taken.  It follows 
electoral cycles closely, spiking during the mid-term election year of 1997 (45%) and the 
presidential election years of 2000 (36%) and 2006 (41%).18   The Desencanto 
                                                
18 The 2003 mid-term election is the exception, when not even the congressional races could lift Mexicans’ 
evaluations of their democracy out of the doldrums. 
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Ciudadano survey seconds the 41% satisfaction rating registered by Latinobarometer in 
2006, with 39% of citizens calling themselves “very” or “somewhat” satisfied.  These 
peaks, however, are ephemeral, and after each election satisfaction settles back in to its 
normal, low level.  The sharp 2006 recovery was also temporary.  The excitement 
generated by the heated presidential race focused att ntion on what had been one of the 
uncontestable achievements of Mexican democracy:  free and fair elections.  Both the 
PAN and PRD believed their candidate had a reasonable shot at the presidency up until 
election day and beyond, as uncertainty about the winner persisted in the weeks following 
polling.  Yet Mexicans’ enthusiasm subsided rapidly, with half of Mexicans believing the 
election was plagued by irregularities19 and the vast majority calling the country 
“undemocratic”.20  The Latinobarometer surveys since 2006 have ratified Mexicans’ 
renewed malaise.  In 2007, satisfaction came in at just 31%, a decline of ten percentage 
points from the previous year, and in 2008, satisfaction declined even further to 23%.   
If the high points tracked election years, the low points seemed to coincide with 
scandal and conflict.  The 2003-2005 trough in satisf ction was marked by the failure of 
significant Fox administration policy initiatives (most notably on tax and energy reform); 
the videoescándalos revealing kickback schemes in public contracts administered during 
Rosario Robles’s left-leaning Party of the Democrati  Revolution (PRD) government in 
Mexico City; and the Fox government’s attempt to prsecute PRD presidential candidate 
Andrés Manuel López Obrador criminally and prevent him from running for president in 
                                                
19 El Universal, “Comicios dañaron la imagen del IFE, revelan”, November 10, 2006, and Parametría poll, 
September, 2006, http://www.parametria.com.mx/carta-parametrica.phtml?id=4040&text1=septiembre 
[accessed April 23, 2009].   
20 GEA-ISA poll “Escenarios políticos, 2004-2006:  gobernabilidad y sucesión”, August, 2006,  
http://www.isa.org.mx/contenido/Gimx0608p.pdf [access d on April 23, 2009].   
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2006.  Some 72% of Mexicans believed this move was a politically motivated attempt to 
eliminate a rival candidate from contention.21   
Why Do the Surveys Differ? 
A brief digression on the apparent inconsistencies between the surveys is in order.  
The three series at times diverge significantly.  For example, in February, 2003, the 
ENCUP estimated satisfaction at 29%, compared to 37% for the El Universal figure for 
the same month—a difference of 8%.  The Latinobarometer survey of April, 2004, 
yielded a 17% satisfaction rate (the lowest of all 19 data points), but the El Universal 
survey of just a month later put satisfaction at 33%, a discrepancy of 16%.  The July, 
2003, Latinobarometer (18%) and November, 2003, El Universal (42%) estimates exhibit 
an even wider margin of 24%.   
What explains these differences?  Naturally, all other things being equal we 
would expect some divergence due to sampling error, but these differences are probably 
too great to be explained by sampling error alone.  Different sample designs and field 
methodologies may account for some of the disagreement.  Variations in question 
wording and the number of answer categories provided to respondents also affect the 
measurement of satisfaction.  The ENCUP surveys asked about satisfaction with Mexican 
democracy “at present” (2001) or “today” (2003 and 2005), whereas the El Universal and 
Latinobarometer items were variants on satisfaction with “the way democracy is 
working”.  The latter formulation suggests a narrower, more immediate focus on 
incumbents and policy results—that is, on attitudinal objects located at the more concrete 
end of the concrete-abstract continuum shown in Figure 2.1—whereas the former 
                                                
21 El Universal, “Desafuero por razón política, señalan”, April 21, 005.   
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phrasing reflects the more holistic approach of the “summary indicator” interpretation of 
satisfaction with democracy.   
Furthermore, whereas the El Universal, Latinobarometer, and the first ENCUP 
survey only provided the customary four response cat gories (“not at all”, “not very”, 
“somewhat”, and “very” satisfied), the 2003 and 2005 ENCUP surveys report data for a 
fifth, intermediate category (“neither dissatisfied nor satisfied”).  This category was not 
read to respondents, but used to record spontaneous ne tral responses.  Evidently, 
accepting a middle-of-the-road answer yields a different distribution of responses than 
forcing positive or negative answers, which the four-point scale does:  respondents who 
might otherwise have offered a neutral evaluation will skew one way or the other when 
that option is taken away.   
Finally, the surveys were conducted at different times, coinciding only in 
February, 2003.  If satisfaction with democracy is sensitive to current events, as I surmise 
above, a difference of even a few months could produce very different estimates of 
satisfaction.  In short, all these factors make comparison across different surveys 
problematic—a difficulty that also inheres among different cross-national surveys.   
Nonetheless, a clear picture of satisfaction with democracy emerges from the 
three series, considered separately or taken together:  Mexicans have been generally 
dissatisfied with their democracy during the past decade and, aside from momentary, 
election-year upticks, have become less so over time.   
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SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES WORLDWIDE 22 
Disenchantment with democracy is hardly unique to Mexico.  Satisfaction with 
democracy is generally low, declining, or both in new democracies.  In broad strokes, the 
third wave of democratization began in Southern Europe in 1974 with the peaceful 
deposing of the Salazar dictatorship in Portugal (Huntington 1991).  It reached South 
America in the early- and mid-1980’s, ending military rule in many countries there, and 
touched down in Asia in the middle and end of that decade.  The three years from 1989 to 
1991 saw a massive swell of democratization with the demise of communism in Eastern 
Europe, culminating in the collapse of the Soviet Union.  The third democratic wave also 
washed over Central America in the late-1980’s and early-1990’s, finally reaching 
African shores in 1990.   
In this section I examine citizens’ assessments of their democracies in Latin 
America, Europe, Asia, and Africa.  I present descriptive statistics from new democracies 
(and a few older, low-income democracies) in which surveys posed the satisfaction with 
democracy question on at least one occasion.  “New d mocracies” are those that 
democratized—or, in some cases, redemocratized—during the third wave.  
“Democratization” is defined as having achieved a Freedom House rating of at least 
“partially free” and a positive score in the Polity IV data set for three consecutive years 
                                                
22 Among the books and articles I consulted for histor cal background on transitions to democracy in the 
regions and countries included in this study are:  Ake (1991), Bunce (1999), Callaghy (1994), Case (1996), 
Dagi (1996), Diamond (1999), Fumonyoh (2001), Hedman (2001), Jones (1998), Joseph (1997), Khan 
(1993), J. Lee (2002), H.Y. Lee (1993), Linz and Stepan (1996), McFaul (2002), Mulikita (2003), 
Nasang’o (2007), ‘Nyong’o (1992), Rose et. al (1998), Suryadinata (1997), Thompson (1996), and Van de 
Walle (2002).  Also helpful were the survey organiztions’ reports, available at their web sites 
(www.latinobarometer.org, www.asiabarometer.org, www.afrobarometer.org), the CIA World Fact Book 
country reports (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook), the Freedom House’s 
“Freedom in the World” reports (http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15), and Wikipedia 
(www.wikipedia.org).   
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since 1974.  “Low-income” democracies are those with a median per capita gross 
domestic product of $10,000 or less (unadjusted by purchasing power parity).     
These two categories, new and low-income democracies, overlap almost 
completely.  By the beginning of the third wave, most wealthy countries had already 
become democracies.  Thus, the pool of countries elgible for democratization comprised 
almost entirely low-income countries.  There are some exceptions, however.  Eight low-
income countries included here (Botswana, Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Malaysia, Sri 
Lanka, Turkey, and Venezuela) had democratized before the third wave.  Conversely, 
four countries that democratized during the third wave (Greece, Portugal, South Korea, 
and Spain)—three in Western Europe—are high-income.    
Though this study focuses on new democracies, I include some low-income, older 
democracies.  Contrasting these with the wealthier, n w democracies may help shed light 
on whether citizen disenchantment springs from these democracies’ newness, economic 
underdevelopment, or both.  That is, does dissatisfaction owe more to the newness of 
democracy or to its apparent failure in promoting material well-being?  Newer 
democracies tend to be marked by a fragile rule of law, inefficient or corrupt 
governmental institutions, tenuous ties between representatives and constituents, and 
uneven implantation of democratic values in mass publics and, especially, elites.  These 
problems may become more apparent as the novelty of democracy fades.  At the same 
time, most new democracies have made little headway against perennial problems of 
poverty and inequality.   
This chapter focuses on describing levels of and trends in satisfaction with 
democracy around the world.  Using the World Values Survey (WVS), the regional 
“barometer” surveys (Latinobarometer, Afrobarometer, and AsiaBarometer), and the 
Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (CDCEE) 1990-2001 study, I 
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present means and linear trends in satisfaction with democracy for some 72 new and low-
income democracies around the world.  I leave systematic exploration of satisfaction’s 
individual-level determinants for Chapters 5 (in the case of Mexico) and 7 (for the rest of 
the world).   
In addition to these individual determinants there are also, of course, 
characteristics of countries that affect satisfaction for all citizens in the country, raising 
(or lowering) aggregate satisfaction relative to that of other countries.  Among the factors 
that appear to increase satisfaction are holding elections, healthy economic performance, 
effective post-transition leadership, prior experienc  with democracy, and a favorable 
international environment.  Country-level causes of dissatisfaction include post-electoral 
violence, economic crisis, ethnic and religious conflict, and border disputes or 
international war.  Satisfaction also varies widely by region.  I first give an overview of 
satisfaction with democracy around the world.  Then, I organize the discussion by 
country-level variable, adducing cases to illustrate these variables’ possible effects on 
satisfaction.23   
Table 3.1 shows means and trends in satisfaction for 72 new and low-income 
democracies, as these terms are defined above.  Columns 2 and 3 together identify the 
source of the data.  Column 2 names the survey organization and Column 3, the year of 
the survey.  The World Values Survey (WVS) has been conducted every five years or so 
since 1981, and has grown to include over a hundred countries.  It began including the 
“satisfaction with democracy” item in the third wave (1996-1998 for the countries 
considered here), and asked the question in most new democracies only in the fourth 
                                                
23 Though I carry out cross-national tests of individual determinants of satisfaction with democracy in 
Chapter 7, I do not test for the effects of aggregate-level determinants in this dissertation.  This testing 
remains, for now, an area of further exploration.   
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wave (1999-2001).24  The Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CDCEE) survey comprises two waves, the first conducted in eleven countries from 1990 
to 1992, the second, in 15 from 1998 to 2001.  The Latinobarometer survey has been 
carried yearly since 1995 and now includes 18 countries.  The Afrobarometer and 
AsiaBarometer surveys are of more recent vintage.  The former has been carried out 
biannually since 2002 and now covers 18 countries, while the latter has been carried out 
annually since 2003 in a total of 33 countries.   
Sometimes a given survey organization asked inhabitants to rate their satisfaction 
with democracy on a single occasion—as happened, for example, in Albania during 
2002.  Columns 4 and 5 list satisfaction scores for these countries.  The “Single Shot 
Mean” (Column 4) presents the average score for each country projected onto a 0 to 1 
scale.  In all cases, the means were significantly above or below the (normed) midpoint of 
0.5.  Since the polls use different scales, norming means in this fashion facilitates 
comparisons among countries.25  Latinobarometer, Afrobarometer, and WVS provide 
respondents the four traditional response categories, “v ry,” “fairly,” “not very,” and “not 
at all” satisfied with “the way democracy is working.”  AsiaBarometer poses the question 
differently, as part of a battery on general life satisfaction:  “Please tell me how satisfied 
you are with the following aspects of your life,” one of which was “the democratic 
system.”  Interviewees had five response categories available, including a neutral 
midpoint:  “very satisfied,” “satisfied,” “neither satisfied nor dissatisfied,” “dissatisfied,” 
and “very dissatisfied.”  The CDCEE asked respondents to rate how satisfied they were 
                                                
24 The exceptions are the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the Ukraine, and Moldova, 
surveyed in both the third and fourth WVS waves.   
25 Comparability across surveys also depends on the assumption that, despite variations in their wording, 
the questions are functionally equivalent.   
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with “democracy in their country” on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 was “totally dissatisfied” 
and 10 was “totally satisfied”.   
Analysts commonly report satisfaction scores as the combined percentage of 
respondents with positive answers (i.e., ones above the midpoint of the scale:  2.5 for 
WVS, Latinobarometer, and Afrobarometer, 3 for AsiaBarometer, and 5.5 for CDCEE).  
I adhere to this convention to Column 5.  Note, however, that these combined 
percentages often distort the true level of satisfaction, as indicated by the mean, because 
they conceal the internal frequency distributions among the categories that constitute the 
combined score.  For example, the mean for a country i  which zero percent of 
respondents are “fairly satisfied” with democracy and 50% are “very satisfied” will differ 
from a mean where 50% are “fairly satisfied” and zero percent, “very satisfied”.  
Respondents in the first country are much more satisfied than their counterparts in the 
second, but both report a 50% satisfaction rate when t  top two categories are combined.  
This distortion may be especially pronounced in cases with an odd number of response 
categories, such as the five-point AsiaBarometer scale.  Whereas an even-numbered scale 
balances positive and negative responsive categories, an odd number of categories yields 
a lopsided satisfaction score:  the number of categori s that contribute to a positive 
satisfaction rating is less than half of the total.  Thus, the satisfaction percentage scores 
reported in Column 5, though easier to grasp intuitively and more commonly used, are 




                                                
26 Unfortunately, the Latinobarometer micro-data are not publicly available and very expensive to 
purchase.  So, I could not calculate mean satisfacton for countries; I instead relied on satisfaction 
percentages that Latinobarometer publishes in yearl summary reports.   
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Single Shot Trend 
Country Survey Year(s) Mean* % Start End B Start(%)  End(%)  B(%)   
Albania WVS 2002 0.340 26.7% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Argentina LB 1997-2007 -- -- -- -- -- 39.5% 33.3% -0.6% 
 
Armenia WVS 1997 0.252 4.7% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Bangladesh WVS 2002 0.623 77.3% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Bangladesh ASB 2005 0.635 58.6% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Belarus CDCEE 1998 0.368 25.5% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Benin AFB 2006 0.560 57.8% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Bolivia LB 1997-2007 -- -- -- -- -- 24.1% 28.9% 0.5% 
 
Bosnia-Herz WVS 2001 0.389 34.0% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Botswana AFB 2002,2004,2006 -- -- 0.660 0.564 -0.024 76.7% 63.5% -3.3% 
 
Brazil LB 1997-2007 -- -- -- -- -- 19.2% 27.9% 0.9% 
 
Bulgaria WVS 1999 0.365 28.6% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Bulgaria CDCEE 1990,1999 -- -- 0.300 0.312 0.001 13.0% 18.6% 0.6% **  
Cape Verde AFB 2004,2006 -- -- 0.434 0.555 0.061 35.5% 52.9% 17.4% 
 
Chile LB 1997-2007 -- -- -- -- -- 28.4% 37.1% 0.8% 
 
Colombia LB 1997-2007 -- -- -- -- -- 24.5% 26.3% 0.2% **  
Costa Rica LB 1997-2007 -- -- -- -- -- 67.8% 47.9% -2.0% 
 
Croatia WVS 1999 0.311 17.9% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Czech Republic WVS 1999 0.419 37.7% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Czech Republic CDCEE 1990,2001 -- -- 0.416 0.391 -0.002 34.1% 29.2% -0.4% **  
Dominican Rep. LB 1997-2007 -- -- -- -- -- 47.6% 36.6% -1.1% 
 
East Germany CDCEE 1992,2000 -- -- 0.390 0.455 0.008 26.8% 42.2% 1.9% 
 
Ecuador LB 1997-2007 -- -- -- -- -- 26.8% 21.1% -0.6% 
 
El Salvador LB 1997-2007 -- -- -- -- -- 40.6% 31.4% -0.9% 
 
Estonia WVS 1996,1999 -- -- 0.433 0.422 -0.004 40.6% 36.7% -1.3% **  
Estonia CDCEE 1991,2001 -- -- 0.360 0.394 0.003 20.7% 26.5% 0.6% **  
Georgia WVS 1996 0.315 15.9% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Ghana AFB 2002,2004,2006 -- -- 0.511 0.695 0.046 59.6% 79.1% 4.9% 
 
Greece WVS 2000 0.512 55.2% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Guatemala LB 1997-2007 -- -- -- -- -- 45.9% 26.3% -2.0% 
 
Honduras LB 1997-2007 -- -- -- -- -- 49.9% 34.0% -1.6% 
 
Hungary WVS 1999 0.402 31.4% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Hungary CDCEE 1990,1999 -- -- 0.349 0.393 0.005 19.6% 28.2% 1.0% 
 
India WVS 2001 0.563 63.5% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Indonesia WVS 2001 0.397 28.8% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Indonesia ASB 2004 0.773 83.7% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Kenya AFB 2004,2006 -- -- 0.663 0.554 -0.054 83.2% 63.9% -19.3% 
 
Latvia CDCEE 1998 0.372 24.3% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Latvia WVS 1996,1999 -- -- 0.317 0.404 0.029 13.6% 30.2% 5.6% 
 
Lesotho AFB 2002,2004,2006 -- -- 0.534 0.491 -0.011 57.0% 50.7% -1.6% 
 
Lithuania CDCEE 1991,2001 -- -- 0.453 0.362 -0.009 40.8% 23.6% -1.7% 
 
Lithuania WVS 1997,1999 -- -- 0.379 0.350 -0.015 26.1% 25.5% -0.3% **  
Macedonia WVS 2001 0.270 17.5% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Madagascar AFB 2006 0.441 40.0% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Malawi AFB 2002,2004,2006 -- -- 0.565 0.361 -0.051 61.1% 29.7% -7.9% 
 
Malaysia ASB 2003,2004 -- -- 0.704 0.748 0.044 73.5% 83.1% 9.6% 
 
Mali AFB 2002,2004,2006 -- -- 0.571 0.577 0.001 65.4% 60.9% -1.1% **  
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Single Shot Trend 
Country Survey Year(s) Mean* % Start End B Start(%)  End(%)  B(%)   
Mexico LB 1997-2007 -- -- -- -- -- 31.8% 26.4% -0.5% 
 
Moldova WVS 1996,2002 -- -- 0.258 0.268 0.002 6.5% 10.2% 0.6% **  
Mongolia ASB 2005 0.512 39.3% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Mozambique AFB 2004,2006 -- -- 0.568 0.667 0.042 61.4% 71.1% 9.7% 
 
Namibia AFB 2002,2004,2006 -- -- 0.645 0.667 0.006 71.2% 75.1% 0.9% **  
Nepal ASB 2005 0.391 25.8% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Nicaragua LB 1997-2007 -- -- -- -- -- 37.0% 30.3% -0.7% 
 
Nigeria AFB 2002,2004,2006 -- -- 0.653 0.261 -0.098 78.9% 20.3% -14.7% 
 
Pakistan WVS 2001 0.273 17.9% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Panama LB 1997-2007 -- -- -- -- -- 38.4% 32.7% -0.6% 
 
Paraguay LB 1997-2007 -- -- -- -- -- 17.6% 11.2% -0.6% 
 
Peru LB 1997-2007 -- -- -- -- -- 20.1% 15.2% -0.5% 
 
Philippines WVS 2001 0.473 43.0% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Philippines ASB 2004 0.534 47.5% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Poland WVS 1999 0.436 43.1% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Poland CDCEE 1991,2000 -- -- 0.409 0.330 -0.009 28.7% 17.5% -1.2% 
 
Portugal WVS 1999 0.618 78.6% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Romania WVS 1999 0.319 20.9% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Romania CDCEE 1990,1998 -- -- 0.457 0.317 -0.017 48.8% 16.8% -4.0% 
 
Russia CDCEE 1998 0.279 11.8% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Russia WVS 1999 0.187 6.8% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Senegal AFB 2004,2006 -- -- 0.581 0.588 0.003 66.3% 63.5% -2.7% **  
Slovakia WVS 1999 0.334 23.4% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Slovakia CDCEE 1990,2001 -- -- 0.371 0.341 -0.003 26.6% 22.9% -0.3% **  
Slovenia WVS 1999 0.451 45.1% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Slovenia CDCEE 1991,1999 -- -- 0.419 0.392 -0.003 33.3% 25.9% -0.9% **  
South Africa AFB 2002,2004,2006 -- -- 0.483 0.570 0.022 50.4% 63.4% 3.3% 
 
South Korea WVS 2001 0.420 32.6% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
South Korea ASB 2003,2004 -- -- 0.476 0.408 -0.069 18.0% 14.4% -3.7% 
 
Spain WVS 1999 0.559 66.2% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Sri Lanka ASB 2003-2005 -- -- 0.540 .590 0.025 51.2% 47.8% -1.7% 
 
Tanzania AFB 2002,2004,2006 -- -- 0.592 0.740 0.037 73.2% 84.5% 2.8% 
 
Thailand ASB 2003,2004 -- -- 0.711 0.729 0.018 74.6% 76.7% 2.1% **  
Turkey WVS 2001 0.255 23.8% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Uganda AFB 2002,2004,2006 -- -- 0.653 0.597 -0.014 76.8% 68.7% -2.0% 
 
Ukraine CDCEE 1991,1998 -- -- 0.291 0.198 -0.013 8.8% 4.6% -0.6% 
 
Ukraine WVS 1996,1999 -- -- 0.254 0.270 0.005 7.3% 15.4% 2.7% **  
Uruguay LB 1997-2007 -- -- -- -- -- 63.7% 57.9% -0.6% 
 
Venezuela LB 1997-2007 -- -- -- -- -- 32.5% 51.0% 1.8% 
 
Yugoslavia WVS 2001 0.409 39.5% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Zambia AFB 2002,2004,2006 -- -- 0.573 0.416 0.039 65.8% 36.6% -7.3% 
 
Table 3.1:  Levels and Trends in Satisfaction with Democracy around the World, 1990-




A.  Country 
B.  AFB = Afrobarometer; ASB = AsiaBarometer; CDCEE = Consolidation of Democracy in Central and 
Eastern Europe; Survey; LB = Latinobarometer; WVS = World Values  
C.  Years survey was conducted; discrete years separat d by commas; dash indicates yearly between start 
and end dates 
D.  Normed mean of "single-shot" survey (conducted by a given survey house in only one year), where 
means on 4-, 5-, and 10-point scales are projected on 0-1 scale 
E.  Percentage of respondents above the midpoint on each satisfaction with democracy scale 
F.  Normed predicted mean (i.e., projected onto a 0-1 scale) in the starting year of a multi-year survey 
G.  Normed predicted mean in the end year of a multi-year survey 
H.   Average yearly (linear) change on a 0-1 scale 
I.  Predicted percentage of people above the midpoint on satisfaction with democracy scale in the starting 
year of a multi-year survey 
J.  Predicted percentage of respondents above the midpoint on satisfaction with democracy scale in the end 
year of a multi-year survey 
K.  Average yearly (linear) change in percentage of respondents above midpoint on satisfaction with 
democracy scale 
 
* All means differ significantly from the midpoint (with 95% confidence) at p < .001 
** T-tests for differences of means between starting a d ending values insignificant at p < .05 
In many cases, a survey organization polled a given country on more than one 
occasion.  The CDCEE carried out surveys for most countries on two occasions; 
Afrobarometer, on three; and Latinobarometer, on 11. AsiaBarometer surveyed citizens 
of some Asian democracies on two or three consecutive years between 2003 and 2005.  I 
report trend data in Columns 6 through 11.  A “trend” is simply a regression line drawn 
through the available data points, where a “data point” is aggregate satisfaction in a given 
country in a given year.27  The figures in Column 6, labelled “Start”, are linear 
predictions—not raw data points—of mean satisfaction (normed as in Column 4) in the 
first year of the data series, and Column 7, “End”, contains linear predictions for the last 
year.  Column 8, “B”, is the slope coefficient reprsenting average yearly (linear) change 
of the normed means.  Similarly, Columns 9 through 11 are predicted values for 
satisfaction percentage scores in the first and last years of a survey (Columns 9 and 10), 
and linear change in satisfaction percentages (Column 11).  I have denoted cases where 
                                                
27 In the Eastern European countries, the trend is a line r extrapolation between two data points.   
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change was statistically insignificant (as revealed by t-tests for comparisons of 
independent means in the starting and ending years of a survey) with a double asterisk 
after Column 11.   
Satisfaction:  Low, Declining, or Both 
Table 3.2 classifies new and low-income democracies by their level of satisfaction 
with democracy.  It is low, falling, or both in about three quarters of the world’s new and 
low income democracies.  The first column, labelled “Single Shot”, synthesizes data 
contained in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3.1 and includes countries measured at only one 
point in time by a given survey house.28  Satisfaction above the normed midpoint of 0.5 
was reckoned “High”, and below 0.5 was “Low”.  Of the 23 single-survey countries, 
satisfaction was low in 17 (74%) and high in just six (26%).  Three of the six high 
satisfaction countries are Western European democracies—Greece, Spain, and 
Portugal—that, according to modernization theory, should democratized long before the 
third wave.   
The second and third columns (“Falling” and “Rising”, respectively) contain 50 
countries surveyed on two or more occasions.  The table cross-classifies these countries 
by absolute level of satisfaction at the initial survey (rows) and change over time 
(columns).  Satisfaction with democracy is low, falling, or both in 42 (in Row 1, Columns 
2 and 3, and Row 2, Column 2) of these 50 countries (84%).  Countries that began the 
observation period with low satisfaction (Row 1, Columns 2 and 3) outnumbered those 
that started at high satisfaction levels (Row 2, Columns 2 and 3) by 31 (68%) to 19  
                                                
28 Some countries (Russia, the Philippines, Pakistan, and others) were measured on two occasions, but by 
different survey organizations; given methodological differences between surveys, however, prudence 
seemed to militate against taking the different measurements as indicative of a trend.  In all cases save one, 
Indonesia, both surveys’ satisfaction scores fell above or below the 50% mark.  Indonesia is, thus, report d 
twice, leading to 73 table entries (but only 72 countries).   
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(32%).  Of the 11 countries where satisfaction started high but fell (Row 2, Column 2), 
fully six—marked by a double asterisk—descended below the midpoint threshold into 
low satisfaction territory.  In contrast, only one of the 11 countries with initially low but 
rising satisfaction (Row 1, Column 3)—Cape Verde, marked by a single-asterisk—ended 
up with a high satisfaction rate.  Finally, consider ng only the direction of change and not 
the starting point, countries which satisfaction fell (Rows 1 and 2, Column 2) 
outnumbered those in which it rose (Rows 1 and 2, Column 3) by 31 (68%) to 19 (32%).  
In short, citizens of new (and older, low-income) democracies are disenchanted with 
democracy.   
COUNTRY-LEVEL CAUSES OF DISENCHANTMENT  
I now turn to some country-level variables that appear to affect satisfaction for 
citizenries as a whole.  I present each variable’s hypothesized effects, then exemplify 
with several prominent cases.   
Economic Crisis and Growth 
Poor economic performance and economic crises, in some cases brought about by 
harsh market-oriented shock therapy, undermine satisfac on with democracy.  On the 
other hand, prosperity increases satisfaction—especially when broadly distributed.  If 
resource-hoarding elites in authoritarian regimes foster social inequality, then democracy 
should promote greater equality.  At the very least, lternation in power should spread the 
benefits of patronage more widely.  At a deeper level, greater political equality brought 
about by democracy should redress social inequality through policy change aimed at 
redistributing the benefits of growth more evenly.  Citizens could see poverty, then, as 
not only a failure of economic policy, but of democracy itself.   
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Table 3.2:  Summary of Satisfaction with Democracy in New and Low-Income 
Democracies around the World, 1990-2006.   
* Changing satisfaction rose above the midpoint thres old into high satisfaction (one country). 
** Changing satisfaction fell below the midpoint threshold into low satisfaction (11 countries).   
 
Sources:  World Values Survey, Latinobarometer, Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern 
Europe, AsiaBarometer, Afrobarometer.   
Argentina suffered a severe currency devaluation crisis in the late 1990’s that 
hastened on grave political instability in the early 2000’s, when the country shuffled 
through five presidents in a two-year span.  Mean stisfaction declined in Argentina at 
the rate of 0.6% per year, from 39.5% to 33.3%, betwe n 1997 and 2007.  In the heart of 
the former Soviet Empire, Russia and the Ukraine suffered severe economic crises in the 














































































early 1990’s.  Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s “shock therapy” of market-oriented 
reform in Russia resulted in sharp inflation, massive unemployment, contracting 
productivity, and decaying social services.  A deep r cession besieged the newly-
democratic Ukraine.  Both countries had among the lowest mean satisfaction in the 
world.  In the Ukraine, satisfaction plunged from .291 to .198 by -.013 yearly between 
1991 and 1998.  Russia recorded satisfaction of .279 in 1998 (CDCEE) and .187 in 1999 
(WVS).   
On the other hand, economic wealth and health boost satisfaction with 
democracy.  Of the four relatively rich new democracies in this study (where “rich” is 
defined as over $10,000 GDP per capita)—Portugal, Spain, Greece, and South Korea—
the first three enjoy satisfaction ratings significantly above the midpoint.29  The WVS 
measured the three in 1999 and 2000, registering .618 in Portugal, .559 in Spain, and .512 
in Greece.  Satisfaction with democracy in Venezuela skyrocketed from 32.5% to 51.0% 
(an average yearly increase of 1.8%).  A good part of the explanation undoubtedly lies in 
the phenomenal economic growth Venezuela has experienced recently.  Inflation-
adjusted GDP growth, most of it in the non-oil sector, averaged over 12% from 2005 to 
2007, the highest rate in Latin America and among the highest in the world.  
Furthermore, the benefits of growth were distributed broadly:  by some estimates, poverty 
was halved between 2003 and 2007, and social spending has skyrocketed some 300% 
during Chavez’s tenure (Weisbrot 2008).  Chile’s solid economic growth and 
macroeconomic stability contributed to a 0.8% yearly increase in satisfaction, from 
28.4% to 37.1%, between 1997 and 2007.  Satisfaction in Malaysia satisfaction registered 
.704 in 2003 and .748 in 2004, a period preceded by many years of rising prosperity as a 
                                                
29 The outlier was South Korea, which transitioned from military rule in 1987 after an “endogenous” 
process of democratization (Boix and Stokes 2003).  The East Asian country scored satisfaction of .429 in 
2001 (WVS), .476 in 2003 (ASB), and .408 (ASB).   
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manufacturing hub.  Among the most prosperous of the post-Communist Eastern 
European states, Slovenia has also consistently had high satisfaction rates relative to the 
rest of the region, .451 in the WVS 1999 survey compared to the WVS fourth wave 
average of .353. 
Elections, Fraud, and Post-Electoral Violence 
Elections appear to affect satisfaction with democracy in two, opposite ways.  
Satisfaction with democracy seems to spike in election years, but post-electoral 
controversy deflates satisfaction.  Elections, especially competitive ones, lift satisfaction 
because they hark back to the initial jubilation that attended democratic transition and the 
foundational election.  As we saw above in the Mexican case, election years marked local 
peaks in satisfaction (in the context of a general decline), but proved ephemeral.  
Sometimes the salutary effects of elections endure longer.  The downward trend in 
Bolivian and Nicaraguan satisfaction reversed course after elections in 2005 and 2006, 
respectively.  The 2005 Bolivian election that brought leftist and former cocalero (coca 
leaf grower) union head Evo Morales to power was preceded by three years’ average 
satisfaction of 22%, and followed by the three years from 2005 to 2007 in which average 
satisfaction rose to 34.7%.  The 2006 Nicaraguan election returned former Sandinista 
Daniel Ortega to the presidency, which he had exercis d in the 1980’s after the victorious 
Sandinista revolution (a period most observers classify as pre-democratic).  The two 
years prior to the election registered average satisfac on of 19.5%, and the two years 
after, 34.5%.   
In Asia, elections were held in Malaysian, the Philipp nes, and Thailand in 2004.  
AsiaBarometer put satisfaction in Malaysia at .748 and Thailand at .729, both high 
relative to the mean of .626 for the six countries surveyed that year.   Aggregate 
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satisfaction in the Philippines, .534, had improved on that posted in the 2001 WVS 
survey (.473).  Political satisfaction, though, hassince fallen in these countries.  The 2004 
Philippine elections were widely held to have been rigged, and President Gloria 
Macapagal silenced protests with gag orders on legislators and reporters.  She declared 
martial law in 2006 after surviving a coup attempt.  Thai democracy collapsed in a 
September, 2006, when the Thai army took control to defuse a social crisis precipitated 
by the prime minister’s dissolving parliament in response to public protests over 
corruption.  (The country restored parliamentary elections in December, 2007.)  
AsiaBarometer results for 2007 have mean satisfaction at .370 in the Philippines and .393 
in Thailand.   
Clean elections that resulted in peaceful inter-party transfers of power contributed 
to high, rising satisfaction in the West African countries of Benin, Ghana, and Cape 
Verde.  Benin and Ghana saw peaceful elections after years of military rule under Major 
Mathieu Kerekou and Air Force Captain Jerry Rawlings, respectively.  Kerekou handed 
over power to the opposition after 1990 elections, and subsequent elections in 1996, 
2001, and 2006 elections (which saw him return to power) were widely regarded as free 
and fair.  Benin’s mean satisfaction in 2006 was 0.56, significantly above Africa’s 2006 
predicted mean of 0.47.  For his part, Ghana’s Rawlings honored the constitutional two-
term limit in 2000 and handed over power to a successor from the opposition party; 
elections since then have been clean.  Between 2002and 2006, Ghana’s predicted mean 
satisfaction rose from .511 to .695 at a clip of .045 per year.  Finally, the African Party 
for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV), a Marxist guerrilla organization that had 
won independence from Portugal in 1974 and formed a one-party socialist state, 
alternated in power with the Movimento para a Democracia (MPD) have alternated in 
 62 
power since the country’s 1991 foundational election.  Satisfaction has risen there from 
.434 to .555 between 2004 and 2006.   
In contrast, post-electoral conflict and perceptions of fraud reduce satisfaction 
with democracy.  In Mexico, as we have seen, a majority f the population believed there 
were widespread irregularities in the 2006 elections, and satisfaction declined rapidly 
after then.  As recently as 2008, a third of the electorate continued to believe there had 
been fraud.30  In Armenia, independent and democratic since the 1991 disbandment of the 
Soviet Union, fraud increasingly stained elections since 1995; mean satisfaction there 
was .252 in 1997.  The country’s Freedom House political rights rating would slip to “not 
free” in 2007 and 2008.   
Irregularities and violence have plagued elections in everal African countries.  
Nigeria’s 2003 election of former dictator Olesegun Obasanjo was riddled with fraud, 
and the country’s predicted mean satisfaction score declined from .653 in 2002 to .261 in 
2006.  Political violence surrounding the 2007 election of Obasanjo’s anointed successor 
left around 2,000 dead.  In Zambia, labor leader Frede ick Chiluba’s Movement for 
Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) won 1991 elections after ending two decades of post-
independence single-party rule under pan-Africanist Kenneth Kuanda and the United 
National Independence Party (UNIP).  But Chiluba’s 1996 and 2001 victories were 
stained by numerous irregularities, and mean satisfac on in Zambia declined from .573 to 
.416 between 2002 and 2006.  Similarly, Malawi’s satisf ction declined from .565 to .361 
from 2002 to 2006 after Bakili Muluzi of the United Democratic Front (UDF) 
unsuccessfully attempted to repeal constitutional two-term limits, settling on transferring 
power to hand-chosen dauphins instead.  In the Southern African country of Lesotho, 
                                                
30 Mitofsky poll, “Dos años después de la elección presidencial en México”, 
http://www.consulta.com.mx/interiores/12_mex_por_consulta/mex_por_c_menu.html.   
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political instability resurfaced in 1998 when the Lsotho Congress for Democracy rioted 
in protest of election fraud.  South Africa and Botswana sent peacekeeping forces into the 
country, and elections would not be held until four years later in 2002.  These gains were 
erased in 2006 snap elections, after which opposition parties disputed the allocation of 
seats and called a general strike.  The government imposed a curfew, and the homes of 
several opposition leaders were attacked.  Satisfaction with democracy declined from 
.534 to .491 between 2002 and 2006.   
Secession, Civil War, and International Conflict 
Secessionist struggles, civil war, border disputes, international war also tamp 
down enthusiasm for democracy.  When it works, democracy replaces bullets with 
ballots.  But large-scale political violence indicates schisms between political elites that 
can leave lasting scars on the body politic.   
Conflict over secession lowers satisfaction with democracy, whereas successful 
resolution appears to boost satisfaction.  The Yugoslav wars of the early 1990’s were 
sparked by Croatian then Bosnian declarations of independence, followed by Serbian 
military action to maintain its historic dominance over the Balkans.  The wars provide a 
sort of natural experiment:  the province that broke away earliest and relatively 
peacefully after a 10-day skirmish, Slovenia, had the highest mean satisfaction of the 
Yugoslav republics, .451 in the 1999 WVS survey.  The two most beset by the civil war 
and ethnic cleansing of the early 1990’s, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, scored 
satisfaction means of .311 and .389, respectively.31   
Elsewhere, the Chechen War over secession 1994-1996 may have contributed to 
low mean satisfaction with democracy in Russia (.279 on the 1998 CDCEE and .187 on 
                                                
31 Macedonia is the exception:  its independence was completely without violence, yet its satisfaction level 
was the lowest in the ex-Yugoslav republics, .27.   
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the 1999 WVS).  In the former Soviet republic Moldova, the eastern region of Transnitria 
attempted a “preemptive” secession in the early 1990’s.  Largely ethnic Ukraines and 
Russians, Transnitrians feared that other Moldovans would reunite with their co-nationals 
in the former homeland of Romania.  The region declar d independence in an attempt to 
forestall forcible reunion with Romania.  The dispute over Transnitrian independence 
remains “frozen”, and Moldova’s mean satisfaction (as measured by the WVS) was .258 
in 1996 and .268 in 2002.  Finally, East Timor’s bid to secede from Indonesia—which 
succeeded in 1999—undoubtedly lowered enthusiasm for democracy in the 2001 WVS 
measurement of Indonesia, .397.   
Of course, a party to a civil war may wish to gain control over the central 
government rather than separate from it.  In the Caucasus, a bloody Georgian civil war 
followed a 1992 coup that installed former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze 
in power.  Mean satisfaction on the 1996 WVS was .314.  Nepalese democracy collapsed 
in the early 2000’s under the weight of a Maoist-inspired guerrilla war and palatial 
intrigues that resulted in a royal massacre, ending over a decade of parliamentary rule 
brought about in 1989 by the Jan Andolan (“People’s Movement”).  AsiaBarometer 
pegged Nepalese satisfaction with democracy at .391 in 2005.32    
Latin America provides additional evidence on the effects of internal political 
strife.  Colombia is home to the longest ongoing guerrilla war in the world, lasting over 
four decades.  In the 1960’s, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and 
other groups took up arms after a 1958 agreement between Liberals and Conservatives 
(historically inimical parties) to alternate in power and divide the spoils of governing 
between themselves, excluding other political and social forces.  Despite a wildly popular 
                                                
32 Fortunately, 2006 saw a democratic restoration of parliamentary rule thanks to pressure from a resurgent 
pro-democracy movement.  Thus, Nepal both democratized and redemocratized uring the third wave.   
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Alvaro Uribe presidency, whose approval ratings have been consistently high since Uribe 
assumed office in 2002 and hovered around 80% in 2008, satisfaction with democracy 
has languished around 25% from 1997 to 2007.  In Bolivia, the eastern provinces of 
Santa Cruz, Pando, and others are demanding greater constitutional autonomy and control 
over their considerable mining and energy wealth.  The sometimes violent conflict 
between supporters of the eastern oligarchs and the central government, though far from 
constituting a civil war, has undoubtedly contributed to low satisfaction with democracy.  
Though satisfaction has risen, especially since the election of Evo Morales, the predicted 
mean remained at 28% in 2007.    
Finally, international war may reduce satisfaction with democracy.  Armenia and 
neighboring Azerbaijan warred over the latter’s Nagorno-Karabakh region, dominated by 
ethnic Armenians, in the early 1990’s.  Despite a Russian-mediated truce in 1994, the 
status of Nagorno-Karabakh remains unresolved.  Armenian satisfaction in the 1997 
WVS stood at just .252.   
In contradistinction, successful resolution of civil war redounds in democratic 
“peace dividends” that contribute to high satisfaction with democracy.  Left-wing 
guerrillas and military governments in El Salvador and Guatemala signed peace accords 
in 1991 and 1996, respectively, ending murderous civil wars in which state-sponsored 
death squads carried out massive atrocities.  In 2007, predicted satisfaction percentages 
were 46% for Guatemala and 40.6% for El Salvador, high compared to the Latin 
American predicted mean of 33.6% that year.  Satisfaction subsequently declined in both 
countries, though:  neither was capable of translati g the initial peace divided into lasting 
gains.  In Sri Lanka, the government sat down at the peace table with the secessionist 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam rebels in 2002.  Satisfaction rose from .540 to .590 
during the 2003-2005 period.   In 2006, talks broke down, and the Sri Lankan military 
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has won a series of decisive victories against the Tamil Tigers; it may be that resolving a 
civil war by a decisive victory on one side or the other also increases satisfaction with 
democracy.   
Peaceful secession may also dispose citizens more favorably toward their 
democracies.  Czechoslovakia dissolved peacefully into its two constituent countries after 
the “Velvet Revolution” of 1992.  The 1999 WVS survey puts the Czech Republic’s 
satisfaction mean at .419, significantly higher than the WVS’s fourth wave mean for 
post-Communist Europe, .353.  (Slovaks’.334 mean is statistically indistinguishable from 
the regional mean.)   
Ethnic and Religious Conflict 
Violence between members of different ethnic and religious groups also dampens 
satisfaction with democracy.  In Kenya, ethnic tensio  between Kikuyus (Kenya’s most 
numerous ethnic group, perceived to have been favored under the National Rainbow 
Coalition-led post-transition government since 2002) and Luhyas and Luos continued to 
build after the democratic transition.  Satisfaction declined from .663 to .554 between 
2004 and 2006.  In 2007, post-electoral violence erupt d along ethnic fault lines, leaving 
hundreds dead.   Fortunately, the country avoided Rwandan- or Bosnian-style “ethnic 
cleansing”.  In Nigeria, ethnic tension is overlaid with sectarian violence between 
Muslims in the North and Christians in the South—another factor contributing to the 
precipitous decline in satisfaction from .653 to .261 between 2002 and 2006.   
Inter-ethnic and –religious hostility challenges democracy in several Southeast 
Asian countries.  The Philippines continues to face n armed Islamic insurgency.  Though 
Philippine satisfaction of 2004 of .534 was higher than the 2001 mean, it was nonetheless 
lower than the AsiaBarometer mean of .626 for that year.  Islamic extremism, Papuan 
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separatism, and Christian-Muslim fighting afflict Indonesia, which registered mean 
satisfaction of .397 in the 2001 WVS.   
Prior Experience with Democracy 
Another factor that seems to boost satisfaction with democracy is experience with 
it prior to the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991).  Even brief exposure to 
the principles and practice of self-governance creates historical memory that makes 
subsequent transitions smoother.  In South America, the Southern Cone nations of 
Uruguay and Chile had significant prior experience with democracy.  Uruguay had 
enjoyed over seven decades of democracy until the 1973 coup that brought Juan 
Bordaberry to power.  Though Uruguay’s satisfaction percentage score declined from 
63.7% to 57.9% in the decade spanning 1997 to 2007, it was still the highest in Latin 
America.  Chile was continuously democratic from 1932 until General Augusto Pinochet 
overthrew the democratically elected socialist government of Salvador Allende in 1973.  
But the party system emerged from 16 years’ hibernatio  in 1989 virtually intact, picking 
up where it had left off.  Chilean satisfaction rose from 28.4% to 37.1% (1997-2001).   
Several Eastern European countries had fleeting democratic episodes in the 
interwar period.  The three states on the Baltic Sea (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) had 
the deepest, most enduring prior experience with democracy of any of the Soviet 
republics.  The three gained independence from the Russian Empire after World War I 
and were independent until the Soviet Union forcibly annexed them in 1940.  Estonia and 
Latvia had held free, multi-party elections from independence until autochthonous coups 
in 1934 (during the economic depression sweeping the West), and Lithuania, for a seven-
year period after the Great War until democratic breakdown in 1925.  The three countries 
had the highest satisfaction scores of all ex-Soviet Republics:  Estonia averaged .402 over 
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four measurements (WVS 1996, 1999; CDCEE 1991, 2001); Latvia, .364 over three 
measurements (WVS 1996, 1999; CDCEE 1998); and Lithuania, .382 over four (WVS 
1997, 1999; CDCEE 1991, 2001).  The average for all other ex-Soviet republics is .270.   
Czechoslovakia was democratic for two decades after th  end of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire in 1919.  Its satisfaction rating, .409 over three measurements (WVS 
1999; CDCEE 1990, 2001), was higher than any other post-Communist Central European 
country.  The combined average for Poland, Hungary, nd Slovakia was .378.  Former 
East Germany had glimpsed democracy twice, but the democratic impulses of 1848 were 
thwarted by Bismarck, those of the Weimar Republic crushed by Nazism.  Satisfaction 
with democracy rose there from .390 to .455 from 1992 to 2000.  Spain’s democratic 
spark in the 1936-1939 Republican period may have stood it in good stead to rekindle 
their democracy four decades later.  Nearly a quarter decade after shucking off the yoke 
of franquismo, Spaniards are still satisfied with their democracy t .559 (WVS 1999).   
In addition to cases of erstwhile democracies that redemocratized, the older, low-
income democracies considered are, on the whole, reatively more satisfied with 
democracy.  In Latin America, Venezuela has been democratic since the 1958 Pacto de 
Punto Fijo (notwithstanding backsliding under Hugo Chávez, in the perceptions of many 
analysts).  As I note above, satisfaction with democracy has risen vertiginously to 51.0%.  
Costa Rican democracy dates from the mid-19th Century, interrupted only by a coup 
d’état in 1917 and a brief 1948 civil war in the wake of a disputed presidential contest 
that led to a military junta.  Despite going into a rapid tailspin (from a predicted score of 
69% in 1997 to 47.9% a decade later), satisfaction remains among the highest on the 
continent.  Costa Ricans’ “reserve of good will” toward democracy (Easton 1975: 444; 
Fuchs et al. 1995: 327) has proven deep indeed.   
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Asia contains three countries that have been continuously democratic since before 
the third wave:  India, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka.  South Asia, including India and Sri 
Lanka (formerly Ceylon), won freedom from Britain in 1947 when the Indian 
independence movement forced an end to colonial rule.  Both India and Sri Lanka have 
mean satisfaction above the midpoint:  .563 (WVS 2001) and .565 (AsiaBarometer 2003-
2005), respectively.  A former British colony, Malaysia has been democratic since 
leaving the Commonwealth in 1963.  The peninsula averaged satisfaction of .726 
(AsiaBarometer 2003, 2004).  In Africa, Botswana—also a former British colony—has 
had a parliamentary democracy since becoming independent in 1966.  Though the 
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has governed through t the country’s independent 
life, it has won elections widely regarded as free and fair.  Satisfaction in Botswana 
averaged .619 from 2002 to 2006 (Afrobarometer).  In fact, of eight low-income second 
wave democracies for which data exist (Botswana, Colombia, Costa Rica, India, 
Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Venezuela), in only two—Colombia and Turkey—is 
mean satisfaction with democracy below the midpoint f .5.   
Leadership 
Satisfaction with democracy also appears to depend on the highly contingent, 
slippery quality of effective leadership.  Citizens are more satisfied with democracies in 
countries that have been shepherded to democracy by morally solvent leaders committed 
to inclusiveness rather than driven by an animus of retribution.  Poland’s Lech Walesa, 
South Africa’s Nelson Mandela, and Spain’s Adolfo Suárez are often cited as examples 
of such leadership.  In 1989, Poland’s Solidarity labor movement, led by Walesa, 
successfully challenged a Soviet regime virtually orphaned by Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
refusal to prop it up by force.  Poland’s average satisfaction over three measurements 
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(WVS 1999, CDCEE 1991, 2000), .403, is significantly higher than the overall Eastern 
European mean of .334.  In South Africa the National Party (NP), architect of apartheid, 
lifted the ban on the Nelson Mandela-led African National Congress (ANC), releasing 
Mandela from decades of imprisonment.  Mandela won the country’s first multi-racial 
elections in 1994, and the ANC has remained in power ev r since.  South Africa’s Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission exposed in detail the atrocities committed under the NP, 
but did not exact revenge against white South Africans.  Satisfaction there averaged .527 
between 2002 and 2006, and is on the rise.  Spaniard Adolfo Suárez differs from Walesa 
and Mandela in one crucial respect:  he did not come from the ranks of the opposition, 
but rather from the bureaucratic authoritarian regime nto which franquismo had morphed 
after the civil service reform of the 1960’s.  On Franco’s death in 1976, King Juan Carlos 
II ascended to the throne and appointed Suárez prime minister in July, 1976.  Suarez 
quickly met with different political factions, including the outlawed Spanish Communist 
Party (PCE) and the Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), and hashed out the Pact of 
Moncloa that would erect the legal scaffolding for the Spanish transition.  Suárez won 
1977 elections, competing against a newly-legalized PCE, but the left would go on to 
govern during much of Spain’s democratic life.  As we have seen, Spanish satisfaction 
was at .559 when measured in 1999.   
In contrast, other post-transition leaders have attemp ed to perpetuate the 
privileges they enjoyed under the ancien regime—at the expense of actors and social 
movements who, despite hastening on democratic transi io , are unable to control it.  
Satisfaction with democracy is lower in these cases.  Albania and Bulgaria are 
instructive.  The national Communist parties were abl  to dictate favorable terms for their 
democratic transitions in both countries.  Bulgarian Communist Party leaders set in 
motion a regime-initiated transition in November, 1989, when they removed long-
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standing sultanistic dictator Todor Zhivkov from party leadership in November, 1989.  
The successor Bulgarian Socialist Party won fraudulent elections in June, 1990.  Though 
the opposition Union of Democratic Forces won power soon after, in October, 1991, the 
initial distaste seems to have lingered:  satisfaction remained at around .305 during the 
entire decade of the 1990’s.  In Albania, the Communist party agreed to elections in 
March, 1991, which it won handily.  A general strike forced another round of polling 
several months later, but the Communists held on to a share of power as part of a national 
unity government.  In 1992, voters routed the Communist party definitively, but as in 
Bulgaria the malaise endured:  the WVS put satisfaction there at .342 in 2002.   
For better or worse, in new democracies the first impression may be the lasting 
impression.  The salutary effects of good leadership urvive the end of the initial post-
transition governments, enabling new democracies to weather spells of mediocrity.  But 
by the same token, the pernicious effects of bad leership also endure.   
International Environment 
The literature on democratic diffusion teaches us that he likelihood of a country 
becoming democratic depends on whether or not surrounding countries are also 
democratic (see, e.g., Starr 1991).  An environment favorable to the spread of democracy 
may also enhance the spread of democracies that work ell and engender high 
satisfaction in their citizens.  Just as a country surrounded by democratic countries is 
likelier to become a democracy itself, a democracy surrounded by other democracies with 
long-standing representative institutions and egalitarian values may be a more satisfied 
democracy.   
East Germany is illustrative.  It differed from the r st of post-Communist 
Europe—and the rest of all new democracies—in one crucial respect.  It alone was 
 72 
absorbed into another country with a solid 40 years’ democratic experience and one of 
Europe’s highest standards of living, to boot.  But the other European third wave 
democracies also enjoyed an ersatz version of this advantage.  The European community 
of nations received Portugal, Spain, and Greece with open arms, throwing open the doors 
of its institutions (NATO, the Common Market) once th y became democratic.  We have 
already seen that satisfaction is above the midpoint in all three countries.   
Region 
That satisfaction with democracy in a given country could be shaped, at least in 
part, by satisfaction in nearby countries leads naturally to consideration of regional 
variation.  Satisfaction with democracy does indeed vary from region to region.  Figure 
3.2 presents regional trends in satisfaction worldwide from 1990 to 2007:33   
Figure 3.2:  Trends in Satisfaction with Democracy by Region, 1990-2007.   
                                                
33 I report satisfaction as combined percentages of respondents in categories above the midpoint.  Since 
satisfaction is only available as a combined percentage for Latin American countries, reporting combined 




















Satisfaction with democracy is lowest in Eastern Europe, where predicted mean 
satisfaction declines from 25.3% in 1990 to 22.2% in 2001—a slow but steady linear fall 
of a third a percentage point yearly.  It is next lowest in Latin America, which starts at 
35.3% in 1997 and falls to 31.8% (a decline nearly identical to that in Eastern Europe).  
Satisfaction is highest in Africa, starting at 65.0% in 2002 and dropping to 55.4% in 2006 
at a linear rate of -2.4% yearly, steeper than both Eastern Europe and Latin America.  
Finally, satisfaction with democracy is second highest in Asia, but plummets most 
sharply there.  It starts at 60.1% in 2003 and nosedives to 45.8% just two years later, a 
yearly decline of 7.1%.   
Sizing up the extent of citizen disenchantment in Mexico and new democracies 
worldwide, the available data portray citizenries of new and low-income democracies as 
generally unhappy with the state of democracy in their countries.  The data detect an 
unmistakable secular, downward trend in satisfaction with democracy in Africa, Asia, 
Eastern Europe, and Latin America—and in most of the 72 countries that constitute those 
regions.  Why?  In the next three chapters, I turn to the Mexican case to explore the 




Conceptions of Democracy in Mexico 
It is commonplace to aver that Mexico became democratic only after the 2000 
election of the first president from a party other than the PRI in post-Revolutionary 
Mexico.  Although that year marks the culmination of Mexico’s contemporary 
democratic transition, the idea of democracy has a long, storied history in Mexico—even 
if the actual practice of democracy comprised only short-lived, sporadic episodes.  From 
its inception two centuries ago, Mexico’s tradition f reflection on democracy (or 
“republican government”, as it would have been called then) has drawn on European and 
Anglo-American political philosophy.  But Mexicans have embellished “universal” ideas 
with indigenous flourishes, and the content of Mexican democratic thought has also been 
shaped by social realities in Mexico.34   
How do Mexicans conceive of democracy?  In Mexico, as elsewhere, there is no 
single answer to that question.  Political theorists do not all share the same definition of 
democracy, and neither do Mexicans.  In this chapter, I develop a three-fold typology of 
citizen conceptions of democracy in Mexico.  Liberal democracy, rooted in post-
Independence nineteenth-century liberalism, conceives of democracy as a collection of 
rights and liberties associated with citizenship:  freedom of belief, expression, and 
association, equality before the law, property rights, pluralism, and others.  Substantive 
democracy, a view incarnated in the 1917 Constitution, equates democracy with 
economic improvement and social justice.  Finally, electoral democracy, a view that has 
acquired greater currency as Mexican elections progressed from fraud-plagued exercises 
                                                
34 For example, Reyes Heroles, in his definitive study of Mexican liberalism, states, “One of the main 
teachings of the liberal process in Mexico consists in showing the birth of a national political form that 
parted from a rational application of supposed universal validity” (1974: X).   
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in authoritarian regime legitimization to genuine choices between competing candidates, 
sees democracy as a mechanism by which to choose decision-makers.  .   
Before describing the consequences of ideas about democracy, I first examine 
their content and distribution in Mexico.  Debates over the meaning of democracy do not 
exist in a vacuum, removed from time and history.  They resonate among thinkers, 
politicians, and citizens.  I review the embodiment of hese ideas in thought, word, and 
deed in a brief history of the idea of democracy in Mexico.  I focus on 19th liberalism, the 
maderista electoral movement that sparked the Revolution, andthe social charter 
contained in the 1917 Constitution as defining moments in each conception of 
democracy.   
I then consider Mexican citizens of today, whose opini ns on democracy I 
explored via the Desencanto Ciudadano poll taken in June, 2006.  I describe the survey 
items used to explore concepts of democracy and the way in which they were combined 
to form indices for each of the three democratic orientations found in Mexico.  I also 
offer descriptive statistics that examine both the distribution of scores for each of the 
three indices and the bivariate relationships betwen them.  In particular, I show that the 
indices are virtually orthogonal to one another, meaning that they indeed reflect 
analytically distinguishable conceptual dimensions f democracy.   
The chapter then considers the question of how many Mexicans hold each 
conception.  It turns out that substantive democrats are most numerous, followed by 
electoral then liberal democrats.  I conclude by proffe ing some tentative explanations of 
why substantive democrats outnumber their electoral and liberal counterparts and where 
these ideas might come from.     
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THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY IN MEXICO  
Each of these three basic orientations toward democracy—liberal, substantive, 
and electoral—has deep roots in Mexican history.  In this section, I examine the pedigree 
of each idea in the history of Mexican thought.  I start with the oldest, liberal democracy, 
then turn to electoral and substantive democracy.   
Liberal Democracy 
Liberal ideas were present in the foundational documents emanating from 
Mexico’s war of Independence from Spain (1810-1821) and the subsequent constitutional 
assembly.  Crucial ingredients of that liberal ideology include federalism, pluralism, 
property rights, equality before the law, and freedom of the press.  Studies have traced the 
intellectual origins of Mexican liberalism to French Enlightenment thought, and its 
operative content to U.S. constitutionalism and the Spanish cortes.35  Newspapers such as 
El Federalista published the United States Constitution and Washington’s second 
inaugural address, while the intelligentsia read Montesquieu, Rousseau, Locke, Madison, 
and Thomas Paine.  Meanwhile, Mexico’s most illustrious representatives gained 
practical legislative experience forging the political reforms of the cortes, roughly the 
equivalent of the French Estates, and the liberal 1812 Constitution of Cádiz.    
The liberal principle most evident at first was that of federalism—so much so that 
Reyes Heroles would say that for many early Mexican liberals, federalism was liberalism 
(1985: 57).  Mexican federalism established a tripart te division of powers (executive, 
legislative, and judicial), adapted from the French and American constitutions, and a 
confederation of sovereign states bound together under a relatively weak central 
                                                
35 See, e.g., the first chapter of Reyes Heroles (1974) for an excellent discussion of Mexicans liberalism’s 
intellectual roots and Hale (1982) for a review of the influence of U.S. constitutionalism.   
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constitution.36  Mexico’s history of dictatorships in the 19th Century and one-party 
domination in the 20th would mean that this federalism was, in reality, subordinated to 
central rule.  But the federalist template remained as a guide and would ultimately be 
vindicated in 1997, when the Congress effectively checked presidential authority.   
Early Mexican liberalism’s record on political rights and equality before the law 
can best be described as good intentions that were, however, less than fully realized in its 
political constitutions and in social life.  The 1821 Plan of Iguala proclaimed equality of 
pportunity for all citizens, “with no distinctions between Europeans, Africans, or Indians” 
(Article 12), and the record of congressional debat in the first constitutional assembly 
(1822-1824) contains numerous pronouncements in favor of political equality.  
Nonetheless, the 1824 Constitution, the 1836 Seven Constitutional Laws, and the 1843 
Organic Bases all failed to guarantee political equality explicitly.  The 1824 Constitution 
provided  for a bicameral legislature, with deputies directly elected by state citizens and 
the president elected by Congress (Articles 7, 8, 78-84).  Nonetheless, the states were left 
to define citizenship, and a number of states imposed property or literacy requirements 
(Ferrer Muñóz and Bono López 1998: 167-171).  It was not until the 1857 Constitution 
that political equality was guaranteed, and even then states’ observance of this 
requirement was, in practice, varied and subject to apricious implementing legislation.   
The concept of individual liberties and property rights was, in contrast, fairly well 
developed in the 1824 Constitution, some of which eo s the language of the U.S. 
Constitution’s Bill of Rights.  That constitution prohibited “forever” confiscation of 
property (Article 147).  It also forbade arbitrary detentions without evidence of a crime 
(Article 150) and illegal searches of houses and personal effects (Article 152).  Finally, it 
                                                
36 The Argentinian liberal Alberdi would blame the weakness of the Mexican central state for the country’s 
loss of half its national territory to the United States (see Reyes Heroles 1974).   
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guaranteed freedom of the press, the exercise of which could “never be suspended, much 
less abolished” (Article 50, para. 3, and Article 171).   
Though the 1824 Constitution contains no explicit guarantees of freedom of 
association, the early constitutional drafters were aware of the need for pluralism, the 
existence of groups and opinions autonomous from the s ate.  Andrés Quintana Roo, a 
key figure in Mexico’s early political and literary history, wrote eloquently and fervently 
on the salutary effects of pluralism in his 1816 essay on “The Necessity for Opposition 
Parties to Exist”, from which I quote at length here:   
   In every country that desires to preserve political liberty, there must be an 
opposition party …  There need be no fear that he who rules will want for 
support:  rather, the difficulty lies in finding support for those who build a wall of 
containment around those who rule.  This difficulty is quite considerable in 
Mexico, where despotism has such deep roots that those who dedicate themselves 
to containing it shall scarcely find anyone to thank them.  But nothing is more 
necessary today than the spirit of censure that purifies the actions of government, 
that keeps rulers alert and obliges them to take all care and make all effort to 
fulfill the duties the nation has entrusted them … Happy the nation where the 
spirit of censure and vigilance over government action has taken root!  (Quintana 
Roo 1985 [1910]: 194-196).   
The anti-clericalism that characterized Mexican liberalism in the posterior phase 
of its development identified with Benito Juárez, however, was absent immediately 
following independence.  Although Freemasons and free-thinkers figured prominently in 
the first constitutional congress, the Plan of Iguala (1821) and the 1824 Constitution 
established Catholicism as the state religion, prohibited the exercise of any other faith, 
and preserved the autonomous jurisdiction (fuero) of the Catholic church (Articles 3 and 
154).  However, the next decades would see a series of bitter conflicts between Mexican 
liberals and the Catholic church.  Rome denied Mexico “patronage” powers (control over 
ecclesiastical personnel and political affairs) it had granted Spain and even refused to 
recognize Mexican independence until 1836 (Macune 1984).  Headed by José Luis Mora, 
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Mexican liberals advocated revocation of Article 154 of the 1824 Constitution (Hale 
1982: 111-151).  These battles would culminate in the 1857 Constitution and the Laws of 
Reform that expropriated church lands and secularized the state by, among other things, 
establishing a civil registrar for issuing official documents such as marriage licenses and 
birth and death certificates.  Juárez’s 1867 military victory over Emperor Maximilian and 
the Conservatives established liberalism as Mexico’s dominant ideology and made the 
church-state reforms permanent.   
Electoral Democracy 
The electoral vision of democracy also figures prominently in Mexican history, 
especially the 20th Century.  Two distinct periods of electoralism may be distinguished.  
The first began in 1910 with Francisco I. Madero’s challenge to the seemingly perpetual 
reelection of Porfirio Díaz, which ultimately sparked the Revolution.  But Madero’s 
electoral demands were quickly eclipsed by the social programs of other revolutionaries.  
The second epoch of electoralism occurred in the 1990’s, when reforming Mexico’s 
electoral institutions and achieving genuine electoral competition provided a common 
platform for oppositionists of all stripes.   
As noted above, direct, popular election of representatives was a feature of 
Mexican republicanism from its first political constitution.  Nonetheless, the 19th Century 
was plagued by numerous extra-constitutional changes of power, followed by the three-
decade dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz.  The period between 1824 and 1858, the year Juárez 
assumed office, saw 49 presidencies come and go, only five of which lasted longer than 
two years and 11 of which were held by one man, Antonio López de Santa Anna.  
Porfirio Díaz’s regime held power from 1876 to 1911, interrupted  only twice, once when 
Díaz himself appointed an interim president and another time by an officer and 
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government official closely identified with him.  Although elections were held regularly, 
they were riddled with fraud and Díaz was not shy about threatening and killing political 
opponents.  During the period, underground newspapers ironized the slogan Díaz himself 
had used to defeat Comonfort in 1876:  “sufragio efectivo, no reelección” (effective 
suffrage, no reelection) became “sufragio efectivo no, reelección” (no effective suffrage, 
reelection).   
Given an entire century in which the right to vote had very little real effect on the 
exercise of public power, it is little wonder that Francisco I. Madero’s main democratic 
demands were for free elections and alternation in power.  Madero ran for governor of 
Coahuila against the official candidate in 1905, denied him by fraudulent means, and 
challenged Díaz himself in 1910 as candidate for the National Anti-Reelectionist Party, 
after which he was jailed then sent to exile in San Antonio, Texas.  Madero issued the 
call to arms that agglutinated strong, but disperse, revolutionary energies in Mexico.  The 
Plan of San Luis Potosí declared null the re-election of Díaz and set a date of November 
20 for the uprising.   
But Madero himself seems to have been a reluctant revolutionary.  In La sucesión 
Presidencial en 1910, published in his native Coahuila in 1908, he is the voice of 
moderation itself, laying out a barebones democratic program that emphasizes election of 
political leaders and freedom of the press.  He specifically eschews revolutionary 
violence, arguing that even though he would have been more than justified in using force 
to vindicate his stolen 1905 victory, “[t]he triumphs obtained by the democratic system 
are slower, but surer and more fruitful” (1999 [1908]: 13).  The book, in fact, is a detailed 
interpretation of universal and Mexican history that vituperates against despotic 
militarism (“Woe the peoples whose destiny depends on the life, will, or whim of one 
man alone!”, p. 65) and praises the benefits of democratic rule.   
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His vision of democracy is eminently procedural and i fluenced in no small 
measure by the U.S. electoral system.  In recounting the prelude to the 1905 gubernatorial 
election, he recalls that “following the American custom” delegates held a party 
convention that issued “what is known in the U.S. as an ‘electoral platform’” (p. 11) 
before deciding upon a candidate.  Elsewhere, he praises U.S. leaders’ adherence to the 
law as the source of its greatness, urging Mexico to imitate the U.S. in at least this aspect 
(p. 50).   
La Sucesión Presidencial marshalls episodes of Mexican history to assert tha , 
despite a history of militarism and pervasive illiteracy, Mexicans were “apt for 
democracy” (p. 293).  Madero cites the 1857 constitutional assembly as the most 
eloquent proof that in Mexico we are perfectly capable of democracy, since no pressure 
whatsoever was exercised in electing [the delegates], who were genuine, legitimate 
representatives of the people” (p. 61).  He praises Ortega’s recognition of Juárez’s 
electoral victory, declaring that by “bow[ing] to the verdict of the public vote and 
put[ting] his sword at the service of his rival”, he drew greater glory upon himself than he 
could have won by even the best government.  The only alternative to authoritarian 
dictatorship in Mexico was “alternation of officials through the implantation of 
democratic practices” (p. 282).   
To this end, the tract proposes formation of the Nation l Democratic Party to 
contest the 1910 election.  The party’s two guiding principles were “free suffrage” and 
“no re-election”.37  Madero goes on to offer thorough guidelines for the organic structure 
of the party (state “political clubs” that send repr sentatives to a national party), 
procedures for electing candidates, and urging massive turnout at the polls and struggle 
                                                
37 During PRI rule, the slogan would back to the Díaz-era formulation of “effective suffrage”.   
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through democratic means—although he foresees violence as the almost inevitable result 
if Díaz were to refuse to recognize an opposition victory.   
Though Madero himself was betrayed by his own army commander, Victoriano 
Huerta, and executed in 1913, maderismo and the principle of no re-election were 
enshrined in the 1917 Constitution.  Article 83 established, categorically, a one-term limit 
for presidents:   
… Any citizen who has served as President of the Republic, whether elected by 
the people or as interim, provision, or substitute pr sident, shall in no case and for 
no reason serve again in that office.   
The Constitution also guaranteed universal suffrage (Articles 30, 34, and 35) and 
prohibited re-election of deputies and senators for c nsecutive terms (Article 59).  
Perversely, official documents during PRI rule bore (and still bear) the legend “sufragio 
efectivo, no reelección” underneath the signature line—another vestige of maderismo.  
PRI governments observed the prohibition on re-election scrupulously, but “effective 
suffrage” fell by the wayside during its 71-year dominance.   
It was precisely the renewed demand for the right to choose political leaders that 
animated the democratic transition of the late-1980’s and the 1990’s.  The twin propellers 
of election reform and a citizenry organized to defend the vote thrust forward the 
electoral vision of democracy.  Perhaps to win a legitimacy it had forfeited in the 
fraudulent election of 1988, the Salinas administration undertook three reforms in 1989-
1990, 1993, and 1994.  The first two were lukewarm efforts that did, nonetheless, 
produce advances:  creation of IFE, putting election verification in its hands, and 
eliminating the “governability clause” (which creatd an artificial legislative majority for 
parties with 42.5% of the vote or more), and expanding from 100 to 200 the number of 
seats elected by proportional representation.  Surrounded by a context of political 
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violence—including the assassination of Salinas’s successor, PRI candidate Luis Donaldo 
Colosio, and the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas—the 1994 reform went deeper.  It 
“citizenized” the IFE, substituting a counsel of citizens approved by the Congress for 
presidentially-appointed election officials; authorized national and international election 
observation; and mandated massive registration and reliable voter rolls.   
It was the 1996 Zedillo administration reform, however, that went furthest.  The 
sweeping changes to the Federal Election Code (Cofipe, in Spanish) helped level the 
playing field for opposition parties.  They institued public funding for parties and 
granted them media time, both awarded according to a proportional formula with a 
compensatory component for small parties.  The reforms also extended proportional 
representation to the Senate.  A notable failing, however, was the omission of direct 
democracy measures, including citizen initiative, pl biscites, and others that then-Interior 
Secretary Emilio Chuayffet Chemor had promised in a major 1995 speech.     
At the same time, citizen organizations sprung up to organize election monitoring, 
propose election reforms, and call for truly effective suffrage—conditions for electoral 
competition and end to fraud and vote-buying.  I cite just two examples among many that 
could be mentioned.  In 1994, several civic organiztions devoted to defending elections 
banded together as Alianza Cívica, which has organized observation of federal elections 
from that year on.  Some 20,000 citizens under the aegis of Alianza watched over the 
1994 contest.  In the following decade, their program expanded to include civic 
education, non-partisan get-out-the-vote campaigns, a d media monitoring.   
The Seminario del Grupo de Chapultepec, a group of notables comprising party 
representatives and intellectuals,38 met on January 16, 1996, and proffered a series of 
                                                
38 The list of participants included party presidents Carlos Castillo Peraza (PAN), Porfirio Muñóz Ledo 
(PRD), and Santiago Oñate Laborde (PRI) and intellectuals Adolfo Aguilar Zínser, José Antonio Crespo, 
Alonso Lujambio, Juan Molinar Horcasitas, and Federico Reyes Heroles, among other luminaries.     
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reforms.  Many were implemented in the watershed elctoral reform of summer that year, 
including a major organic reform that reinforced the IFE’s autonomy and created special 
election courts, and the public financing and media time schemes mentioned above.   
Furthermore, other citizen organizations with non-electoral demands added their 
voices to those of groups with an exclusively electoral focus.  Labor,  feminist, gay and 
lesbian, environmental, anti-neoliberal, human rights, and other groups saw in elections 
at least a necessary condition for them to advance their political and legislative programs.  
Many members of these groups would go on to elected office or high-level political 
appointments at all levels of government.  In short, society seemed to clamor with one 
voice for fulfillment of the principles Madero had fought for, but which dominant-party 
rule had denied for seven decades.   
Substantive Democracy 
The 1917 Constitution preserved, aufhebung-like, liberal precepts from the 19th 
Century at the same time that it encapsulated new socioeconomic demands.  It carried 
forward the program of individual liberties and anti-clericalism characteristic of 
liberalism.  And, as discussed above, maderismo’s electoralism informed the provisions 
for constituting the legislative and executive branches.   
But the Constitution also contained a social charter, one of the most far-reaching 
of its time, inspired in the mosaic of ideological currents that drove the Mexican 
Revolution.  The Mexican Liberal Party of 1906 program gave voice to the masses’ and 
the proletariat’s egalitarian aspirations: 
It is axiomatic that peoples are not prosperous unless citizens in general enjoy 
personal and even relative prosperity.  A few millionaires, hoarding all the 
country’s riches, … do no make for general welfare but for public misery, as we 
see in Mexico.  ¶  Improving working conditions, on the one hand, and an 
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equitable distribution of land and the means to cultivate and improve them … will 
produce immeasurable advantages for the Nation (cited in Córdova 1973: 123).   
Dispossessed peasant masses and repressed workers opposed their vision of social 
revolution to the program of political reform espoused by Madero and his heirs, the 
constitucionalistas headed by Venustiano Carranza.  Peasants backed their demands for 
land reform with military force in Emiliano Zapata’s Army of the South and Francisco 
“Pancho” Villa’s División del Norte.  The urban proletariat did not enjoy the military 
cohesion of the campesinos, never forming an autonomous armed organization of their, 
but found in anarchist Ricardo Flores Magón a cogent d fense of workers’ class struggle 
against capitalists.  Thus, even when the constitucionalistas emerged victorious from the 
internecine cannibalism among revolutionary leaders, their desire to keep the peasant and 
worker masses at bay obliged them to incorporate agrari n reform and labor rights in the 
1917 Constitution (Córdova 1973: 24-25, 142-187).   
Article 27 of the Constitution addressed land reform.  It established the right of 
eminent domain (subject to reasonable compensation), declaring all land and natural 
resources to be property of the nation, though alien ble to individuals in the form of 
private property.  (For this reason, among others, Córdova (1973) argues that the 
Revolution was not essentially anti-capitalist.)  The article also reversed all the land 
expropriations effected during Porfirio Díaz’s regime in favor of the northern 
latifundistas (large landholders), Morelos cane growers, and other landed and commercial 
ineterests.  These lands were to be redistributed to their original owners, both individual 
peasant small landholders and communities.   
Workers’ demands found expression in the monumental Article 123.  The 
provisions of this article improved working conditions by establishing an eight-hour 
workday, vacation time, a minimum wage, overtime pay, maternity leave, job safety, and 
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employer accident liability, among other rights that could not be ceded contractually.  
Collective bargaining was also guaranteed, as Article 123 guaranteed the right to form 
unions, to strike, and to arbitration and representation in authorities that resolved labor 
disputes.   
Also a key element of the 1917 Constitution’s social charter was the 
establishment of free, secular primary education cotained in Article 3.  Subsequent 
modifications would specify that public education was compulsory and universal, and 
extend these rights to secondary education.  A 1946 reform to Article 3 introduced 
language that would condense the essence of substantive democracy.  Public education 
was also to be “democratic”, where democracy was defined as “not only a legal structure 
and political regime, but also a system of life founded on a constant economic, social, and 
cultural betterment of the people.”  This idea, propagated by the powerful socializing 
force of the public school system, would come to dominate Mexicans’ views of 
democracy.   
MEXICANS ’  CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY TODAY  
The liberal, electoral, and substantive concepts of democracy persist in Mexico’s 
citizens of today.  The Desencanto Ciudadano survey included a battery of questions 
specially designed to explore Mexicans’ beliefs about what democracy should be and do.  
Each concept was articulated by four items, each asking the respondent to agree or 
disagree more or less strongly with a statement about democracy (or, in three cases, with 
one statement versus another).  The response options on the agree-disagree scales were 
“agree very much”, “agree somewhat”, “neither agree nor disagree”, “disagree 
somewhat”, and “disagree very much.” .  For the items eliciting relative agreement or 
disagreement, the response categories were “agree very much with the first”, “agree 
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somewhat with the first”, “in the middle”, “agree somewhat with the second”, and “agree 
very much with the second”.  I scored the responses so that so that higher numbers 
always represent greater agreement with a given conception of democracy (which in 
some cases meant disagreeing with the statement in the question).  I then created three 
summary scales, one for each conception, by summing the scores for the four items 
representing a conception.  The scores thus ranged between 4 and 20 (rescaled from 0 to 
16).   
Liberal Democracy Scale 
Drawing on the theoretical considerations in Chapter 2 , the four items in the 
liberal democracy scale measure support for religious freedom and tolerance, freedom of 
expression and association, political pluralism, and private property.  The religious 
tolerance item measures the extent to which Mexicans may have abandoned the principle 
of separation of church and state, rooted in mid-19th Century anti-clericalism.  It asks if 
respondents agree that “[a] democratic government’s public policies should reflect the 
majority’s religious values.”  Although religious precepts generally orient our political 
views, this question asks about a much more direct transgression of secularism:  the 
explicit translation of religious views into policy at the expense of minority religious 
views.   
The second statement, “In a democracy, gays and lesbians have the right to 
organize public marches,” concerns the right of unpopular minority groups to organize 
and express themselves publicly.  I chose gays and lesbians as an example of a 
traditionally reviled social group that has nonetheless gained increased acceptance in the 
last few decades.  For example, the World Values Survey asks Mexicans to place their 
views of homosexuality on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 meant that homosexuality is “never 
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justifiable” and 10 meant that it is “always justifiable”.  In the 1990 survey, the mean was 
2.9.  In 2000, approval rose to 3.6.  Since gays and lesbians are neither universally 
accepted nor universally scorned, we might expect varying opinions about the rights they 
should enjoy.   
The third item determines the extent to which Mexicans support pluralism—a 
profusion of non-state political actors that holding different, even contradictory, 
perspectives.  Pluralists deny that anything like a “general will” exists, much less that any 
one individual or group could embody it.  This item asks respondents to indicate the 
degree to which they agree more that “It’s better for the President’s party to have a 
majority in Congress so that laws don’t get held up” than that “It’s better to have many 
parties in Congress so there is more debate” or vice ersa.  I chose political parties as 
perhaps the most emblematic of the political actors embraced by the concept of pluralism. 
In addition to representing interests  (aggregating individual preferences and articulating 
them into policy), parties are powerful symbols of c llective identity.  Given the often 
high emotional content of party identification, accepting the desirability of multiple 
parties is a highly pluralistic response.   
The final item taps government respect for private property.  This item poses a 
hypothetical situation in which “the government wants to build a social service center,” 
and “the only feasible place is located on private property, but the owner is against it.  It 
then asks respondents to indicate the extent to which they agree more that “the 
government should lean toward respecting private property” than toward “putting the 
public interest first and taking the land” or vice v rsa.  Although the right of eminent 
domain is clearly part of democratic governments’ legitimate repertoire of action, 
Mexico’s history of abusive land seizures under undemocratic governments may make 
citizens wary of its exercise under even a democratic egime.   
 
Figure 4.1 shows the mean values for survey respondents’ score  on each of the 
items constituting the liberal democracy battery.  On tolerating religious and political 
dissent, Mexicans are more liberal than illiberal, with means above the midpoint of 3 in 
both cases.  On the other hand, they tend toward majority government at the expense of 
plural representation and debate in Congress.  Thissentiment that no doubt owes much to 
the gridlock that plagued Fox’s presidency, for which most blame the Congress rather 
than what some commentators have decried as the executive branch’s maladroit political 
operation in Congress.  Finally, Mexicans overwhelmingly favor respecting private 
property over governmental exercise of eminent domain.  
Figure 4.1:  Means for Liberal
Electoral Democracy Scale 
The electoral democracy items inquired about whether respondents saw electoral 
competition and majority rule as sufficient conditions for democracy
ingredients.  The first two items, “More 
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democratic”, are essentially opposite ways of getting at the same concept.  The third item 
asks whether majority rule is a sine que non:  “More than anything, democracy is for 
parties to compete for the majority’s support”.  The fourth item inquires whether 
respondents believe that elections or protest are more effective as a means for achieving 
change:  “If people don’t like a government decision, the most effective thing among 
many that people can do to change the decision is 1) vote for another party in the next 
election or 2) protest and pressure government through means other than the vote.” 
Figure 4.2 displays graphically the means for each electoral democracy question:   
 
 
Figure 4.2:  Means for Electoral Democracy Items.   
Mexicans’ identify democracy with the concepts of free and fair elections, and 
majority rule.  Most feel that the ballot box is a better method for changing policy 
decisions than protest.  However, most reject the notio  that elections alone are enough 
for democracy to thrive, nuancing the emphasis on elections with sensitivity to 
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Substantive Democracy Scale 
The substantive democracy battery asks if in addition o constituting a political 
system, democracy has social dimensions.  Two questions, the first and last substantive 
democracy items, refer to greater socioeconomic equality as a necessary component of 
democracy:  “A country with big differences between the rich and poor can’t be 
considered a democracy” and “In addition to equality before the law, democracy is also 
greater economic equality among persons.”  The second query refers to democracy’s role 
in elevating living conditions for the worst off:  “In a real democracy, there would be no 
hunger or poverty.”  The third item in the set asks whether respondents believe, as 
Schumpeterians would have it, that capitalism is indispensable for democracy:  
“Democracy and capitalism go together” (a substantive democrat would say they are not).   
Figure 4.3 represents the means for each substantive democracy question:   
 
 



















Mexicans scored at or above the midpoint for each of t e substantive democracy 
items.  They feel strongly that a democratic governme t should eradicate poverty and 
malnutrition.  They also advocate, slightly less strongly, a redistributive role for 
government to redress longstanding social inequalities.  Finally, Mexicans are divided 
about the relationship between free markets and democracy, with most believing in an 
economic system that combines the virtues of markets with the necessity for government 
intervention.  In the Mexican constellation of ideas about democracy, arduous defense of 
private property—specifically, land—against government caprice is not incompatible 
with redistribution of income and public goods.  One involves arbitrary seizures of 
property, while the other involves taxation—which most people accept as part of the 
obligations of citizenship, even if they do not enjoy paying taxes.  Even the Revolution’s 
program of land reform was framed, and accepted as, returning lands to their rightful 
owners after the unjust expropriations of the porfiriato.  In contrast to the previous two 
batteries of survey questions, the means are mostly indistinguishable from one another 
except for the third item, the mean of which is clearly higher than the that for the other 
three.   
Distribution of Conceptions of Democracy among Mexican Citizens 
To get an idea of how prevalent each view is in Mexico, I first classified 
respondents as liberal, electoral, or substantive democrats—three mutually exclusive 
categories—according to which scale they scored highest on.  Figure 4.4 represents the 
distribution of these concepts of democracy in Mexico.  Substantive democrats 
predominate, constituting nearly 30% of the population, followed by electoral democrats 
at 26% and liberal democrats at just below 22%.39   
                                                




Figure 4.4:  Distribution of Concepts of Democracy mong Mexicans.   
 
As I have already argued, however, these three conceptions are actually 
independent continua rather than mutually exclusive categories.  Figure 4.5 is a 
scatterplot of Mexicans in the three-dimensional “conceptual space” described in Chapter 
2.  The grouping of points in the middle indicates that most Mexicans hold each 
conception to some degree—suggesting that they are not mutually exclusive.  On the 
other hand, some points are low on the electoral democracy dimension but middling on 
the liberal and substantive dimensions, others low on the liberal and substantive 
dimensions, but higher on the electoral dimension, and so on—demonstrating that the 
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WHERE DO THESE VIEWS OF DEMOCRACY COME FROM?   
Why are their more substantive democrats than electoral democrats, and more 
electoral than liberal?  Who holds these conceptions of democracy?  Where do they come 
from and how do they spread?   
It is hardly surprising that in a country plagued by endemic poverty and drastic 
inequalities, citizens would hew most to the substantive definition of democracy.  
Furthermore, it seems likely that citizens have inter alized the vision of democracy as 
spreading the wealth that the PRI propagated for so long (at least until the arrival of the 
technocrats)—cynically, some would say, to compensat  for rigged elections, corruption, 
and rights violations.  As one informant noted, thebenefits that accrued to the citizenry 
during the golden age of PRI rule (solid economic growth, a burgeoning middle class) 
had nothing to do with political democracy.40   
That Mexicans’ second most common conception of democracy was electoral in 
June, 2006 also makes sense.  The heated race between Calderón and López Obrador 
afforded ample reason to be excited about electoral democracy.  And the country’s recent 
string of three clean, competitive federal elections left an impression of a country 
overcoming a rich tradition of election fraud—still recent enough to cast a pall as election 
day grew close.   
Why are liberal democrats fewest in number in Mexico?  One possibility is that 
Mexico is just illiberal.  According to the 2005 World Values Survey, for example, 33% 
of Mexicans would oppose having homosexuals as next-door neighbors and 22%, AIDS 
victims.  A quarter of Mexicans believe that a university education is more important for 
boys than girls, and over 28% say that men make better political leaders.  Over 37% 
believe that it is better to have more people with strong religious beliefs in elected posts.   
                                                
40 Interview with Silvia Gómez-Tagle, June 14, 2004.   
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On the other hand, it may be the case that Mexicans—even those whose views are 
liberal—simply do not believe that expanding indiviual freedoms is as urgent as 
achieving greater economic equality.  Mexicans may see the country as sufficiently 
liberal, since even the PRI’s relatively pliant brand of autocracy was compatible with the 
exercise of certain civil liberties.   
What impels individuals to adopt one or another idea of democracy?  Their social 
circumstances?  Perhaps surprisingly, not so much.  Regressing each attitude scale on 
party identification dummy variables for the PRI, PAN, and PRD and socioeconomic 
variables reveals that higher education results in a greater preference for liberal 
democracy.  Those with graduate degrees score 1.8 points higher on the 17-point liberal 
democracy scale than those with no education—a result driven mostly by the greater 
more highly educated’s  greater tolerance for gays’ nd lesbians’ right to protest.  But no 
other sociodemographic variable had an effect on how citizens define democracy.  So, for 
example, substantive democrats are not merely the los rs under neoliberalism, nor are 
those who emphasize democracy’s procedural aspects drawn primarily from the upper 
crust.   
Rather, conceptions of democracy appear to be socially tr nsmitted, with political 
parties as an important vehicle.  PRD sympathizers are much likelier to be substantive 
democrats ( = .716, p = .024) as well as liberal democrats ( = .588, p = .063).  For their 
part, panistas lean toward the electoral definition of democracy ( = .622, .032).  
Furthermore, where one lives has an important effect on how one views democracy.  
Between 11% and 17% of the variation in each attitude scale is attributable to aggregate-
level differences across municipalities.    
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CHAPTER 5 
The Causes:  Why Mexicans Are Dissatisfied with (Their) Democracy 
As Chapter 3 demonstrated, Mexicans’ satisfaction with their democracy has been 
declining since 1997.  Recapping, the percentage of Mexicans who declared themselves 
“very satisfied” or “satisfied” with democracy in their country declined from a high point 
of 45% in 1997 to around 17% in 2003 to 2005.  After a momentary uptick in 2006, 
satisfaction settled back into its customarily low level, registering 23% in 2008.  The high 
points of Mexican satisfaction with democracy have been short-lived.  Satisfaction 
peaked during the mid-term election year of 1997, at the beginning of the 
Latinobarometer series, and the presidential election years of 2000, when the PRI lost the 
presidency for the first time in its seven-decade history, and 2006.  As I have shown, the 
sharp recovery in 2006, as with previous peaks, was temporary.  
This rapid, deep disillusionment is especially puzzling because we would expect 
the euphoria following the culmination of Mexico’s transition to electoral democracy in 
2000 to be higher and more enduring than it has been.  Typically, the legitimacy afforded 
the new democratic regime after years or decades of struggle for democracy affords it a 
“reservoir of good will” that enables democratic governments to withstand “performance 
deficits”.  This reservoir, in theory, prevents dissatisfaction with specific aspects of 
democracy (politicians, policies, etc.) from being generalized to democracy as a system 
of government (Easton 1975: 444; Fuchs et al. 1995: 327).  In their study of Western 
European democracies, for example, Fuchs et al. (1995) found that support for 
democracy was highest in Greece and Portugal, precisely the two countries which had 
emerged from dictatorships most recently.  Having both redemocratized in 1974, these 
two countries had enjoyed some 17 years of democratic rule when the Fuchs survey was 
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taken in 1991.  In contrast, Mexico took a mere eight years or less for satisfaction with 
democracy to decline so dramatically.   
Why are Mexicans so dissatisfied with democracy in Mexico?  Seeking to explain 
only the current low level of satisfaction with democracy (rather than the rapid rate of 
decline), I argue that the combination of citizen con epts of democracy emphasizing 
economic improvement and social equity, on the one hand, and poor government 
performance in just those respects, on the other hand, is partly responsible.  That is, even 
after taking into account individual socioeconomic conditions, evaluations of incumbents, 
their policies, and government performance generally, how Mexicans define democracy 
and the expectations they have of it exercise an independent and important effect on how 
satisfied they are with democracy in Mexico.  Specifically, citizens who view democracy 
as either political rights or elections will be more satisfied than those who see it as 
economic development and levelling.   
Government political performance has been mixed.  Despite congressional 
gridlock on major legislation and a wave of corruption scandals involving the Mexico 
City government and President Fox’s stepsons, Mexico has seen three federal elections in 
1997, 2000, and 2003 that were widely acknowledged as clean.  Congress now checks 
executive authority (gridlock’s silver lining) instead of merely rubber-stamping 
presidential decisions.  The last two decades have also witnessed, in general, expansion 
of freedom of speech and an increasingly critical press.41  Government economic 
performance, by contrast, has been much more unmixedly ineffective.  Poverty and 
inequality remain, only modestly abated.  In short, elections and rights have fared better 
                                                
41 Nonetheless, there are some signs that freedom of the press has diminished sharply in the last two years.  
See the discussion below in the section “Liberal Democracy”.      
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than the economy.  As we shall see, electoral democrats are, indeed, most satisfied with 
democracy, followed by liberal democrats and substantive democrats.   
Chapter 5 proceeds as follows.  First, I specify my ain hypotheses on how 
conceptions of democracy affect satisfaction with it. This specification relies on a 
detailed review of the Mexican government’s recent conomic, political, and electoral 
performance.  I then test these hypotheses empirically, relying on the survey Desencanto 
Ciudadano and other public opinion data.  While satisfaction with democracy has several 
determinants (including evaluations of the governmet’s political and economic 
performance), popular understandings of democracy do in eed play an important role.  
Finally, I offer some concluding remarks that highlt the implications of my findings.  
Particularly, I argue that dissatisfaction with democracy may be relatively enduring.  It 
probably goes beyond waning “specific support” (in Eastonian terms) for incumbents and 
policies in Mexico, speaking instead to expectations f democracy that are unlikely to be 
fulfilled soon.   
CONCEPTS OF DEMOCRACY AND DISENCHANTMENT IN MEXICO :  HYPOTHESES 
Building on Chapter 4’s exploration of ideas of democracy in Mexico, this section 
explains how each of the three public orientations to democracy could affect Mexicans’ 
evaluations of democratic development in their country.  Departing from the path marked 
by Miller et al. (1997), who explored concepts of democracy among both masses and 
elites in Russia and other post-Soviet states (see Chapter 2), I do not examine elite 
opinion.  What legislators, party officials, high-level bureaucrats, and business leaders 
think about democracy is crucial to political development in Mexico.  This study, 
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however, focuses exclusively on popular opinion, the implications of which are no less 
important for the future of democracy.42   
Substantive Democracy 
Substantive democrats see democracy as a mechanism for alleviating long-
standing poverty and economic inequality.  Since th Fox administration—the first to 
follow the culmination of Mexico’s transition to electoral democracy—largely failed to 
ameliorate these problems, I hypothesize that substantive democrats will be least satisfied 
with democracy in Mexico.   
The economic panorama under Fox was far from uniformly bleak.  By following 
the orthodox fiscal and monetary policies of his predecessor, Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de 
León, Fox kept a lid on inflation and maintained currency exchange stability.  Inflation 
averaged around 4% a year from 2000 to 2006 with a high of 4.7% in 2002—high 
perhaps by U.S. standards, but a far cry from the 52% of 1995 and 27% in 1996% 
following the “December mistake” and subsequent peso devaluation crisis.   
                                                
42 For evidence about elite opinion on economic and other policy issues, see Greene and Bruhn (2007).  
The authors observe greater polarization among political candidates than mass publics on issues such as 
privatization of electricity and abortion.  While noting that elite polarization has played an important role in 
democratic breakdown, they find grounds for optimis n the relatively more moderate masses.   
More than elite polarization, however, anti-democrati  views and acts on the part of Mexican 
elites appear to be a greater obstacle to democratic onsolidation.  Elite adherence to norms that regulate 
democratic politics is weak.  For example, as noted above, the filing of criminal charges against Mexico 
City mayor and PRD presidential candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador, and Congress’s subsequent 
removal of immunity (“desafuero”), was seen by the public to have been a transparent political ploy by the 
Fox administration and competing parties, the PAN and PRI, to eliminate the left from electoral 
competition.  The Business Coordinating Council’s ad —explicitly forbidden by the election code’s 
prohibition on third-party advertising (Cofipe Article 48, paragraphs 1 and 13)—and the Fox 
administration’s electoral use of social programs, strongly excoriated by the Electoral Tribunal (Dictamen 
relativo al cómputo final de la elección de presidente de los estados unidos mexicanos, declaración de 
validez de la elección y de presidente electo,  published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación on 
September 8, 2006, http://dof.gob.mx/nota_to_doc.php?codnota=4930964 [accessed on April 26, 2009]), 
are further evidence of elites’ willingness to play outside the rules.    
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Mexico’s currency hovered between $9.50 and $11.00 pesos to the U.S. dollar for 
most of the Fox presidency, reaching its weakest point in the middle of 2004, when a 
dollar bought $11.65 pesos.  Fox managed to avoid the devaluation crises, and 
corresponding inflationary spirals, that scourged the country in 1982, 1987, and 1994.43   
But avoiding crisis was insufficient to satisfy the expectations of most Mexicans.  
Mexicans wanted their government to alleviate poverty and create jobs.  For example, an 
IPSO-Bimsa poll commissioned by the Chamber of Deputi s’ Center for Public Opinion 
Studies44 found that 19% of Mexicans identified “lack of jobs” as the most important 
problem that leaders need to resolve, while 18% were concerned about poverty—in 
second and third place, respectively, after public insecurity.  In the 2006 
Latinobarometer, the highest percentage of Mexicans (at 18%) identified 
“unemployment” as the most pressing problem facing the country, followed by “crime” 
at 17% (Latinobarómetro 2006).   
Indeed, Mexicans share these concerns with most Latin Americans.  According to 
Latinobarometer’s 2002 survey, 34.6% of citizens in the 18 Latin American countries 
surveyed reported “employment problems” as their main concern.  An additional 26.3% 
cited “poverty, inequality, and insufficient income” as their country’s principal difficulty 
(PNUD 2004: 74).   
The Fox government’s progress on these fronts was deficient.  Evaluating success 
in combatting poverty depends, partly, on which of several measures is used.  In general, 
poverty reduction appears to have been slight, while absolute levels remained high.  
                                                
43 As of this writing in early 2009, the peso is currently trading at nearly 14 to the dollar.  Currencis in 
countries with emerging markets have generally devalu d to attract investments that have fled to havens 
perceived to be safer.   
44 Centro de Estudios de Opinión Pública (CEOP), “Pulso Ciudadano (indicadores selectos de opinión 
pública)”, August, 2005,  http://www.diputados.gob.mx/cesop/doctos/PCN016%20Pulso%2016.pps, p. 21 
[accessed April 26, 2009].   
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When poverty is defined as living on two dollars or less (in purchasing power parity 
terms) a day, almost two out of every five Mexicans lived in poverty over the six years 
Fox was in office.  According calculations performed by the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL, in Spanish) based on data from the Mexican 
National Household Income and Expenditures Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y 
Gastos del Hogar, ENIGH), the poverty head count stood at 39.4% in 2002 and 37% in 
2000.  The same data puts extreme poverty, reduction of which was touted by the Fox 
government as a major achievement, at 12.6% in 2002and 11.7% in 2004.45   
By another measure, the relative decrease of poverty was greater, but the absolute 
level, higher.  When defined as “patrimonial poverty”, or the percentage of people living 
in households whose annual income is insufficient to meet basic food, clothing, housing, 
transportation, and education costs, roughly half of all Mexicans were poor.  However, 
the proportion declined 53.6% in 2000 to 47% in 2005.  Though patrimonial poverty 
declined slightly but constantly from 2000 to 2004, the absolute number of poor appears 
to have increased between 2004 and 2005 by about 270,000 individuals from about 48.62 
to 48.89 million.   
Other development indicators were stagnant or worsened.  Mexico remains a 
country of great disparities between rich and poor in one of the most unequal regions in 
the world.  Income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, registered .514 in 
2002 and .516 in 2004.  Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita averaged an anemic 
2.3% throughout the 2001-2006 period, a figure greatly boosted by the preliminary 
government estimate of 4.8% in 2006.  While not terrible, GDP growth was well below 
that needed to breach the poverty gap (4.6% per year for 11 years, according to one 
                                                
45 CEPAL, Anuario Estadístico de América Latina y el Caribe,  2005,  
http://websie.eclac.cl/anuario_estadistico/anuario_2005/ [accessed April 25, 2009].   
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estimate)46—and a far cry indeed from the 7% yearly growth that Vicente Fox famously 
promised during the run-up to the 2000 election.   
According to information from the International Labor Organization, 
unemployment increased from 3.4% to 4.6% during the Fox presidency.47  However, 
many analysts consider the figure is artificially low because of a lax international 
definition of employment (working at least one hour per week, whether paid or not) and 
an enormous numbers of Mexicans working in the United States—estimated at 10 to 12 
million—whose presence in Mexico would certainly swell the ranks of the unemployed.  
When the underemployed (people who worked less than 15 hours a week) are added in, 
the rate of un- and underemployment increased from 7.4% to 9.7% during Fox’s term.   
More problematic, though, is that the jobs that do exist are often precarious and 
poorly paid.  According to the ILO report cited above, only 45% of those employed had 
access to public health.  The percentage of urban workers in the informal sector grew 
from 39.4% in 2000 to 42.6% in 2005.  The minimum wage remained stagnant at 70% of 
its 1990 value throughout Fox’s term, and average real monetary income increased only 
slightly from $27,952 pesos per year to $30,260.   
In short, Fox administration policies failed to effect significant improvement in 
the areas that most matter to Mexicans:  poverty, gowth, jobs, and income.  Fox deserves 
credit for maintaining the macroeconomic stability that Zedillo recouped after the 1995-
1997 peso crisis, but stability meant merely holding ground rather than advancing.  It 
would hardly be surprising that those who emphasize economic improvement most in 
their definition of democracy are least satisfied with its performance in Mexico.   
                                                
46 La Jornada, “Para abatir la pobreza, México debe crecer 4.6% durante 11 años:  Cepal", August 28, 
2005.   
47 Organización Internacional del Trabajo, Panorama Laboral 2006.  América Latina y el Caribe, 
http://www.oit.org.pe/WDMS/bib/publ/panorama/panorama06.pdf [accessed April 26, 2009].   
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Liberal Democracy 
Liberal democrats see democracy as a series of rights and freedoms inherent in 
citizenship.  These rights carve out autonomous spheres of action vis-à-vis government 
regulation and are, thus, untouchable by the vagaries of majority rule.  Crucial to this 
conception of democracy is preservation of the right to express unpopular opinions and 
organize in favor of unpopular causes.  These rights include freedom of expression, of the 
press, of association, and of religious and political belief—rights that successive Mexican 
constitutions have continually expanded.  Liberal democrats accept others, even those 
with contrary ideas, as their political equals.  Consequently, they espouse the key values 
of tolerance and pluralism.  Since they believe in active participation in public decision-
making, and believe themselves competent o do so, they seek opportunities beyond the 
ballot box to express their points of view.  And they demand transparency in government 
decisions to hold their political leaders accountable.   
Mexico’s progress toward a liberal political culture has been mixed.  A liberal 
political culture embraces the actions and attitudes of both political leaders and the 
public.  The following paragraphs examine on governme t practice of liberal values such 
as transparency and accountability, and freedom of association and of the press; 
adherence to international human rights norms; and maintenance of the rule of law.   
Since citizens’ satisfaction with democracy presumably depends more on evaluations of 
government than of fellow citizens, I focus on government actions.   
Transparency and Accountability 
Government respect for rights has shown both notable dvances and, especially at 
the local level, serious setbacks.  On the positive side of the ledger, the Fox 
administration made important progress toward greate  transparency.  Virtually all 
government agencies (including the Office of the Prsidency; the Ministry of Finance and 
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Public Credit, Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público; the Economy Ministry; and 
many others) began publishing budget information on-line.  A clearinghouse 
(CompraNet) was created for information on letting of public contracts.  And in 2002, 
President Fox signed into law a freedom of information act, the Federal Transparency and 
Access to Public Government Information Act, enforced by the Federal Institute for 
Access to Information (Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información, IFAI).   Twenty-
seven of Mexico’s 32 state governments (including the Federal District) followed suit 
shortly after.48 
Freedom of Expression and Association 
In general, citizens enjoy freedom to organize and place demands on government.  
Organized civil society has flourished over the past two decades, growing from several 
hundred civil society organizations (CSO’s) at the beginning of the 1990’s to 4,500 civil 
society organizations currently registered with theInterior Ministry.  Some estimates 
place the true figure at between 16,000 and 20,000,49 which “even taking away half that 
are party fronts”50 still implies a vertiginous increase in the number of non-governmental 
organizations.  Whereas most CSO’s at the beginning of the 1990’s were affiliated with 
the Catholic church, they presently represent a broad array of social interests.  CSO’s 
embrace environmental concerns, rights advocacy for ma ginalized groups (women, 
children, the elderly, indigenous groups, gays and lesbians), electoral observation, 
political reform, fair trade and anti-globalization, and many, many others.  Freedom 
House had classified Mexico as a “free” country from 2002 to 2006, awarding Mexico a 
                                                
48 Several observers, however, have suggested that transparency is more illusory than real and noted the 
ease with which some government agencies dodge freedom of information requests (see, e.g., Ernesto 
Villanueva, “IFAI:  de la aperture al secreto”, Proceso, No. 1609, September 1, 2007.   
49 Comunicación e Información de la Mujer (CIMAC), http://www.cimacnoticias.com/site/07012508-
Autoritarismo-y-con.16346.0.html [accessed April 26, 009].   
50 Interview with Julia Flores Dávila, July 23, 2004.   
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civil liberties rating of 2 (the maximum is 1).  However, the rating slipped a point to 3 in 
2007 and 2008, with Freedom House citing violence against journalists, local persecution 
of religious dissenters, beatings and murder of opposition activists, and human rights 
abuses committed by the army, among other things, as causes.   
Mexico has also seen growing governmental and social tolerance of diverse 
sexual preferences.  The Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trnsvestite and Transgender (LGBT) 
Pride march, held annually at the end of June for the past 28 years, drew over 100,000 
participants—and many curious, overwhelmingly friendly, onlookers—in 2006.  The 
march is also celebrated in the cities of Mérida, Chilpancingo, Veracruz, Monterrey, and 
even Guadalajara, a bastion of traditionalism.  Mexico City authorized domestic 
partnerships in 2006, followed by the state of Coahuil .  In 2007, the state congresses of 
Michoacán, Veracruz, and Zacatecas debated legalizing domestic partnerships.   
Human Rights 
Against this backdrop of general government respect for civil liberties, however, 
notable human rights abuses occur frequently, especially at the state and local level, 
where caciquismo51 continues to be the norm, and in the south of the country.  Although 
the National Human Rights Commission enjoys real autonomy and denounces violations 
of rights tenaciously, its non-binding recommendations are rarely taken into account by 
the state governors and government agencies to which t ey are directed.  Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, and other groups have documented numerous human 
rights violations in the past decade, including hundreds of cases of arbitrary arrests, 
torture, and violence against and killings of journalists and human rights advocates.  
                                                
51 Local political bossism sustained by alliances with the landowning class and other dominant economic 
groups and by the use of police forces and paramilit ry groups.   
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Virtually all of these abuses remain unpunished by local and federal authorities, many of 
whom are, after all, either directly involved in or t lerate abuses.   
Two cases that occurred before the June, 2006, Desencanto Ciudadano survey 
attracted international attention and may have influenced respondents’ evaluations of 
government observance of rights.  First, in May, 2004, then-mayor of Guadalajara 
Francisco Acuña Ramírez (now Interior Minister in Calderón’s government) ordered 
police to jail 111 protestors after a rally against eoliberalism and globalization.  Some 
protestors were held incommunicado and tortured to ob ain confessions.52   
Second, on May 3-4, 2006, in San Salvador Atenco, Mexico State, the Federal 
Preventive Police (PFP, in Spanish) and state and local police forces violently broke up a 
sit-in to protest forcible relocation of flower stands.  Members of the PFP beat, tortured, 
and raped protestors in police custody as they wereb ing transported to jail.  Federal and 
state authorities minimized the abuses.53  Ultimately, head of the Public Security Ministry 
Eduardo Medina Mora (now Attorney General in Calderón’s government) denied that 
they had occurred.54  Despite ample documentation of abuses by the CNDH and national 
and international rights groups, to date no police officer or government official has been 
punished.55   
But these high profile cases are the proverbial tip of the iceberg.  The litany also 
includes forced disappearances of over 100 suspected gu rrillas in Guerrero; continued 
operation of paramilitary groups and landowners’ armed guards (guardias blancas) in 
                                                
52 Human Rights Watch, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/ 7/15/mexico9079.htm [accessed April 26, 
2009].   
53 El Universal, “Acepta SSP excesos policiales en Atenco”, May 6, 2006; La Jornada, “En Atenco no 
hubo violaciones sino abusos deshonestos:  Yunes”, May 14, 2006.   
54 La Jornada, “La comisión reclama congruencia al funcionario”, November 14, 2006.   
55 Amnesty International, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR410282006 [accessed April 26, 
2009].   
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Chiapas, Oaxaca, and other states; unpunished violations of worker rights and harassment 
of union leaders in Mexico’s maquila industry, concentrated on the northern border; rape 
and murder of over 400 women in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, since 1993; fatal attacks of 
gay activists in Querétaro, Tamaulipas, Yucatán, and Colima; and many, many other 
cases.56  Amnesty International’s 2006 report opined that President Fox’s commitment to 
rights was merely rhetorical, declaring that there had been “little advance in ending 
human rights violations and impunity, particularly at state level.”     
Freedom of the Press 
Freedom of the press—while generally a bright spot over the past two decades in 
Mexico—also met with numerous obstacles.  The days when the government shut down 
dissident papers outright, such as the infamous Excelsior closing in 1973, are a thing of 
the past.  Though radio and television political news is, at best, tepid in its criticism and, 
at worst, unabashedly pro-PAN, the written press is generally more aggressive.   
But other problems abound.  Notoriously strict libel laws make defamation a 
criminal offense and have been used for political purposes.  In the most high profile case, 
former first lady Martha Sahagún de Fox sued the wekly Proceso over critical coverage.  
Some 40 journalists are currently facing criminal charges in Chiapas under state libel 
laws.    Journalism is an increasingly dangerous profession in Mexico.  Around 27 
reporters were killed between 2001 and 2005, making Mexico the most perilous Latin 
American nation.  In 2006, Mexico was second only to Iraq for the number of journalists 
killed.  Finally, the extreme concentration of electronic media in Mexico limits criticism 
of the government and the diversity of opinions expr ssed.  Just two networks, Televisa 
and TV Azteca, control 90% to 95% of the national viewing audience.  Just 13 business 
                                                
56 This list was culled from the Amnesty International and Freedom House country reports for 2002-2006.   
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groups own over 1,142 commercial radio stations.57  Furthermore, a law passed in April, 
2006, known derisively as the “Ley Televisa”, virtually guaranties perpetuation of these 
businesses’ stranglehold on information, extending existing licenses for 30 years, 
exempting existing broadcasters from paying for rights on new concessions, and 
imposing forbidding entry barriers for new media enterprises.   
International media watchdog groups downgraded their ratings of press freedom 
in Mexico during the last years of the Fox presidency.  Figure 5.1 presents the Freedom 
House ratings since 2000 and those of the Paris-based Reporters without Borders 
(Reporters sans Frontières, RSF, in French) since 2002 for Mexico.  The figure also 
includes an average for Spanish-speaking Latin American countries (excluding Mexico) 
for comparison.   
 
Figure 5.1:   Freedom of the Press Rankings (Freedom H use and Reporters sans 
Frontières) for Mexico and Latin America, 2000-2008. 
                                                
57 See Inter Press Service News Agency, “A Larger Piece of the Pie, for the Few”,  
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=32440 [accessed April 26, 2009], and Variety, “Mexican Senate to 
Vote on Media Law”, http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117940559.html?categoryid=19&cs=1 [accessed 
April 26, 2009].     
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Despite the two groups’ different ideological orientations (Freedom House is 
conservative while RSF is liberal), they concur in placing Mexico generally below the 
Latin American average.  Both note a sharp downturn in press liberty during the 2003-
2008 period—the last three years of the Fox administrat on and the first two of 
Calderón’s—from 62 to 49 on the inverted Freedom House scale (or 13% of the range) 
and from 82 to 51 on the RSF scale (nearly 30% of its range).58  Mexico declined from 
74th to 140th place (out of 173) in the RSF country rankings during this period.   
Corruption and Impunity 
Corruption of public officials and a dysfunctional justice system that cannot, or 
will not, bring malefactors to justice continue to scourge Mexico.  Transparencia 
Mexicana (the Mexican affiliate of Transparency International) estimates that in 2007 
Mexican citizens paid bribes one out of every 10 times they dealt with government 
bureaucracies to do things like file property taxes, seek construction permits, enroll their 
children in public schools, get vehicle smog certificates, and so on.  This meant that 
Mexicans paid over 27 billion pesos (about $1.9 billion U.S.), $138 pesos per 
household—or around 8% of their income.59   
The justice system also continues to constitute onef the weakest links in 
Mexico’s nascent democracy.  The vast majority of crimes remain unpunished and, given 
deep-seated public distrust, unreported.  Local and federal authorities routinely use the 
courts to prosecute political vendettas.  One high profile example was Puebla governor 
                                                
58 Since the Freedom House and RSF questionnaires and rati gs scales differ substantially , no direct 
comparison may be made between their scores.  Sinceboth groups use lower scores to indicate greater 
press freedom, I have inverted the scales here for greater interpretability.  I subtract individual scores from 
100 (the worst score possible) in the case of the Fre dom House Scores and from 106 (the average worst
score from 2002 to 2008) in the case of RSF.    
59 Transparencia Mexicana, Encuesta Nacional de Corrupción y Buen Gobierno 2003, 
http://www.transparenciamexicana.org.mx/documentos/INCBG/2007/Presentacion_INCBG_2007.pdf 
[accessed on April 26, 2009].     
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Mario Marín’s 2005 illegal detention (in Quintana Roo) and jailing of journalist Lydia 
Cacho, who had exposed a child pornography ring involving businessmen close to the 
governor.   
Citizens continually rank courts and judges as among the least trustworthy 
institutions.  Based on public opinion polls, Covarrubias and Associates reported in 
August, 2005, that citizens ranked the courts as the most corrupt of 12 public institutions 
mentioned.  Some 84% of citizens believed there was “very much” (“muchísima”)  or “a 
lot” (“ mucha”) of corruption in the common courts (“juzgados”), and 65% believe what 
judges say either “a little” or “not at all”.60   
As this brief review shows, the progress of civil liberties in Mexico during the era 
of democracy has been ambiguous, marked by advances o  some fronts and setbacks on 
others.  I thus expect liberal democrats to be more satisfied than substantive democrats, 
but less so than electoral democrats.   
Electoral Democrats 
Until the disputed 2006 presidential contest, fair and competitive elections had 
been the crowning achievement of Mexican democracy.  The three previous federal 
elections—in 1997, 2000, and 2003—were largely clean and free from controversy.  At 
both the national and subnational level, elections have become increasingly competitive 
over the last two decades.  Particularly encouraging were the results of the 1997 and 2000 
national elections, which broke the PRI’s virtual monopoly on the federal government.  
Finally, though electoral participation has been declining over the past decade, it still 
remains fairly high.   
                                                
60 Covarrubias y Asociados, “Las instituciones ante el spejo de la opinión pública”, 
http://www.amai.org/datos_files/las_inst_ante_el_espejo.pdf [accessed April 26, 2009].     
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In the span of 15 years, Mexican elections had progressed from mere window 
dressing to legitimize authoritarian governments to a genuine mechanism for selecting 
political leadership.  Electoral fraud in 1986 in the northern state of Chihuahua, which 
robbed the PAN candidate Francisco Barrio Terrazas of the governorship, became a 
national focal point for citizen outrage with election fraud.  Even the normally staid 
Conference of the Mexican Episcopate lodged a complaint with the Organization of 
American States’ Inter-American Commission for Human Rights.  The story was 
repeated nationally during the 1988 presidential election, when massive fraud helped put 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari in Los Pinos (Mexico’s presidential mansion).     
Perhaps to legitimize the Salinas presidency, the PRI began to recognize 
opposition victories.  Although the PRI had recognized a handful of municipal opposition 
victories since 1946 (including PAN victories in Mérida in 1964 and Hermosillo in 
1969), the state of Baja California became the first to be governed by an opposition party.   
In 1989, the PAN’s Ernesto Ruffo Appel won the gubernatorial race.   
Opposition victories snowballed during the 1990’s in municipalities and state 
legislatures.  By the middle of that decade, Mexico’s electoral map had become a green, 
blue, and yellow (the PRI, PAN, and PRD colors, respectively) patchwork of overlapping 
opposition governments.  By mid-1997, divided or “non-majoritarian”61 governments 
prevailed in six of Mexico’s state legislatures:  Chihuahua, Guanajuato, Aguascalientes, 
the State of Mexico, Morelos, and Coahuila.  By 1998, the PAN governed in seven states 
(Aguascalientes, Baja California twice, Chihuahua, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Nuevo León, 
and Querétaro), and by 1999 the PRD had won four gubernatorial contests (Baja 
California Sur, Distrito Federal, Tlaxcala, and Zacatecas).   
                                                
61 Alejandro Poiré’s term for governments in which the executive belongs to one party but none has an 
outright legislative majority.   
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At the municipal level, the panorama was even more variegated.  The year 1997 
began with the PRI governing in about 55% of the country’s municipalities, the PAN in 
30%, and the PRD in 9%.  It ended with the PRI controlling 46%, the PAN, 32%, and the 
PRD, 20%.62     
Opposition parties’ growing success at the polls percolated up to the federal level 
in 1997, when a combination of opposition parties wrested the Congress from the PRI’s 
control for the first time ever in that year’s midterm elections.  The PRI remained the 
most numerous contingent in the lower house of the 57th Legislature with 239 seats (of 
500), 164 from victories in single-member districts (SMD’s) and 75 by PR.  Voters 
awarded the PRD 125 seats (70 SMD, 55 PR); the PAN, 122 seats (65 SMD, 57 PR); the 
Workers Party (Partido del Trabajo, PT), 8 (1 SMD and the rest PR); and the Partido 
Verde Ecologista de México, or “Greens”, 6 (all by PR).  The PRI retained a simple 
majority in the Senate, but not the two-thirds supermajority required to reform the 
Constitution.   
  In 2000, Fox culminated Mexico’s long march toward electoral democracy by 
upsetting PRI candidate Francisco Labastida by a margin of 42.5% to 36.1%.  Strategic 
voting certainly favored Fox:  many who would have normally voted for PRD icon 
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (and did support the PRD in congressional elections) shifted their 
supported to the man who had promised to “take the PRI out of Los Pinos” (see Crow 
2005).   
National and international electoral observers generally vouched for the hygiene 
of the 1997, 2000, and 2003 elections.   Irregularities and electoral violence was sporadic 
and exceptional.  In 1997 and 2000, Mexican NGO Alianza Cívica and international 
                                                
62 Reforma, “Oposición:  la nueva mayoría“, November 17, 1997.   
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groups such as the Carter Center, Global Exchange, the European Union, and the 
Organization of American States found evidence of vote buying, intimidation of voters 
and election monitors, and use of public resources for partisan purposes, mostly in rural 
areas controlled by the PRI.  Chiapas continued to represent a sore spot.  In all three 
elections, inter-party political violence—fanned by the presence of paramilitary groups, 
the armed forces, and the guerrilla Zapatista Nation l Liberation Army (EZLN, in 
Spanish)—resulted in poll closures and burning of ballot materials at many polling sites.  
Nonetheless, these groups agreed that incidents of violence and vote buying were 
“isolated” and insufficient to affect the final election outcome.  Similarly, the press 
reported that the 2003 elections were mostly “withou  incident”, except in San Salvador 
Atenco (in the State of Mexico), Chihuahua, and Chiapas, focusing instead on high voter 
abstention and the PRI’s resurgence.63   
Furthermore, Mexican voters themselves seemed to believe that the country had 
overcome its benighted past, turning out to vote in impressive numbers.  As might be 
expected, turnout at the ballot boxes declined from its high point during dominant party 
rule, when corporatist control of voting blocks regularly got over 90% of citizens to the 
polls.  When citizens are free not to vote, some will choose not to.64  Nonetheless, even 
absent the PRI’s social control mechanisms, turnout remained robust.  Figure 5.2 shows 
                                                
63 See, e.g., La Jornada, “Jornada tranquila en general; en Chiapas, graves incidentes”, July 7, 1997; La 
Jornada, “70% consideraron muy democráticos los comicios, en sondeo de IFE”, July 26, 1997; El 
Universal, “Denuncian apoyo al tricolor”, July 1, 2000; El Universal, “Elección ‘limpia y transparente’:  
observadores”, July 3, 2000; El Universal, “Sí hubo fraude electoral:  observadores”, July 5, 2000; Global 
Exchange and Alianza Cívica, Mexican Federal Elections 2000; Electoral Observation Report, 
http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/americas/mexico/election2000/ElectionReport.pdf [accessed 
April 26, 2009], El Universal, “Califican de desigual la elección en México”, September 13, 2000; La 
Jornada, “Cifras preliminares dan severo descalabro a AN”, July 7, 2003; El Universal, “Proceso tranquilo, 
reportan observadores”, November 10, 2003.   
64 Although Article 36 of Mexico’s Constitution includes voting in its enumeration of citizen obligations, 
neither the Constitution nor enabling legislation provides for penalties when citizens fail to vote, rendering 
the “obligation” unenforceable.   
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turnout in Mexican presidential and midterm elections since 1991, using U.S. federal 
elections as a foil:   
 
Figure 5.2:  Voter Turnout in Mexican and U.S. Federal Elections, 1991-2006.   
Participation in the three presidential elections of 1994, 2000, and 2006, averaged 66.6%, 
reaching a low of 58.6%.65  By comparison, participation rates in the four U.S. 
presidential elections from 1992 to 2004 averaged 53%, nearly 14 points less.   
Consistent with patterns elsewhere, turnout in Mexico’s midterm elections was 
lower than that for presidential contests, but still vigorous—with the exception of 41.7% 
in 2003, when disillusionment with the Fox governmet began to set in.  The average was 
55.1%, compared to 39.8% for the U.S.  Even Mexico’s 2003 nadir was higher than the 
U.S.’s midterm zenith of 40.4% during this period, registered in the 2006 congressional 
                                                
65 If adjusted for inaccurate rosters, which are slow t  remove voters who have died or emigrated and 
duplicate entries, these figures would certainly be higher.  Election authorities estimated that, as of 2005, as 
many as 15% of the voters on the rolls should not have been there.   
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elections when anger over the Iraq war got voters to the polls.  In fact, Mexico’s lowest 
midterm turnout ever is about the same as the U.S.’s 1982 all-time high of 41.8%.   
If “[n]ational elections are powerful symbols of the democratic legitimacy of a 
nation-state” (Topf 1995: 27), these figures evidence a vigorous belief in electoral 
democracy over the past 12 years.  During this period, Mexicans were justifiably proud of 
an electoral system that had gone from being the butt of their own jokes66 to a model for 
other countries.67  Gone was the colorful lexicon—“carrousel”,68 “crazy mouse”,69 “vote 
taco”70, “pregnant urn”71, and so on—describing the myriad, folkloric forms of fraud that 
the PRI and its adherents had perfected during that party’s tenure in power.  In its stead 
arose the bureaucratic lingo of electoral systems:  mayoría relativa72, diputados 
uninominales and plurinomales73 , circunscripción74, and other terms.  By the 2006 
presidential election, Mexico had made enormous strides in instilling citizen confidence 
in elections.  Furthermore, the PAN and PRD candidates were involved in a dead heat.  
What had months before seemed to be certain victory for López Obrador was now in 
                                                
66 One joke from the Salinas era goes as follows:  Carlos Salinas de Gortari, Bill Clinton, and Canadian 
Prime Minister Jean Chrétien are travelling in a private jet with only the pilot.  Suddenly, the engine fails 
and the pilot bails out, leaving only one parachute.  Each man argues that he should get the parachute, but 
none manages to convince the others.  So they decide to hold an election to determine who gets the 
parachute.  Salinas wins.  He grabs the parachute and jumps out of the plane.  The other two contemplate 
their imminent demise in silence until Chrétien says glumly:  “Well, Salinas won it.”  Clinton says, “Yeah, 
but what I don’t understand is how he won by 60 votes!”   
67 For example, at least two Electoral Counsellors (members of the IFE’s governing board), Alonso 
Lujambio and Jacqueline Peschard, advised Iraqis on their electoral system prior to their first national 
elections.   
68 A form of fraud where a voter receives a marked ballot from a local political strongman, gets a blank 
one, deposits the marked ballot in the ballot box, and returns to give the blank ballot to the local boss.   
69 When election officials move polling sites at the last minute without telling opposition voters.    
70 Rolling several ballots into a single tube similar to a rolled taco (“flauta”) stuffed with chicken or 
mashed potatoes.   
71 When polling officials stuff the ballot box (“urna”) so that there are more ballots than voters.   
72 Plurality, first-past-the-post districts.   
73 Congressional representatives from single-member (SMD) and proportional representation (PR) districts, 
respectively, in Mexico’s mixed electoral system 
74 One of Mexico’s five PR districts, each of magnitude 40.   
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doubt, generating an excitement and enthusiasm that harked back to 2000, after the gray 
2003 midterms.   
If upholding and expanding rights was a fitful process—and broad social 
inclusion of Mexicans in the benefits of economic liberalization, a virtually non-existent 
one—elections were, at least in June, 2006 (when th Desencanto Ciudadano survey was 
undertaken, before the general election in July), an unambiguously positive facet of 
Mexican democracy.  Thus, I expect that citizens who define democracy as simply a 
competitive contest to choose political leaders will be most satisfied with Mexico’s 
democratic regime.   
 
 
Figure 5.3:  Hypothesized Satisfaction with Democracy by Conceptions of Democracy.   
A simple linear model of these relationships is:  
  
 uSUBLIBELESAT +++++= SATSAT γX '3210 ββββ ,  (Eq. 5.1) 
where SAT = Level of Satisfaction with Democracy; ELE, LIB, and SUB are the 
electoral, liberal, and substantive conceptions of democracy; the vector SATX '  contains 
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other determinants of satisfaction; the β’s and the elements of the column vector SATγ  
associated with 'SATX  are parameters to be estimated; and u is a disturbance or “error 
term.”  The hypotheses are that β1  > 0, β3 < 0, and β1  > β2 > β3.   
OTHER EXPLANATIONS OF SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY :  RETROSPECTIVE 
EVALUATIONS AND PERSONAL RESOURCES 
Although conceptions of democracy are important influences on satisfaction, they 
are not the only ones.  As I explain in Chapter 2, at least two other theoretical currents 
have been marshalled to explain levels of satisfaction with democracy:  retrospective 
evaluations and personal resources.  Conceptions of democracy are a crucial for 
explaining satisfaction with democracy, but they complement (rather than replace) 
existing explanations.  I incorporate variables embodying these two schools of thought 
into my model to ensure that the effects of conceptions of democracy on satisfaction are 
not confounded with other possible causes.  Following the order the variables are laid out 
in Chapter 2, I now describe the measurement and costruction of control variables.   
Retrospective Evaluations 
The retrospective evaluations considered here are economic performance, 
government respect for rights, electoral conduct, satisfaction with government services, 
and approval of incumbent politicians.   
Economic Performance 
I am concerned here with between perceptions of economic performance, not with 
indicators of macroeconomic performance.  I do not address the thorny epistemological 
question of the extent to which public perceptions reflect reality.  At all events, economic 
information can only influence evaluations about government through the cognitive 
“microfoundation” of individual perceptions about the economy.  I adopt the distinction 
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typically made in public opinion studies between “pocketbook” (or “egoistic”) and 
“sociotropic” judgments about economic performance.  In the former, respondents are 
asked to rate their personal or household economy on an ordinal or interval scale; in the 
latter, they are asked to assess the national economy.  Pocketbook assessments make less 
strenuous cognitive demands than their sociotropic counterparts:  those require only that 
respondents have some knowledge or impression about their own financial state of affairs 
while these presume respondents have some knowledge of larger macroeconomic 
tendencies.   
Both survey questions assume that citizens attribute economic performance to 
government policy to at least some extent.  As Weatherford puts it, “[T]he government is 
assumed to possess the tools and abilities to solvecial problems” (1984, 189).  Whether 
Mexicans’ opinions of economic performance affect evaluations of the political system as 
a whole—i.e., as “an institutional design to problem solving”—or only of specific 
political actors is an open question (see Guillory and Anderson 1997: 72).  Exacerbated 
presidentialism has meant that citizens ascribe the chief executive talismanic powers over 
almost all aspects of public life, including the economy.  However, Congress’s 
increasingly visible role in formulating economic policy—especially as a veto player that 
has rejected budgets and tax increases proposed by the president—means that credit or 
blame for economic policy might now be more diffusely distributed than in the past.   
Whichever the case, the Desencanto Ciudadano survey questions made explicit 
the assumption that citizens attribute economic performance to government action.  I 
reformulated the typical sociotropic and pocketbook economic evaluation items by asking 
respondents not for their perceptions about the economy and their personal finances in 
general, but specifically about whether “government conomic decisions” have been 
“good for the country” and “good for me personally”.   
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These two items were highly correlated (Pearson’s r = .77) and seem to constitute 
two indicators of a single, broad economic perception.  I thus combined them in a single, 
additive nine-point scale (ranging from 0 to 8).  The combined variable had a mean of 
3.36, considerably below its midpoint value of 4.  Mexicans, on the whole, had 
unfavorable judgments of government economic performance.   
Favorable economic judgments should results in greate  satisfaction with 
democracy.   
Political Performance:  Respect for Rights 
The Desencanto Ciudadano survey asked respondents to agree or disagree (on a 
five-point scale including a neutral middle category) with the statements, “The federal 
government respects people’s rights” and “[t]he state government respects people’s 
rights”.  Respondents’ answers to these two items were highly correlated (Pearson’s r = 
.69), indicating that these questions may tap an underlying, overall opinion about 
observance of rights in Mexico.  I summed the respon es to these to questions to create a 
single score on a nine-point scale (ranging, again, from 0 to 8).  The mean for this 
constructed variable was 3.5, lower than the midpoint (4) but higher than the mean score 
for economic perceptions.  Thus, Mexicans judged that t e government had done a better 
job preserving rights than fostering economic growth, but that the government had done 
poorly in both respects.   
A positive evaluation of Mexican governments’ respect for rights will result in 
greater satisfaction with democracy.   
Political Performance:  Elections 
I anticipated that respondents might differentiate th ir evaluations of elections 
according to the office being elected.  There are many redoubts of political bossism 
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(caudillismo)—or “authoritarian enclaves”—at the state and local levels in Mexico that 
have resisted democratization.  Furthermore, two thirds of the states hold state and local 
elections on a different date than federal elections; in all states, state and federal elections 
are organized by different authorities.  Thus, the Desencanto Ciudadano survey included 
separate items that asked respondents to agree or disag ee (on a five-point scale including 
a neutral mid-point category) with the statements that he “past federal elections” and the 
“past state elections were clean”.   
Nonetheless, these two items were highly correlated (P arson’s r = .71).  As with 
evaluations about rights and the economy, these two questions seem to encompass an 
overall evaluation of electoral fairness.  Thus, I combine them into a single, additive 
measure ranging from 0 to 8 with a mean of 4.21.  Mexicans’ judgment of elections was, 
in contradistinction to their assessments of the economy and rights, on the balance 
positive—above the midpoint of 4.   
Positive assessments of the Mexican government’s conduct of elections should 
mean greater satisfaction with democracy.   
Government Services 
The Desencanto Ciudadano survey included four items to gauge citizen opinions 
of services.  It asked respondents to rate their sat sfaction with “provision of water”, 
“provision of electricity”, “public education”, and “police performance” on a scale of 1 to 
7.  Figure 5.4 shows the mean evaluations for each of t ese services.  On the whole, 
Mexicans are satisfied with public services, with the notable exception of public security.  
While satisfaction with electricity, water, and education are above the midpoint of 4 on 
the approval scale, the police are well below the middle.  These items’ effects on 
satisfaction with democracy are evaluated separately.   
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Figure 5.4:  Mexicans’ Evaluations of Selected Government Services, 2006.   
Although other items might have been selected as indicators of public 
contentment with government’s ability to deliver basic services, these items represent 
areas of special concern to most Mexicans.  Security and corruption continually rank high 
in opinion surveys where respondents are asked to ientify the most important problems 
facing the country; police performance encompasses both of those dimensions.  In these 
same opinion surveys, Mexicans consistently call for improvements to public education.  
In a 2005 Mitofsky poll, 25% of respondents mentioned “education” as the area on which 
the most public money should be spent, second only t  health.75   Finally, many regions 
of the country are plagued by water shortages, and repeated calls for privatization of 
electric energy cite poor service (in addition to the need for capital) as the main 
justification.   
                                                
75 Consulta Mitofsky, Boletín Semanal de Consulta, No. 135, August, 2005.   
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People who are satisfied with government services should also be more satisfied 
with democracy.   
Approval of Incumbents 
To determine if approval ratings of incumbents play a role in satisfaction with 
democracy, I included in Desencanto Ciudadano questions about the chief executives of 
the three levels of government:  federal (president of the Republic), state (governor), and 
municipal (mayor, or presidente municipal).  Respondents were asked to rate their 
satisfaction with the “performance” of each on a seven-point scale.   
Furthermore, a fourth item inquired about satisfaction with the performance of 
“Congress”, also on a seven-point scale.  It unlikely, however, that this question measures 
respondents’ opinion about the performance of individual legislators—especially since 
poll evidence reveals that most Mexicans do not know the name of their representative in 
the Chamber of Deputies (lower house) or state senators (three per state, plus an 
additional 32 elected by PR in a single circunscripción, or district).  Rather, this item 
probably captures a more generalized evaluation of the current legislature as a whole, or 
perhaps even several recent incarnations of Congress.76  Thus, the item may lie 
somewhere in between “incumbents” and “institutions” on the scale of attitudinal objects, 
combining features of both.   
Figure 5.5 shows respondents’ mean scores on the approval scales:   
 
                                                
76 Deputies’ terms last three years and all elections are concurrent.  Senators stay in office for six years and 
terms are staggered.   
 
Figure 5.5:  Mexicans’ Approval of Selected Incumbents, 2006.  
While approval of chief executives (mayors, governors,
overwhelming, each of these politicians comes in on the positive side of the approval 
ledger.  Congress, however, rates slightly below the midpoint on the approval scale.  
Each of the four items is included separately in the multivar
Citizens who rate incumbents more highly should be more satisfied with 
democracy.   
Personal Resources 
 Reiterating, the personal resources taken into account by my analysis are income, 
education, age, gender, and partisanship.  
Income 
Income is difficult to measure in Mexico.  The prevalence of workers in the 
service and informal economies, and of independent co ractors, means that earnings 




 and president) is not 
iate analysis.   
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how much he or she earns a month (or if they do, they may be reluctant to give the 
figure), standard practice asks respondents to categoriz  themselves into pre-established 
income ranges.  I treated these ordinal categories as equidistant in my analysis,  
“linearizing” the variable by assigning respondents a peso value corresponding to the 
midpoint in a category (e.g. $1,500 pesos if the category were “between $1,000 and 
$2,000 pesos) and using census data to impute values for the highest, open-ended 
category.   
Higher-income Mexicans should be more satisfied with democracy than lower-
income Mexicans.   
Education 
As with income, Mexican survey practice also often measures education in 
categories like “incomplete primary schooling” or “completed primary school.”  This 
ameliorates the potential embarrassment of respondents with lower levels of education 
and guards against a false sense of precision where respondents do not remember the 
exact year they left school.  Education was also treated as a linear variable, assigning 
respondents the number of years represented by a completed category of education and to 
the midpoint between categories when respondents did not complete a given level of 
education. 
Greater education ought to result in more satisfaction with democracy.   
Age 
As a proxy for experience and wisdom, age is another resource that might 
influence satisfaction with democracy.  In Mexico (and other new democracies), older 
survey respondents may be more satisfied with democracy, since they have direct 
memories of authoritarianism.  Older respondents are also likelier to have more stable 
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incomes and social positions.  On the other hand, youth are notorious detractors from 
politics in general.  Also, their other preoccupations (completing their studies, finding 
work, seeking a mate, and so on) may preclude them fro  high levels interest in 
politics—a variable potentially associated with political satisfaction.   
Older citizens should be more satisfied with democracy than younger ones.   
Gender 
My own analyses of other survey data (including the ENCUP and CSES) lead me 
to suspect that men will be more satisfied with democracy than women.  They also 
typically exhibit greater interest in politics and display higher levels of political 
knowledge than woman (although they do not necessarily vote in higher proportions).   
Partisanship 
The Desencanto Ciudadano survey had a battery of questions, based on the U.S. 
National Election Study (NES), designed to measure the direction and intensity of party 
support.  Respondents who reported any level of identification (“a little”, “somewhat”, or 
“a lot”) for a given party were counted as sympathizers of that party.  I thus created 
dummy variable for each of Mexico’s three leading parties, the PAN, PRI, and PRD, 
grouping those who identified no party at all (or with smaller parties) as the reference 
group.   Figure 5.6 shows the distribution of partis n identification among Mexicans just 
prior to the 2006 elections:77   
In Mexico, the PAN has been the biggest beneficiary of the transition to electoral 
democracy.  It has controlled the federal executive branch since Fox’s 2000 victory, as 
                                                
77 The distribution of partisanship—in both absolute values and rank ordering of parties—is consistent with
that yielded by other surveys.  Interestingly, while both the PAN and PRD candidates attracted a vote share 
greater than the percentage of citizens who identifi d with their parties, PRI candidate Roberto Madrazo 
actually subtracted votes from the party base (about a 22% vote share as opposed to a base of 25%).   
 
well as becoming the most numerous parliamentary group from 2000
former place as second group after the 2003 midterm elections).  Altho
continue to predominate at the state level, the PAN scored impressive victories in 
gubernatorial contests during the 1990’s, winning some nine states.  Thus, 
should exhibit satisfaction with democracy than members of other partie
Figure 5.6:  Distribution of Partisan Identification in Mexico, 2006.
THICKENING THE SATISFACTION 
In Chapter 2’s discussion of 
rebutted at length Canache 
However, their point about the risks inherent in using single
satisfaction with democracy is well taken.  
therefore combines two items
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national research):  “In general, how satisfied are you with democracy in Mexico?” and 
“In your opinion, how democratic is Mexico?”78   
Fusing the two questions into a single indicator of satisfaction is justified on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds.  A belief about the degree of democracy that Mexico 
has achieved presupposes, a priori, an evaluative judgment about how democracy is 
faring there.  It is impossible, for example, to imagine a set of circumstances in which 
(taking extreme responses) someone could be “very” satisfied with democracy yet 
believe that the country is “not at all” democratic.  Citizens are dissatisfied with 
democracy in Mexico precisely because they feel Mexico is less democratic than it 
should be.   
The numbers bear this intuition out.  Table 5.1 is a cross-classification of these 
two survey items, with the observed cell counts followed by cell counts expected under 
the independence hypothesis in parentheses:   
Table 5.1:  Cross Classification of Level of Democracy and Satisfaction with Democracy 
(Observed Cell Counts with Counts Expected Under Independence in Parentheses) 
                                                
78  I simply summed the items to obtain the satisfaction scale.  Since there were five ordinal response 
categories to the question “How satisfied are you with democracy” (“very”, “somewhat”, “neither satisfied 
nor dissatisfied”, “not very”, and “not at all”) and four for “How democratic is Mexico?” (the same as for 
the first item, omitting the middle category), adding them yields an eight-point scale ranging from 2 to 9.  
Mean satisfaction is 5.39—slightly lower than the scale’s midpoint of 5.5—and the standard deviation is 
1.6.   





 Not at All Not Very Neither/Nor Somewhat Very  
Not at All 20 (6.9) 12 (10.1) 7 (7.1) 1 (13.8) 0 (2.2) 40 
Not Very 53 (42.3) 79 (62.3) 45 (43.6) 58 (85.5) 12 ( 3.3) 247 
Somewhat 23 (47.1) 52 (69.3) 50 (48.5) 139 (95.2) 11 (14.8) 275 
Very 6 (5.7) 7 (8.3) 3 (5.8) 8 (11.4) 9 (1.8) 33 
 102 150 105 206 32 595 
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If these two variables are conceptually close, we would expect a high 
concentration of cell counts along the faux “diagonal” (including cells {2,3} and {3,4}, 
given that the table is asymmetrical), with observed c ll counts below the expected values 
moving away from the diagonal.  This is roughly what we observe.79  Indeed, there are no 
respondents who described Mexico as undemocratic ye reported being “very” satisfied 
with democracy—though the opposite, believing Mexico to be “very” democratic yet 
being extremely dissatisfied with democracy, is possible.  Relevant measures of 
association also show a high degree of correspondence between the two variables 
(Gamma = .424, Spearman’s rho = .337, Pearson’s r = .335), quite high for survey items 
dealing with the abstruse concepts present here (see Anderson 2002).  In sum, the two 
items fit together well not only logically, but also empirically.    
CONCEPTS OF DEMOCRACY AND DISENCHANTMENT IN MEXICO :  EVIDENCE  
In this section, I use data from the survey Desencanto Ciudadano en México to 
test the hypotheses set forth in the previous sections.  A “first cut” analysis compares 
mean satisfaction with democracy across the three democratic orientations identified in 
                                                
79 Under the usual chi-square test, the probability of observing these data if the variables were independent 
is .000.  I also fit a topological model to the data with the following design matrix (see Powers and Xie 
1999):   
 
1 5 5 7 0 
5 2 2 5 6 
6 5 3 3 5 
0 6 5 5 4 
 
The model is quasi-symmetrical, fitting cells on the main “diagonal” exactly, using one parameter (denot d 
“5”) to fit the cells immediately adjacent to the diagonal, another (“6”) to fit the next “off-diagonal” band, 
and a cell-specific parameter (“7”) for the {1,4} cell.  This model embodies the hypothesis of a strong 
relationship between the two variables—with the characteristic strong concentration on the main diagonl 
that weakens the farther away a cell is from it—and fits the data reasonably well:  model chi-square of .15 
(here, values farther away from .00 are better) and a Bayesian Information Criterion value of -22.26, on 
five degrees of freedom.   
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Chapter 2.  Figure 5.7 is a bar chart representing the mean satisfaction score (on the 









Figure 5.7:  Comparison of Mean Satisfaction with Democracy by Concept of 
Democracy.   
As expected, electoral democrats are most satisfied w th democracy, with a mean 
satisfaction score of 3.79 (on a scale of 0 to 7), followed by liberal democrats (3.42) and 
substantive democrats (3.26).  The midpoint of the scale is 3.5 and the average for all 
respondents who evidenced a definite attitude toward democracy is 3.36.  Thus, liberal 
democrats are slightly above the average but below the midpoint, whereas electoral 
democrats are above both and substantive democrats, below.   
The dashed line in Figure 5.7 is the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval 
for electoral democrats (3.36, 3.97), which is above the mean score for substantive 
democrats (3.26) and slightly below for that of liberal democrats (3.42).  The solid line is 
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which excludes the mean for electoral democrats and barely includes that for liberal 
democrats.  The means for substantive and electoral democrats are, in fact, different from 
one another, although neither is (at the 95% confide ce level) distinct from that of liberal 
democrats.   
This glimpse at the evidence supports the idea that conceptions of democracy do 
indeed affect support for it.  But do they continue to have this apparent effect even after 
taking into account other causes of support?  The estimates from a hierarchical linear 
model (HLM, also known as a random effects or multi-level model) incorporating the 
variables described above confirms that they do. 
A word about hierarchical linear models may be in order.  The two units of 
analysis included in the HLM were individuals nested in electoral sections.80  There are 
two reasons for using HLMs, one technical, the other substantive.  Technically, HLMs 
correct for spatial autocorrelation often present in clustered data.  Respondents living in 
the same geographical area often share many of the at itudes and values, and therefore 
give similar answers to survey items.  In other words, respondents from the same place 
often exhibit within-group correlation that puts them, on the whole, above or below the 
mean for all respondents, violating the classical regression assumption of zero correlation 
among error terms.   
Substantively, HLMs allow us to test the hypothesis that, in addition to variation 
across individuals, there is also variation across groups.  They accomplish this by 
producing, in addition to the usual OLS parameters, a “variance component” (2uσ ) that 
represents the estimated standard deviation of group means around the overall sample 
mean.  Since these group means can be conceived of as drawn at random from some 
                                                
80 The sample was a multi-stage, clustered sample in wh ch 65 electoral sections were chosen randomly 
and then 10 individuals selected in each section.   
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probability distribution (usually the normal), the variance component is also called a 
“random effect”, and models that estimate variance components are known as random 
effects models.   
The “interclass correlation coefficient” (ICC) provides a measure of group 
variability as a percentage of overall variability.  It is simply level-two variance divided 








This number ranges between 0 and 1, as readily perceiv d from the formula.  
Where the ICC is statistically higher than 0, the substantive meaning is that living in a 
geographical cluster significantly alters one’s value on the dependent variable—in this 
case, attitudes toward democracy.  Thus, HLMs provide a way to test for the existence of 
“context effects”, or “unobserved heterogeneity” in which unspecified environmental 
factors contribute to group-level variability on the dependent variable.   Here, the inter-
class correlation coefficient is .05, meaning that about 5% of overall variation is due to 
variability across electoral sections.  In other wods, factors  
Table 5.2 presents the results. The hypothesized rank order of conceptions of 
democracy vis-à-vis satisfaction with democracy obtains even after including other 
variables that explain satisfaction.  Electoral democrats are most satisfied, followed by 





Table 5.2:  Hierarchical Linear Model Regression on Satisfaction with Democracy.81   
                                                
81 I also regressed the same variables on the single-item, 5-pt. indicator for satisfaction with democracy, 
and the results were substantially the same (using both linear and ordinal logistic parameterizations):  the 
rank order was always the same for substantive, libral, and electoral democrats, and the 95% confidence 
interval for the parameter associated with electoral democracy always excluded the parameter value for 
Variable B se p 
Concepts of Democracy    
   Substantive -.055 .030 .066 * 
   Liberal -.024 .030 .436 
   Electoral  .069 .031 .024 ** 
Partisanship    
   PAN   .573 .196 .003 *** 
   PRI -.130 .195 .504 
   PRD  .537 .215 .012 ** 
Economic Performance  .187 .038 .000 *** 
Political Performance:  Rights  .114 .039 .004 *** 
Political Performance:  Elections  .067 .039 .088 * 
Government Services    
    Water  .063 .041 .118 
    Electricity  .037 .044 .392 
    Public Education  .012 .042 .776 
    Police -.043 .039 .271 
Incumbents    
   President Fox  .007 .047 .885 
   State Governor  .004 .041 .929 
   Mayor  .059 .042 .169 
   Congress  .139 .051 .006 *** 
Sociodemographic Conditions    
   Sex  .143 .147 .333 
   Age -.006 .005 .293 
   Income (per $1,000 pesos) -.030 .020 .129 
   Education  .009 .020 .648 
Rho  .049   
    
Adj. R2 = 0.29    
N = 434    
*      p < .10    
**    p < .05     
***  p < .01    
 134 
 
The parameter estimates for the electoral, liberal, and substantive democracy 
attitudinal scales are .069, -.024, and -.055, respectively.  Hypothesis testing 
demonstrates that the effects are mostly distinguishable from one another.  The electoral 
democracy point estimate is clearly higher than those for the liberal and substantive 
democracy scales.  If the electoral and liberal democracy parameters in reality had the 
same value, the probability of observing the difference produced by the model (.093) is p 
= .036.  Similarly, the probability of observing the difference between the electoral and 
substantive democracy parameters (.124) is p = .004 under the null hypothesis that the 
difference is 0.  (However, the parameter estimates for ubstantive and liberal democracy 
are statistically indistinguishable; under the null hypothesis of no difference, the 
probability of the observed difference, .031, is p = .470.)   
Controlling for the model’s other regressors heightens the differences between 
concepts of democracy, compared to the ANOVA-type analysis shown in Figure 5.7.  In 
the means comparison, mean satisfaction for liberal democrats was not statistically 
different from that of either substantive or electoral democrats.  In the multivariate 
model, however, liberal democrats were considerably less satisfied with democracy than 
electoral democrats.   
Furthermore, definitions of democracy have important effects on support for it.  
The coefficient for the substantive view of democracy, -.055 (p = .066), means that 
moving from the minimum value on the attitudinal scale (0) to the maximum value (16) 
reduces a respondent’s satisfaction with democracy by .88 points on the seven-point 
satisfaction scale, a movement of over 12.5% of the dependent variable’s range.   
                                                                                                                                      
substantive democracy.  The major differences are that the effect for electoral democracy becomes weaker 
and insignificant at conventional levels (B = .027, p = 0.26 in the HLM) and that there is no evidence of 
variation across electoral sections (rho = 0).   
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The electoral view of democracy has an even stronger eff ct in the opposite 
direction.  The parameter value associated with defining democracy primarily as selection 
of political leadership through free and fair elections is .069 (p = .024).  Thus, a 
respondent at the maximum point of the electoral scle is, on average and all other things 
being equal, over 1.1 points higher on the satisfaction indicator than her counterpart at the 
minimum of the democracy scale—a movement of around 15.8% of the dependent 
variable’s range.   
The coefficient for the liberal view of democracy as  collection of freedoms is 
-.024.  However, the high p-value indicates that the liberal view of democracy has no 
appreciable impact on satisfaction.  That is, its effect statistically indistinguishable from 
zero—although, to reiterate, the effect is significantly smaller than an electoral view of 
democracy’s.   
Other Determinants of Satisfaction 
Retrospective evaluations and cognitive personal resources also had important 
implications for satisfaction with democracy.  Of the control variables, psychological 
identification with two political parties, the ruling PAN and the perennial outs, the PRD, 
had the most significant impact on satisfaction.  PAN sympathizers were, on average, 
nearly six-tenths of a point higher on the satisfaction scale (nearly 8.2% of the range) 
than other citizens.  Affective affinity with the PRD caused a similar rise in satisfaction 
of .54 points on the seven-point scale (7.7% of the range).  On the other hand, priístas 
were on the whole neither more nor less satisfied than other citizens.   
The source of the PAN’s satisfaction is obvious.  When the survey was taken in 
June, 2006, it had controlled the presidency for five and a half years, constituted the 
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largest parliamentary group for over half of that time, and governed in nine states as well 
as about a fifth of Mexico’s municipalities.   
At first blush, the source of PRD adherents’ satisfction is less apparent, but a 
moment’s reflection reveals that it is related to the timing of the poll.  The party’s 
candidate, López Obrador, had been ahead in the polls for two years and, despite a fierce 
opposition onslaught, had a better than even chance of winning the presidency.  The 
absence of a relationship between inclining toward the PRI and support for democracy is 
perhaps due to the party’s mixed electoral performance over the past six years.  The party 
lost the presidency, but bounced back in the 2003 midterm elections.   
Government economic and political performance also influenced satisfaction with 
democracy.  Of the performance evaluations, respondents’ overall perception of the 
impact of government economic policy on the country and their household economies 
was most associated with increasing satisfaction with democracy.  The coefficient for 
economic performance was .187.  Thus, moving from the minimum to the maximum on 
the eight-point economic evaluation scale elevates sati faction by about 1.5 points, nearly 
21.4% of the range.   
Aspects of political performance were also important, although less so than 
opinions on economic performance.  Interviewees’ globa  perception of government 
respect for rights shapes their support for democracy significantly, with a coefficient of 
.114.  Those at the highest point on the eight-point rights scale scored, on average, nine-
tenths of a point higher on the satisfaction scale (13% of the range) than those with the 
lowest possible evaluation of rights.   
Finally, perceptions of the federal and state governments’ ability to organize clean 
and fair elections were positively related to support f r democracy.  The coefficient was 
.067, implying just over a half-point difference insatisfaction between those at the 
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maximum and minimum points on the clean election scale.  This represents about 7.7% 
of the dependent variable’s range.   
These results are roughly consistent with those yielded by other polls.  My own 
dynamic analyses of the 2001 and 2003 waves of the National Survey on Political 
Cultural (ENCUP) revealed that perceptions of economic performance, respect for rights, 
and electoral hygiene were highly related to changing satisfaction with democracy in the 
early years of the Fox administration (see Chapter 6 in this volume, and Crow 2004, 
2006).  In those analyses, democratic advancement mattered more to Mexicans than 
economic accomplishments in shaping regime support.  Whether or not economics counts 
more than politics, both were clearly more important than other determinants of 
satisfaction considered in the ENCUP.   
Similarly, my own analysis of the 2000 and 2003 Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems (CSES) data in Mexico shows that citizens’ beliefs about whether elections were 
fraudulent or not has a clear impact on both their proclivity to vote and were more 
satisfied with democracy.  In 2000, the odds of voting for citizens who believed the last 
elections were clean were 25% higher than those for th se who thought elections were 
fraudulent.   For the 2003 midterm elections, believ rs in clean elections’ odds of voting 
were 20% higher than skeptics’ odds.  In the same vein, satisfaction with the conduct of 
elections increased satisfaction with democracy in both years.   
Another important cause of satisfaction with democracy is approval of Congress.  
The effect associated with this variable is comparable to that of government respect for 
rights.  The coefficient of .139 means that the aver g  difference in satisfaction with 
democracy between those with the most positive evaluation of Congress (a score of 7) 
and those with the most negative (a score of 1) is over eight-tenths of a point, or close to 
12% of the range of the dependent variable.   
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As explained above, it is probably more accurate to interpret congressional 
approval as an attitude toward an institution rather an toward the individuals who, at the 
time of the poll, personified the institution.  For one thing, the survey item was phrased to 
ask about Congress in general, rather than any specific representative.  Perhaps more 
tellingly, an overwhelming number of Mexicans do not know who their SMD 
representative is.  The most highly visible politicians are tapped for PR seats so they are 
assured a seat.  Thus, the peculiarities of Mexico’s mixed electoral system—and the lack 
of a tradition of personal representation and “constituent work” in Mexican politics—
contribute to SMD legislators’ status as virtual unknowns.   
The variables that failed to impact satisfaction with democracy were incumbent 
evaluations, contentment with provision of public services, and individual conditions.  
Contrary to what I hypothesized, and what other studies have found, Mexicans’ 
evaluations of federal, state, and municipal chief executives had no bearing on their 
evaluations of democracy.  The coefficients for Presid nt Fox and state governors were 
.007 and .004, respectively, both with p-values above .88.   
The lack of a relationship between presidential andgubernatorial approval and 
satisfaction with democracy is surprising in a country of traditionally top-down politics, 
presidentialism, and caudillismo.  However, it is consistent with the interpretation that 
some commentators have offered of high presidential approval ratings—especially those 
of Fox—as reflective more of the president’s positive valence than of widespread 
approbation of his policies or performance.  Mayoral evaluations came closest to 
affecting satisfaction with democracy (coefficient of .059), but the p-value of .169 is too 
high to exclude the possibility that the coefficient value is an artifact of sampling 
variability.   
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Opinions of “system outputs”—basic government services such as supplying 
water, electricity, education, and public security—similarly had no bearing on support for 
democracy.  Although a crucial component of modern governance is the ability to 
provide public goods, Mexicans’ experience may lead them to dissociate supply of these 
goods with specifically democratic governance.  Authoritarian rule under the PRI, 
especially during the heyday from around 1940 to 1970, did a reasonable job at building 
the country’s material infrastructure.  Despite numerous deficiencies, Mexico’s public 
education system also performed adequately in raising literacy rates.  So, it seems 
reasonable to speculate that Mexicans’ expectations of democracy go well beyond getting 
basic services and that, therefore, how well the government furnishes them has little to do 
with how citizens evaluate democracy.   
Also contrary to expectation is the null effect of individual socioeconomic 
circumstances on support for democracy.  Men are not more satisfied with democracy 
than women.  Older citizens are not more satisfied than the young, nor the well-off more 
than the less affluent, nor the better educated more than those with less schooling.   
The sociodemographic variable that comes closest to having a discernible impact 
is income, but what effect there may be is in the opposite direction than previous studies 
would have led us to believe.  The negative coeffici nt, -.03, implies that for every 
$1,000 pesos more a respondent makes per month, his or er satisfaction with democracy 
decreases by three-hundredths of a point.  It may be that income here is a proxy for other 
assets like access to information, high-level social contacts, and education (with which 
income is correlated at .45), and so on, that make higher earners more critical and 
independent of government largesse.  But a p-value of nearly .13 means that this effect 
may be merely an artifact of this particular sample.   
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Furthermore, it is possible that sociodemographic variables have an i direct effect 
on satisfaction through evaluations of democratic performance.  That is, 
sociodemographic conditions may determine attitudes, which in turn affect support for 
democracy.  In this case, the effect of social conditions would be absorbed through 
attitudinal variables.   
CONCLUSIONS 
Substantive democrats’ greater disillusionment with democracy in Mexico, as 
well as the other causes of dissatisfaction discussed above, could have far-reaching 
implications both for Mexico and other emerging democracies.  The analysis suggests 
that Mexicans’ dissatisfaction is deep-seated and may have already generalized to a fairly 
high level.  Moreover, substantive definitions of democracy are intensifying 
dissatisfaction with democracy elsewhere in Latin America and the world—a topic I take 
it in Chapter 7.   
Disenchantment with democracy in Mexico goes well byond disapproval of 
incumbent politicians, unhappiness with provision of services, and belonging to a party 
other than those currently favored by electors (or not belonging to any party at all).  The 
most important determinant, the perception of economic malaise, is a relatively long-term 
judgment formed virtually over the duration of the Fox government.  The greatest cause 
of dissatisfaction with democracy is precisely the ar a where Mexican democracy has 
performed worse, according to Desencanto Ciudadano respondents.   
Perhaps more worrisome, those who expect democracy to deliver economic 
progress—substantive democrats—are those who are least satisfied with the new 
Mexican regime.  This bespeaks a perhaps long-lasting mismatch between what citizens 
want and need, and what Mexican democracy is delivering.  Of course, all Mexicans’ 
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attitudes toward democracy are colored by economic performance.  But substantive 
democrats’ dissatisfaction is on top of their evaluations of economic performance.  That 
is, socioeconomic expectations of democracy are addd to assessments of poor economic 
performance, making these citizens’ outlook for democracy even dimmer.  And, as 
shown in Chapter 4, the substantive view of democracy is the most prevalent in Mexico.  
In short, the facts point to general dissatisfaction with democracy in Mexico rooted in 
causes that seem to be relatively enduring.   
The Mexican holds lessons for other countries.  Mexico’s low-to-middling 
economic develop—characterized by high levels of poverty and inequality, and low 
economic growth of which the benefits are spread uneve ly—and its low satisfaction 
with democracy make the country typical of new, and poor, democracies.  Thus, we 
might expect citizens of these democracies to have a predominantly substantive view of 
democracy, expecting government to intervene and better their lots in life.  Studies of 
other Latin American countries and post-Soviet societies suggest that this is indeed the 
case.  As I show in Chapter 7, heightened socioeconomic expectations of democracy 
appear to be contributing to disenchantment with democracy elsewhere in the world.   
Why should dissatisfaction worry us, though?  An auscultation of its effects on 
political participation reveals that disenchantment is indeed cause for concern.  In the 
next chapter, I turn to the consequences of dissatisfac on with democracy in Mexico—
and, in particular, to its toxic effects on political participation.    
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CHAPTER 6 
The Consequences:  Dissatisfaction with Democracy and Political 
Participation in Mexico 
In this chapter, I turn to the consequences of dissatisfaction with democracy in 
Mexico.  In particular, I examine dissatisfaction’s implications for political 
participation—three particular aspects of it, to be more precise.  Dissatisfied citizens vote 
less, engage in individual, non-electoral participation less, and protest more, even after 
accounting for the effects of social conditions and political attitudes other than 
satisfaction with democracy that influence participation.   
The chapter proceeds as follows.  First, I discuss political participation generally 
and in Mexico specifically, focusing on the three forms of participation my study 
embraces and citing survey evidence to give an idea of the prevalence of each in Mexico.  
I draw a broad distinction between institutional and contentious forms of participation—
labels that supplant the empirically inaccurate and semantically loaded terms 
“conventional” and “unconventional”.  This distinction will be crucial for differentiating 
the effects of dissatisfaction with democracy on political participation.   
Then, countering a central thrust of democratic consolidation theory I argue that 
the import of dissatisfaction with democracy lies as much in its deleterious effects on the 
quality of democracy as it does in the possibility of reversion to authoritarianism.  The 
most widespread danger is not that dissatisfied citizens will clamor for a return to 
autocracy, but that their political systems will congeal into “diminished” or “illiberal” 
democracies rather than full-blown liberal democracies.  The key link between 
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dissatisfaction and the quality of democracy is participation.  Dissatisfaction diminishes 
institutional participation, which may in turn weaken representative links between 
citizens and lawmakers and reduce the possibility that he former can hold the latter 
accountable for their actions.  Responsiveness and accountability are both crucial 
components of democratic quality.  On the other hand, dissatisfaction increases 
contentious participation, which I take as an indicator rather than a cause of low 
democratic quality.   
Finally, I present my statistical models and the results of the quantitative analysis.  
These results draw mainly upon the Citizen Disenchantment survey, but I also adduce 
evidence from the Mexican National Survey on Political Culture (ENCUP, in Spanish), 
carried out in 2001, 2003, and 2005.  I conclude with some musings on the future of 
political participation in Mexico.   
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN MEXICO :  BETWEEN INSTITUTIONS AND CONTENTION  
In democracies, political participation is action that private citizens undertake to 
influence government and its decisions (Milbraith and Goel 1977: 2).  Of course, political 
activity is not peculiar to democracies.  Authoritarian governments often deepen their 
control over society by mobilizing subjects to demonstrate mass support for the regime 
and ferret out dissidents.  Those who criticize the government do so clandestinely and 
often at great risk.  In contrast, democratic participation is characterized by autonomy 
from the state and the vastly wider range of actions available to citizens.  Democratic 
participation need not be spontaneous—in fact, it is most effective when highly organized 
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by skilled leaders—but it must be voluntary.  It even transgresses the law at times (though 
it is never violent), and many democracies cherish t aditions of civil disobedience.   
The means citizens use to shape democratic politics are myriad:  they may be 
individual or collective; they may be aimed at political authorities directly or indirectly, 
as when citizens seek to persuade and organize other citizens; and they support or 
confront government institutions.  The ends to which these means are employed are 
equally broad, ranging from particularist petitions to solve individual problems to 
communal demands of a regional or national scope.   
Empirical studies on political participation have sought to make sense of this 
variety of possibilities in at least two ways.  Some classify similar activities into broad 
categories, often using data reduction techniques sch as factor analysis (see, e.g., Verba 
and Nie 1972).  Others array political activities on a continuum (sometimes using 
unidimensional scaling techniques) according to criteria such as the amount of effort, 
coordination, or risk a given activity entails, or its degree of social acceptability (see, e.g., 
Marsh 1974, Verba et al. 1978, and McAllister 1992).  Having thus made participation 
more tractable to analysis, scholars then typically examine the socioeconomic, attitudinal, 
and ideological determinants of participation.  Relatively few studies, however, have 
analyzed the role that satisfaction with democracy plays in determining both ow much 
and how citizens participate in politics.    
My aim in this study is not an exhaustive catalog of p litical participation in 
Mexico.  Rather, I focus on a limited—but important—set of activities:  voting, 
individual, non-electoral action, and protest.  Nor d  I contribute to the proliferation of 
typologies here.  For my purposes, one overarching d stinction suffices for explaining 
much of the relationship between satisfaction with democracy and political action, that 
between institutional and contentious participation, a distinction upon which I elaborate 
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below in the section “Satisfaction with Democracy and Political Participation”.  The first 
two forms of participation, voting and individual, non-electoral activity, are institutional.  
Protest is contentious.   
Voting 
In representative democracies (that is to say, all existing democracies), voting is 
the quintessential act of political participation.  Beyond its privileged place in democratic 
theory as the foremost expression of political equality, it is by far the activity in which the 
greatest number of citizens participates.  For thisreason, electoral participation merits 
special attention apart from other activities also classified as “institutional”.   
Chapter 5 detailed turnout rates in Mexico during and after the democratic 
transition.  They are high relative to turnout in the United States, but declining.  Under 
dominant-party rule turnout regularly exceeded 75%, and rose as high as 90%.  Lower 
rates during the democratic transition of the 1990’s signalled the debilitation of 
corporatist mobilizing structures more than citizen apathy.  However, continued decline 
from 2000 on is probably, in part, a symptom of decreasing satisfaction with democracy, 
which fell concurrently with voter turnout.  Though t e analysis based on the 2006 
Citizen Disenchantment survey is cross-sectional, I present evidence from surveys carried 
out earlier in the 2000’s that buttress this interpr tation.   
Individual, Non-Electoral Participation 
Though voting is the main way citizens participate politically, it is not the only 
one.  Individual citizens attempt to influence political authorities in many other ways, 
such as contacting legislators and signing petitions.  They also attempt to persuade and 
organize other citizens by writing letters for publication in newspapers, calling radio talk 
shows, handing out political flyers, and displaying si ns, among other things.  This class 
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of activities is subsumed under the rubric of “indivi ual, non-electoral participation”—
shortened at times simply to “individual participation” or “engagement”.  Though some 
of these actions may be related to election campaigns (for example, signs typically urge 
neighbors to vote for one or another candidate), I use the phrase “non-electoral” to 
distinguish them from the act of voting.  Individual p rticipation is also institutional.   
In Mexico, this type of political participation is relatively infrequent.  For 
example, according the 2005 wave of the World Values Survey, 21% of Mexicans have 
signed a petition at some time (compared to 80% of U.S. citizens).  The 2005 ENCUP 
reports that 14% of Mexican citizens have written the president or other political 
authorities at some point in their lives.  By contras , some 21% of U.S. citizens have 
called, written, or visited authorities in the past year, according to the 2004 American 
National Election Study (ANES).  In the same vein, the 2005 ENCUP reports that 20% of 
Mexicans have written letters to newspapers, 13% have c lled a radio or TV program, 
and 10% have displayed a political sign or banner.82  It is perhaps surprising that 
individual engagement is even this high, given that(according to the same survey) 68% 
of Mexicans believe that lawmakers either take intoaccount their party’s interests or their 
own personal interests when formulating legislation.   
Protest 
In contrast to voting and individual non-electoral action, marches, demonstrations, 
sit-ins, and the like are contentious forms of political participation.  Mexicans’ 
involvement in protest is also comparatively low.  In the 2005 World Values Survey 16% 
of Mexicans reported having participated in lawful demonstrations (compared to 21% of 
U.S. citizens in the 2004 ANES).  The 1999-2000 WVS put the percentage of people who 
                                                
82 No comparable data are available for U.S. citizens.   
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have engaged in lawful protest during their lives at 3% for Mexico, while the 2005 
ENCUP puts this figure at 14%.   
Studies of political participation in the industrial democracies undertaken in the 
1970’s—after the widespread social unrest that beset the United States and Europe during 
the previous decade—labelled voting and individual engagement (as well as membership 
in civic and community organizations) “conventional” participation.  Protest was 
“unconventional”.  I eschew these labels in the Mexican case for two reasons.  First, 
protest in Mexico may be as “conventional” as other forms of political participation.  
Depending on the survey one relies upon, Mexicans protest as frequently as they 
undertake some other, institutional political actions.  Furthermore, many varieties of 
protest are “conventional” in the sense of drawing on well-known discursive and 
behavioral repertoires.   
Second, the term “unconventional” carries an unfavor ble normative connotation, 
reflective in many cases of the trepidation with which some, especially conservative 
scholars, viewed the protests of the 1960’s and early 1970’s.  As I argue below, protest 
entails the exercise of inherently democratic rights; i  is a regular feature of citizen 
participation in all established democracies.  Thus, I use the terms “institutional” and 
“contentious” as rough synonyms for “conventional” nd “unconventional”, respectively.  
The former terms seem more descriptive while avoiding the judgmental baggage of the 
earlier language.   
BEYOND CONSOLIDATION THEORY :  FROM DEMOCRATIC SURVIVAL TO THE QUALITY 
OF DEMOCRACY  
The relatively concrete behavioral focus of this study contrasts with the more 
sweeping concern prevalent in other studies on popular support for democracy:  
democratic breakdown.  Diamond has observed that each “wave” of democratic 
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expansion has been followed by a period of contraction, an ebbing of democracy’s tides 
(1996).  Thus, it was natural for public opinion studies in new democracies to focus on 
political dissatisfaction’s implications for the survival of democracy (see, e.g., Mattes t 
al. 2000, Mishler and Rose 1997, Lagos 2001, and Seligson and Carrion 2002).  Would 
dissatisfaction with the performance of democratic governments erode support for 
democratic ideals?  Would disillusioned citizens yearn for an authoritarian past, 
especially one that produced some measure of economic well-being?  In the Mexican 
context, Moreno and Méndez found that Moreno and Méndez conclude that “a large 
group of Mexicans would prefer to sacrifice civil and political liberties rather than submit 
themselves to economic adversity” (2002: 143).  If democratic rule rests, at least in part, 
on an attitudinal foundation that views democracy as “the only game in town”—as the 
civic culture school of analysis holds—lopsided scores that continually favored the well-
off and powerful may lead the losers to want to change the game entirely.  Dissatisfaction 
might jeopardize consolidation of new democracies and cause reversion to 
authoritarianism.   
The good news was that dissatisfaction with democracy among citizens in new 
democracies did not, for the most part, diminish attitudinal support for democratic 
principles or herald the collapse of democracy.  I do not argue that disenchantment will 
lead to democratic breakdown in Mexico (though it may have helped hasten on a return 
to authoritarianism elsewhere).  Though it is no longer clear that Mexico is transitioning 
toward liberal democracy, neither has it lapsed back into frankly authoritarian rule.  
President Felipe Calderón deftly defused the crisis of legitimacy after the controversial 
2006 election by consolidating his standing with key constituencies (the military and 
business elites, for example) and, indeed, the public at large, among which he enjoys 
relatively high approval ratings.  Similarly, democra y has survived acute economic and 
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political crises in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela over the last decade 
or so.  Reversion to authoritarianism may owe more t  lite polarization and strategic 
interaction than to feeble popular support for democracy (Przeworski 1992b).  
The bad news, though, is that merely maintaining the formal trappings of 
democratic rule does not ensure that budding democracies will flourish and become full-
fledged liberal (or substantive) democracies.  Arguin  against the teleological tint of 
democratic transition theory, Carothers (2002) observes that rather than either 
consolidating or failing, most new democracies remain stuck in a kind of hinterland:  the 
military juntas of yore fail to reappear, but political authorities in democratically elected 
governments routinely abuse their power, abridge political and civil rights, engage in 
corruption, and represent their own interests at the expense of their constituents’.  In 
Latin America and elsewhere, “feckless pluralism” produces alternation in power among 
political parties, but precious little improvement i  citizens’ lives.  These “partial” or 
“illiberal” democracies are increasingly common, accounting for around 30% of the 
world’s polities in 2000 (Epstein et al. 2006, Zakaria 2003).  As Marta Lagos puts it, “For 
these countries, the problem is not so much the threa  of renewed authoritarianism but the 
existence of distinct, and in some ways diminished, forms of democracy” (2001: 2).  The 
significance of political dissatisfaction is not its implications for the survival of 
democracy, but for the quality of democracy.   
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY  
Political participation is related to the quality of democracy in at least two ways.  
On its own, participation is an indicator of democratic quality.  It is also shapes other 
components of high quality democracy, including “vertical accountability” and 
government responsiveness, in significant ways.  According to classical political theory, 
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democracy thrives when citizens are well-informed, interested in politics, and participate 
actively in the political process (Almond and Verba 1963, Putnam et al. 1993).  
Democracy can and does endure even in the absence of this ideal citizenry—nowhere 
observed in the real world—but a nucleus of “attentive citizens” (Dahl 1989) is probably 
necessary for democracy to deepen.  The formal existence of political rights is not 
enough to ensure democratic quality; citizens must exercise these rights by voting, 
participating in political parties and civic organizations, discussing policy issues with 
fellow citizens, and communicating with elected officials (Diamond and Morlino 2004: 
23-24).83   
Intense participation also increases the quality of democracy by contributing to 
vertical accountability, or citizens’ ability to hold political authorities answerable for their 
decisions.  Citizens can wield the vote to punish abuses of power or poor performance, 
turning deficient politicians and parties out of power if enough citizens concur in 
assessing incumbents negatively (and agree on an alternative).  But, as Phillippe 
Schmitter points out, government turnover, loss-of-confidence votes, and the like are 
hardly the only mechanisms through which leaders are held accountable.  When 
politicians inform constituents of their choices and explain their policy rationales, they 
participate in an “ordinary cycle of accountability” (Schmitter 2004: 49) that depends no 
less on citizen participation than more dramatic manifestations of accountability.  
                                                
83  To be sure, there are skeptics regarding the desirability of political participation.  Some conservati e 
scholars, in particular, have argued that excessive participation could jeopardize political stability.  
Huntington, for example, claimed that protest undermines the weak institutions typical of developing 
countries by burdening them with demands they are incapable of processing (Huntington 1968).  “Elitist 
democratic theory” posited that mass participation c uld destabilize even established democracies, and that 
popular demands should be channeled through elite-controlled institutions (Kariel 1970).  High voter 
turnout could produce undesirable consequences, since it would privilege the views of lesser-educated an  
–informed citizens over those of those with greater cognitive competence.  Even in their heyday during the 
late 1960’s and 1970’s, though, these contrarian views were in the minority, and it appears that they ave 
fallen increasingly into disfavor.   
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Citizens must demand these explanations, listen to and process them, and be ready to act 
upon them by pressuring incumbents and, if necessary, replacing them.   
Of course, political participation is only one of several ingredients in the 
accountability recipe.  Widely available information about government activities and 
inter-party competition that provides citizens real alternatives to incumbents are two 
others.  Participation is, thus, an insufficient but necessary condition for vertical 
accountability.   
Political participation can also strengthen representative linkages between citizens 
and decision-makers and foster greater government responsiveness to citizen demands.  
In theory, the “democratic process induces the governm nt to form and implement 
policies the citizens want” (Powell 2004: 91).  The road that translates preferences into 
policy is a winding one, of course.  The structure of policy choices, their complexity and 
citizen uncertainty about them, different rules forinterest aggregation, and hurdles to 
collective action that inhibit achievement of shared goals are just a few of the filters 
through which public preferences must pass before becoming policy.  Furthermore, not 
all linkages between citizens and leaders in democracies are programmatic:  they may 
also be ideological, clientelistic, and charismatic (Kitschelt 2000).  Political participation 
in the context of non-programmatic representative lnkages could increase government 
responsiveness where there is an exchange of policy outcomes for votes (or other forms 
of support), but it could also diminish responsiveness by allowing well organized 
minorities to dominate state institutions.   
Even if political participation does not guarantee r sponsive government, it is still 
an essential condition for responsiveness.  Citizens must make their desires known to 
political leaders and press them to adopt appropriate policies.  The more citizens who do 
so, the greater the likelihood that government will reflect public demands.  Despite 
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difficulties in turning preferences into law, governments often are responsive, at least in 
the established democracies.  A number of studies on the United States and Western 
Europe have compared public opinion surveys with policy outcomes over long periods of 
time and concluded that government policies do, in fact, generally reflect citizen 
preferences (Jacobs and Shapiro 1994).  Of course, accountability and responsiveness are 
also mutually reinforcing attributes:  leaders are more apt to listen to their constituents if 
they face consequences for not doing so.   
In sum, active citizen participation in politics both indicates high democratic 
quality in and of itself, and nurtures (though does not assure) other elements of high 
quality democracy.  Of the three forms of participation considered here—voting, 
individual political activity, and protest—the first two would appear to be unambiguously 
propitious for democratic quality.  The more voting and non-electoral civic engagement, 
the better.  Not only are these forms of participation desirable from the standpoint of 
normative political theory (most of it, anyway), they also lay the groundwork for better 
governance.   
Protest, however, is a thornier matter:  its implications for democratic quality are 
more ambiguous.  On the one hand, peaceful demonstrations constitute an exercise of 
democratic rights characteristic of high-quality democracies.  Organized protest has a 
well-established place in the repertoire of democratic political participation, and public 
demonstrations routinely take place in advanced democracies.  Democracy itself entails 
freedoms (of association, of assembly, etc.) that add up to a right to collective protest.  
The unimpeded use of this right is a sign of a “good” democracy (Diamond 2004: 23).   
On the other hand, protests can reasonably be interpre d as a sign of diminished 
democratic quality—especially when they are massive and sustained.  They indicate a 
failure of institutional mechanisms for processing citizen demands.  Citizens generally 
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turn to contentious forms of claim-making when they p rceive that they cannot get what 
they want through institutional channels and believ strongly in their cause.84  Protest 
often requires greater effort than other forms of participation, and protestors risk their 
own physical safety to some degree.  That some citizens would resort to a relatively 
costly, potentially dangerous form of political participation signals a partial breakdown of 
political representation.  Furthermore, in illiberal democracies protests often occur in 
“authoritarian enclaves” and are aimed at local autocratic leaders.  In this case, protest is 
an even clearer indication of poor democratic quality.   
Protest is also problematic for democratic quality because of an inherent, latent 
potential for violence.  Even peaceful protest owes part of its effectiveness to a show of 
strength, and implicit possibility of violence, tha unsettles political authorities (Tarrow 
1998: 105, Tilly 2003: 196-197).  Demonstrators could become violent.  Beyond the 
possibility of normally level-headed citizens’ tempers flaring in the heat of the moment, 
protests inevitably attract a radical fringe that eschews gradualism in favor of violent 
change.  This is why organizers often train demonstrators in techniques of non-violent 
resistance and police their own ranks, identifying violent interlopers to police.  For their 
part, political authorities often resort to public force in dealing with protests—especially 
in illiberal democracies, in which governments see ev ry protest as a riot in the making 
and are less hesitant to quash dissent.  Here, though, it is not the protest itself, but official 
repression that degrades the quality of democracy.   
                                                
84 In contrast to this perspective of instrumental rationality, some more sociologically-inclined students of 
contentious politics view protest through the lens of group identity:  people participate in marches, at least 
in part, to express and solidify their identification with others who share their worldview (see, e.g., Melucci 
1988).  Undoubtedly, not all elements present in a protest can be explained by a desire to change 
government policy; for example, some chants and slogans emphasize collective solidarity rather than make 
concrete demands.  But instrumental rationality and social psychology explanations are entirely compatible.  
Even if the psychological satisfaction of collective identity-building motivates some protestors more than 
the prospect of making their demands known (especially given uncertainty over how, or if, authorities will 
respond to those demands), frustration with policy outcomes appears to be a necessary trigger for protest.   
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Of course, to the extent that protest becomes an institutionalized staple of the 
repertoire of contentious political action, the risk of violence diminishes.  In some 
countries, police even provide advice and protection t  protestors.  However, in 
Mexico—and probably most new democracies—the degree of institutionalization is 
uneven across protest movements.  For example, labor protests are highly conventional, 
but those undertaken by other social movements are mo unpredictable.   
My impression is that in Mexico, protest is probably a (mostly) democratic 
reaction to flawed democracy.  Electoral competition has largely failed to open new 
avenues for resolving old grievances and redoubts of authoritarianism exist in states such 
as Puebla, Oaxaca, and others.  Whatever the meaning of protest, though, those who are 
dissatisfied with democracy engage in it more than t eir more content counterparts.   
At all events, the present study contemplates participation only as an indicator, 
not a cause, of democratic quality.  Operationalizing and measuring responsiveness and 
accountability entails considerable difficulty, and exploration of the causal relationship 
between these and political participation is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  The 
theoretical discussion of participation’s salutary effects on aligning policy-making with 
public preferences and holding officials responsible for their acts suggests causal 
hypotheses that await empirical exploration at another ime.   
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION  
 
How might satisfaction with democracy affect political participation?  Two stories 
could be spun; the first is one of complacency, the second, of engagement.  In the first 
story, citizens who are happy with their democracy participate less.  People essentially 
undertake political activity to reform laws, make dmands, redress wrongs—in short, to 
change something or other.  Those who are more or lss content with the way things 
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become complacent.  They do not want change; thus, they have no need to participate 
politically.   
The second story is the obverse of the first:  satisfied citizens participate more in 
politics.  For them, the political system works fairly well at producing the policies and 
services they want.  They believe that government is generally responsive to citizen input 
and that they personally have some capacity to shape politics.  In this scenario, satisfied 
citizens have higher levels of political involvement precisely because they believe that 
involvement is efficacious.   
For their part, the dissatisfied citizens in this second narrative disengage from 
politics.  They become alienated from a political system in which cynical elected officials 
seemingly look out only for their own interests.  Discouraged, they perceive that their 
countries are run for the benefit of the powerful and deeply distrust political parties and 
legislatures.  For dissatisfied citizens, political participation is futile since decision-
makers do not heed the opinions of their constituents.   
Intuitively, the second story seems more plausible than the first.   Dissatisfaction 
probably disheartens citizens more than it steels their resolve to work for change.  The 
widely-noted relationship between income and education, on the one hand, and electoral 
turnout, on the other, militates in favor of the “engagement” over the “complacency” 
theory.  We know that educated, well-off citizens tend to vote more than their less-
educated, lower-earning counterparts, both in establi hed democracies such as the United 
States (see, e.g., Silver t al. 1986, Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980 ) and in Mexico 
(Buendía 2002: 449; Buendía and Somuano 2003: 320; Moreno 2003: 152, 160).  Thus, 
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those who have benefitted more from the allocation of resources produced, in part, by the 
political system (and are presumably more satisfied with democracy) also participate 
more—precisely the opposite of what we expect if sat sfaction induced complacency.  
But a more nuanced account is also possible.  Both stories above assume that 
participation is of a piece, an all-or-nothing proposition:  citizens are either generally 
active, availing themselves simultaneously of several a ms in the arsenal of activism, or 
generally inactive, abstaining from town halls, the public square, and the streets in 
addition to the polls.  But studies of political participation and the typologies they 
produced teach us that citizens differentiate their participation, often focusing on one 
category of activity at the expense of others.  In their classic 1972 study on Participation 
in America, Verba and Nie contended that a complete account of political participation 
should take into account types of participation in addition amounts of it.  They classified 
United States citizens into “voting specialists”, “campaigners”, “parochial activists” with 
narrow, individual aims, “communalists” who participated in civic organizations, 
“complete activists”, and the “totally inactive” (1972: 73-81).  Other typologies are also 
possible, of course.     
Mexican citizens also participate selectively, engaging in some activities but not 
others.  Buendía and Somuano, for example, found that "both conventional and 
unconventional modes of non-electoral participation are negatively correlated with 
electoral participation" (2003: 317).  Voters apparently feel that the voting booth suffices 
as an opportunity to influence political decisions while activists of all stripes may eschew 
the vote as a means of social change in favor of more direct forms of political action.   
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Different levels of satisfaction with democracy constitute an important factor in 
Mexicans’ decisions not only on whether or not to participate in politics, but also on how 
to channel their participation.  The main fault line separating the types of participation in 
which satisfied citizens take part from those that attract dissatisfied citizens, is the 
attitude a given political action assumes toward established political authority:  is the 
action institutional or contentious in nature?  Ultimately, of course, all political activity 
seeks to influence government and its decisions (except revolution, which aims to abolish 
existing institutions and replace them with others).  The difference between institutional 
and contentious participation lies in the tactical means that citizens bring to bear in 
asserting their demands.   
Institutional forms of participation stay within the confines of more or less well 
defined legal and social norms.  Participants in institutional action, or their agents, work 
amenably with political institutions and their reprsentatives (legislatures, parties, 
politicians, bureaucracies) to effect gradual, marginal change.  Citizens who are satisfied 
with democracy tend to participate institutionally because they perceive that, in general, 
government works well to process citizen input.  Even when the outputs of government 
decision-makers disfavor otherwise satisfied citizens, they may still believe it ethically 
incumbent on them to support the country’s institutions—a stance often aided by a 
temperamental disinclination toward radicalism.   
On the other hand, contentious participation challenges institutions by threatening 
to disrupt daily life until political authorities react to protestors’ demands.  Contention 
often operates on the margins of the law and public op nion.  Though, as we have seen, 
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democracies guarantee a right to protest, they typically place restrictions on this right, 
specifying acceptable times, places, and manners of protest.85  Furthermore, the public 
itself often deems certain protest activities beyond the pale.  Thus, contentious 
participation may run afoul of both legal regulations and social strictures.  Concurring 
with Somuano’s observation that “[t]hose most dissat fied with democracy in Mexico, as 
well as those who perceive that political leaders don’t concern themselves with people’s 
needs, are most likely to participate unconventionally” (2002: 470), I hypothesize that 
dissatisfied citizens will be drawn to contentious participation.  Since they view 
government as largely unresponsive, they believe that confrontation is required to exert 
pressure on authorities and shock them out of theirin rtia.   
MODELLING POLITICAL PARTICIPATION :  VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES 
The preceding discussion’s hypotheses can be formalized into statistical models, 
one for each of the three types of political participation considered here.  I first detail how 
I use the Citizen Disenchantment data to operationalize my dependent variables, also
providing information on the variables’ univariate distributions.  Then, I specify the 
models and hypotheses.   
Voting 
The Citizen Disenchantment survey was carried out in June, 2006, just prior to the 
July 2 general election.  Thus, electoral participation is measured as respondents’ 
reported intention to vote in the upcoming election, not their claimed past voting 
behavior.  The survey asked respondents how likely the were to vote on July 2.  The 
                                                
85 These restrictions themselves often become causes of contention.   
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response categories (with percentages of respondents in parentheses) are “definitely” 
(55.8%), “very probable” (28.3%), “somewhat probable” (7.5%), “not very probable” 
(4.5%), and “not at all probable” (3.8%).   
Of course, the intention to vote is not the same thing as voting.  Turnout studies 
based on respondents’ reports of past votes also suffer from the same problem:  actual 
behavior often differs from self-reported behavior.  Nonetheless, there is reason to 
believe that the prospective intention to vote repoted in the Citizen Disenchantment 
survey telegraphed real voting behavior fairly well.  Taking into account only those who 
said they would “definitely” vote (55.8% of respondents, compared to an actual turnout 
rate of 58.5%), and removing undecided voters, the predicted vote shares obtained by the 
top two parties come reasonably close to those actually obtained:  33.7% predicted for the 
alliance headed by the PRD (compared to the official vote share of 35.3%) and 31.5% 
predicted for the PAN (with an official share of 35.8%).  On the other hand, the survey 
overestimates the PRI’s vote share (27.7% predicted, 22.3% obtained).  The concordance 
between predicted and real vote shares is a shade clos r if “very probable” voters are 
included with “definite” voters.  Respondents in these two categories totalled 84.1% of 
the sample.  The predicted vote shares for the top tw  parties (with official shares in 
parentheses) are PRD, 31.4% (35.3%) and PAN, 33.6% (35.8%).   
The response categories of the dependent variable are ordered, but their locations 
are not necessarily equidistant.  This suggests that an ordered logistic regression is the 
most appropriate statistical model:  
)'()Pr( PROBVOTEPROBVOTE1 ij uSATFjPROBVOTE +++=> γXβα          (Eq. 6.1) 
where PROBVOTE = respondent’s reported intention to vote, SAT = level of satisfaction 
with democracy; j indexes the J response categories of the dependent variable (in this 
case, five); F is the cumulative logistic density function such that 1)1()( −−+= zezF ; the 
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vector PROBVOTEX' contains other determinants of turnout; the α j’s are J-1 thresholds to be 
estimated corresponding to the upper bound of category j; the β’s and the elements of the 
column vector PROBVOTEγ  associated with PROBVOTEX' are parameters to be estimated; and u 
is a stochastic error.  The hypothesis is that β1 > 0; in words, the more satisfied citizens 
are, the likelier they are to vote.     
Included in the independent variable vector PROBVOTEX'  are the three broad 
democratic orientations (electoral, liberal, and substantive) shown to influence 
satisfaction in the last chapter.  Although they appear on the right-hand side of the model 
I believe that their effect, if any, will work indirectly through satisfaction.   
Individual, Non-Electoral Participation 
For purposes of my analysis, individual political engagement comprises the 
following six activities:  signing a complaint against the government, sending a letter to 
the editor, calling a radio or TV program, writing the president or other authorities, 
handing out flyers or manifestos, and putting up a banner or sign.  If a respondent 
claimed to have done any of these things (or several of them) within the three years prior 
to the survey, she received a score of “1” on the indiv dual participation variable.  If she 
had done none of these things, the variable was coded “0”.   
Eleven percent (or 70) of the 646 respondents for which there is information on 
all six items had undertaken one or more individual po itical action.  Of these, 23 
respondents (3.6%) had participated in two activities; 6 (0.9%), in three; and one, in all 
six activities.  By activity, from most common to least, 40 respondents (5.7%) had 
displayed a political sign; 27 (4.2%), called a talk show; 18 (2.8%), written a government 
official; 16 (2.5%), handed out flyers; 12 respondets (1.9%) had signed a complaint; and 
4 (0.6%), written a newspaper.   
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My justification for combining these participation i dicators into a single dummy 
variable is threefold.  First, they hang together conceptually.  All involve individual 
activity, require low degrees of effort and coordinat on, and entail virtually no risk.  
Second, they fit together empirically.  I estimated a latent class model in which 
respondents’ unobserved membership in one of two underlying categories—“non-
participant” or “participant”—is hypothesized to drive their observed behavior on the six 
modalities of individual engagement considered here.  Since the deviance (G2) statistic of 
45.96 is approximately equal to the degrees of freedom (50, see Powers and Xie 2000: 
68), this latent class model fits the data well:  respondents may be reasonably classified, 
in general, as either participants or non-participants in individual political action.  Finally, 
as a practical matter, several of the actions described above have relatively few 
participants, which could lead to unstable estimates and a degrees of freedom problem 
when regressing a single indicator on the full comple ent of independent variables.   
Given the binary scoring decision for the individual participation variable, a 
logistic regression is appropriate:   
 )()1Pr( INDPARTINDPART10 γX'++== SATgINDPART ββ       (Eq. 6.2)86 
where INDPART is a variable indicating whether the respondent has engaged in any of 
the types of individual participation enumerated above, the function 
1)1()( −−+= zezg , X 
is a vector of variables affecting individual participation, γ is a vector of parameter 
estimates, and all other notation is as above in Equation 6.1.  The hypothesis here is also 
that β1 > 0; that is, greater satisfaction with democracy will increase individual 
engagement.   
                                                
86 In fact, I estimated multi-level, or random effects, logit models for this and the following “Protest” 
equation.  For simplicity’s sake, however, I specify the standard logit regression here.  Interested rea ers 
are referred to Hsiao (2002, Chapter 8) for further details on the random effects logit specification.   
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Protest 
Contentious political participation here comprises four activities:  sit-ins 
(plantón), occupying public buildings, blocking roads, and land invasions.  As with the 
individual participation indicator (and for the same reasons),87 I operationalized the 
protest dependent variable as a dummy variable scored “1” if a respondent had engaged 
in any of the four activities listed in the three yars before the survey was administered, 
and “0” otherwise.   
Just 16 respondents of 649 (or 2.5%) for whom there is information on all four 
component variables had engaged in one or more types of protest.  Half of these (1.2%) 
participated in only one protest activity; 5 (0.8%), in two activities; 2 (0.3%), in three; 
and just one (0.2%), in all four.   
A logit model was also estimated for protest, specified as follows:   
)()1Pr( PROTPROT10 γX'++== SATgPROT ββ       (Eq. 6.3) 
where PROT is a variable indicating whether the respondent has engaged in any of the 
types of individual participation enumerated above, th  function 
1)1()( −−+= zezg , X is a 
vector of variables affecting protest, and all other notation is as Equation 6.2.  The 
hypothesis is that β1 < 0; contrary to its effect on voting and individual participation, 
satisfaction should decrease protest.  Or, putting it the other way around, dissatisfied 
citizens will resort to contentious participation more than their satisfied counterparts.   
                                                
87 I also estimated a latent class model in which a two-category latent variable underlies the four binary 
manifest variables.  Again, the good fit indicated by the G2 statistic (2.63 on six degrees of freedom) 
implies that respondents are either “protestors” or “n n-protestors”.   
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RESULTS:  SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN 
MEXICO  
Data from the Citizen Disenchantment survey generally support the hypothesized 
effects of satisfaction on participation.  I present the results of the three regression models 
I estimated, complementing them with analyses of the ENCUP.   
Voting 
Table 6.1 reports the results of the ordinal logistic regression of self-reported 
intention of voting in the July 2, 2006, on satisfaction with democracy and other 
independent variables.  As expected, Mexicans who are s tisfied with their democracy 
are significantly likelier to vote than unsatisfied citizens.  The odds that a citizen at the 
maximum of the satisfaction scale will “definitely” vote (as opposed to being at most 
only “very likely” to vote) are 38% higher than the odds of “definitely” voting for 
citizens at the mean of the satisfaction scale.  Put another way, holding all other variables 
at their means, the probability that a maximally satisfied citizen “definitely” intends to 
vote is .670, compared to .595 for a citizen with aver ge satisfaction.  In general, the odds 
that a respondents’ reported likelihood of voting was in a given response category or 
higher increase by 16.5% for each one-point increment on the satisfaction with 
democracy scale.   
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Table 6.1:  Ordinal Logistic Regression of Self-Reported Intention to Vote on 
Satisfaction with Democracy and Other Variables (with Cluster-Adjusted 
Standard Errors).88 
Consistent with other voting studies, the propensity to vote is also positively 
related to two sociodemographic variables, age and education.  Older, more educated 
citizens’ evidenced a greater inclination to vote than did their younger, less educated 
counterparts.  Also unsurprisingly, Mexicans’ evaluations the fairness and honesty with 
                                                
88 The hypothesis test for Satisfaction with Democracy in this and all subsequent tables are one-tailed.  All 
other tests are two-tailed.   
 
V ariab le  B  se  p  
S a tis fac t io n  w ith  D em o cracy  0 .1 5 3  0 .0 9 5  0 .0 5 4 *  
C on cep ts o f  D em o cra cy     
   S u b s tan tive  0 .0 6 5  0 .0 4 8  0 .1 7 7  
   L ib e ra l 0 .0 3 1  0 .0 4 6  0 .5 0 4  
   E lec to ra l 0 .0 3 2  0 .0 4 4  0 .4 6 6  
P a r t isa n sh ip     
   P A N  0 .3 2 6  0 .2 9 2  0 .2 6 4  
   P R I 0 .3 6 9  0 .3 3 8  0 .2 7 4  
   P R D  0 .5 7 7  0 .3 5 7  0 .1 0 7  
E con o m ic  P er fo rm a n ce  0 .0 2 2  0 .0 7 1  0 .7 5 5  
P o lit ica l P e r fo rm a n ce :  R ig h ts -0 .0 2 4  0 .0 5 2  0 .6 4 1  
P o lit ica l P e r fo rm a n ce :  E lec t io n s 0 .1 0 6  0 .0 5 5  0 .0 5 3 *  
G o v e rn m en t S erv ices     
    W a ter -0 .0 5 4  0 .0 6 1  0 .3 7 7  
    E lec tric ity  0 .0 6 8  0 .0 6 2  0 .2 7 1  
    P ub l ic  E d ucatio n  -0 .0 2 2  0 .0 6 7  0 .7 4 8  
    P o l ice  0 .1 1 3  0 .0 5 9  0 .0 5 4 *  
In cu m b en ts    
   P res id en t F o x  0 .0 9 0  0 .0 7 5  0 .2 3 3  
   S tate  G o v e rn o r -0 .0 4 6  0 .0 6 6  0 .4 8 9  
   M ayo r -0 .0 1 3  0 .0 8 0  0 .8 6 9  
   C o n gress  -0 .1 2 3  0 .0 8 8  0 .1 6 3  
S o c io d em og ra p h ic  C o n d it io n s    
   S ex  -0 .2 4 5  0 .2 0 4  0 .2 2 9  
   A g e 0 .0 2 8  0 .0 1 0  0 .0 0 5 * * *  
   In com e (p er $ 1 ,0 0 0  p eso s) 0 .0 0 0  0 .0 0 0  0 .1 5 6  
   E d u catio n  0 .1 2 5  0 .0 3 6  0 .0 0 1 * * *  
    
A u x il ia ry  P ara m e te rs     
   T h resh o ld  1  1 .3 6 6  1 .1 7 3  0 .2 4 4  
   T h resh o ld  2  2 .4 7 0  1 .1 3 3  0 .0 2 9  
   T h resh o ld  3  3 .3 1 4  1 .1 9 9  0 .0 0 6  
   T h resh o ld  4  4 .7 9 1  1 .2 7 3  0 .0 0 0  
    
L o g - lik e lih oo d  -4 4 0 .9 4   
W a ld  X 2  7 0 .4 4   .0 0 0  
N  =  4 2 1     
*       p  <  .1 0     
* *     p  <  .0 5      
* * *   p  <  .0 1     
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which authorities conducted past elections is also an important determinant of the 
propensity to vote.  Respondents with the maximum possible clean election rating were 
47% likelier to say they would “definitely” vote than respondents whose rating was 
average.   
Interestingly, assessments of electoral hygiene affct the probability of voting 
independently of satisfaction with democracy.  That is, positive evaluations of elections 
increase turnout directly in addition to the indirect effect they wield by raising 
satisfaction, which, in turn, contributes to greater electoral participation.  Not so with 
other independent variables shown in Chapter 5 to shape satisfaction with democracy, 
including conceptions of democracy and economic evaluations.  These variables’ effects 
appear to be subsumed within that of satisfaction.    
Evidence from the Mexican National Survey on Political Culture (ENCUP) 
corroborates the finding of a positive effect of satisf ction on turnout.  Using data from 
the 2001 and 2003 waves of the ENCUP,89 I regressed self-reported turnout in 
presidential, gubernatorial, and state congressional elections on satisfaction and other 
independent variables.    Since the presidential election was held in 2000, and since no 
state held gubernatorial elections in the lapse betwe n the 2001 and 2003 surveys, the 
presidential and gubernatorial analyses are cross-sectional, based on 2001 data.  On the 
other hand, ten states (Baja California Sur, Coahuil , Guerrero, Hidalgo, Michoacán, 
Oaxaca, Puebla, Quintana Roo, Tlaxcala, and Yucatán) held state and local elections 
between the two panel waves.  Thus, the analysis for the state deputy elections is 
longitudinal and includes respondents from these ten s ates who answered the survey in 
                                                
89 A third ENCUP, from which I cite evidence above in my discussion on political participation, was 
carried out in 2005.  However, the Secretaría de Gobernación (Interior Ministry) elected not to interview 
respondents from the prior editions of the survey, so the panel comprises only repeated measurements from 
the first two waves.  Though this reduced the cost of he third survey, it also greatly diminished its
usefulness.   
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both 2001 and 2003.90  For all three analyses, I estimated random effects logits.  In the 
first two, cross-sectional analyses (president and governor), the random effects represent 
unmodelled, aggregate-level effects on voting for respondents within geographical 
clusters (the área geoestadística básica, AGEB, equivalent to a U.S. census tract).  In the 
third, longitudinal analysis, the random effects represent an unobserved, individual 
propensity to vote that varies across respondents.  I  other words, in the first two analyses 
the random effects model accounts for spatial correlation of voting probabilities among 
respondents who live in the same AGEB, and in the third analysis, for correlation of 
voting probabilities within the same individual over time.  Table 6.2 presents the results 
of these three analyses.   
                                                
90 Whereas the 2003 ENCUP asked separately if respondents had voted for federal and state deputies, the 
2001 ENCUP posed a single question asking whether respondents had voted for either state or federal 
deputies in the last election.  Since an answer of “yes” can, but does not necessarily, mean that a respondent 
voted for state deputies, I had to impute some values for the 2001 reported state deputy vote.  For 
respondents who reported voting for neither state nor federal deputies, the value of “0”—not voting—was 
retained.  For respondents who answered “yes” to having voted for federal and/or state deputies, I imputed 
values for the state deputy vote using the following procedure.  First, I regressed the self-reported 2003 
state deputy vote on variables not included in the models reported in Table 6.2 (including turnout for other 
offices, party activism, and a dummy variable for states that hold their elections concurrently with federal 
elections).  To predict the 2001 state deputy voting probabilities, I plugged the 2001 data for these same 
variables into an equation with the 2003 coefficient stimates.  I added a random perturbation to the 2001 
predicted probabilities, since the parameters for the true 2001 model might differ slightly from those 
estimated by the 2003 model (i.e., since the “pooling assumption” of a single model valid for both 2001 and 
2003 might not hold).  Assuming that each observation for the 2001 state deputy vote is an independent 
realization of a respondent-specific random variable, I conducted ten Bernoulli trials for each respondent 
using the 2001 individual predicted probabilities as the “pi” parameters.  This yielded ten imputed state 
deputy vote variables.  The average correlation betwe n the ten randomly generated variables and the 
single binary voting variable without random perturbation (obtained by assigning a value of “1” to a 
respondent whose 2001 predicted probability of voting was over .5 and “0” otherwise), was .876.  The 
correlations between the multiply imputed 2001 state deputy vote variables and the (known) 2003 state 
deputy vote variable averaged r = .239, a value similar to the r = .305 correlation between the 2001 and 
2003 self-reported turnout in mayoral elections.  (I also analyzed these, but omit the results here; 
satisfaction with democracy had a positive, but statistically insignificant, effect on mayoral voting.)  
Finally, I ran ten separate regressions, one for each set of imputed 2001 values.  To produce the estimates 
given in Table 6.2, I averaged the coefficients andstandard over the ten regressions, with a slight upward 
adjustment to the standard errors that accounts for the variability of standard error estimates across the 
imputations, in addition to within-imputation parameter variance (see Raghunathan 2004: 109).   
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Table 6.2:  Random Effects Logit Regressions of Sel-R ported Presidential, 
Gubernatorial, and State Deputy Votes on Satisfaction with Democracy.   
Satisfaction increases turnout in all three elections.  The odds that a citizen at the 
maximum of the satisfaction scale reported having voted for president are nearly 22% 
higher (odds ratio of 1.217) than those for citizens at the mean of the satisfaction scale.  
This increase in maximally satisfied citizens’ odds of voting, relative to those for citizens 
with just average satisfaction, is about 27% (1.265) in gubernatorial elections and 30% 
(1.293) in state congressional elections.   
As with the prospective voting model based on the Citizen Disenchantment 
survey, age and education are also significant, positive predictors of the decision to vote 
in the ENCUP data—though the negative, statistically significant coefficient on the 
square of age means that voting drops off for the very elderly.  Holding a job increases 
turnout for state deputy elections.  The odds of an employed citizen having voted for state 
deputy are over 30% (1.306) higher than those for the unemployed.  The “rho” 
parameters are relatively high in all three models, indicating significant “unobserved 
 President Governor State Congress 
Variable B se p B se P B se p 
Satisfaction w/ Demo 0.107 0.058 0.033** 0.128 0.055 0.011** 0.096 0.061 0.058* 
Sex (Male = 1) 0.025 0.120 0.838 -0.043 0.116 0.708 0.130 0.147 0.374 
Age 0.173 0.017 0.000*** 0.163 0.017 0.000*** 0.156 0.023 0.000*** 
Age-Squared -0.002 0.000 0.000*** -0.001 0.000 0.000*** -0.001 0.000 0.000*** 
Income ($10K/mo.) 0.000 0.000 0.729 0.000 0.000 0.627 0.000 0.000 .493 
Education 0.081 0.014 0.000*** 0.054 0.013 0.000*** 0.073 0.017 0.000*** 
Employed (Yes = 1) 0.068 0.125 0.586 -0.001 0.120 0.994 0.267 0.148 0.072* 
Student (Yes = 1) -0.273 0.277 0.325 -0.041 0.266 0.878 -0.118 0.384 0.759 
Retrospective 
Sociotropic 
-0.011 0.096 0.909 0.071 0.094 0.452 0.058 0.095 0. 44 
Retrospective 
Pocketbook 
0.122 0.099 0.216 0.039 0.096 0.682 -0.101 0.099 0.310 
Constant -3.762 0.455 0.000*** -3.365 0.434 0.000*** -3.717 0.591 0.000*** 
          
Rho .243  .000 .174  .000 .301  .000 
Log-likelihood -1530.76   -1579.34   -1276.32   
Wald X2 (d.f. = 10) 168.91  .000 151.80  .000 85.24  .000 
N 3118   3118      
*      p < .10          
**    p < .05           
***  p < .01          
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heterogeneity”, or variation in the proclivity to vte, across geographical clusters (in the 
first two models) and individuals (in the third)—even after controlling for the effects of 
sociodemographic demographic conditions and economic evaluations.   
Individual, Non-Electoral Participation 
Table 6.3 presents the results of a logistic regression of individual engagement on 
satisfaction with democracy (and other independent variables) using the Citizen 
Disenchantment survey data.  I used a random effects logit to account for spatial 
correlation of observations within geographical clusters (i.e., polling precincts).  
Satisfaction with democracy has a strong effect on citizens’ inclination to engage in 
individual forms of political participation.  Comparing citizens at the maximum of the 
satisfaction scale with those at the mean, the odds that the former reports having 
participated individually are nearly twice as high (1.94) than those for the latter.  Stated 
another way, the probability that a citizen at the highest point on the satisfaction scale 
will engage in some form of individual political action (holding all variables at their 
means) is .128, compared to .071 for a citizen at the scale’s mean.   
In contrast to the null effects of views of democracy on voting, here substantive 
democrats appear to exhibit higher levels of individual engagement than other citizens.  
This result seems to counter the story of poor governm nt economic performance leading 
to disillusionment and a sense that institutional participation is futile.  It may be that two 
distinct forces are at work here.  Dissatisfaction dampens individual participation for all 
citizens but especially substantive democrats, to the extent they are less satisfied with 
democracy than other citizens.  After discounting for the general effect of dissatisfaction 
on individual participation, though, substantive democrats are more inclined to individual 
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political action, perhaps because their grievances ar  more numerous.  This speculative 
explanation, though, begs further analysis.   
 
Table 6.3:  Random Effects Logistic Regression of Individual Participation on 
Satisfaction with Democracy  
Other determinants of individual participation are ge and education:  older, more 
educated citizens are likelier to attempt to influenc  government decisions or fellow 
citizens.  Education and experience (for which age serves as a proxy) both contribute to 
individuals’ “internal political efficacy”, the knowledge and skills that make citizens 
believe they can influence the political system.  Positive evaluations of state governors’ 
Variable B se p 
Satisfaction with Democracy 0.313 0.161 0.052* 
Concepts of Democracy    
   Substantive 0.129 0.073 0.079* 
   Liberal -0.028 0.072 0.700 
   Electoral -0.033 0.075 0.659 
Partisanship    
   PAN -0.097 0.486 0.842 
   PRI 0.146 0.513 0.777 
   PRD 0.794 0.495 0.109 
Economic Performance 0.066 0.090 0.463 
Political Performance:  Rights -0.037 0.093 0.692 
Political Performance:  Elections 0.052 0.095 0.581 
Government Services    
    Water 0.034 0.101 0.736 
    Electricity -0.050 0.102 0.622 
    Public Education -0.258 0.099 0.009*** 
    Police -0.113 0.099 0.254 
Incumbents    
   President Fox 0.050 0.112 0.654 
   State Governor -0.234 0.096 0.014** 
   Mayor 0.162 0.105 0.121 
   Congress 0.133 0.115 0.247 
Sociodemographic Conditions    
   Sex -0.031 0.351 0.929 
   Age 0.030 0.014 0.024** 
   Income (per $1,000 pesos) 0.000 0.000 0.110 
   Education 0.126 0.049 0.011 
Constant -6.542 1.947 0.001*** 
    
Rho 0.192   
Log-likelihood -440.94   
Wald X2 (d.f.=22) 36.86  .025 
N = 448    
*      p < .10    
**    p < .05     
***  p < .01    
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performance and of the public education system make citizens less likely to participate 
individually.  These may be cases in which the “complacency thesis” (the first theoretical 
“story” set forth above in the section on “Satisfaction with Democracy and Political 
Participation) does hold; that is, citizens who feel their governors are doing a good job 
governing and the public schools, a good job educating, see no need to press for change.   
The ENCUP provides additional support for the finding that Mexicans who are 
relatively satisfied with their democracy engage in individual, non-electoral political 
action more than their dissatisfied compatriots.  Using data from the 2003 wave,91 I 
regressed one indicator of individual participation, signing a petition, on satisfaction with 
democracy and other variables.  Some 20.5% of Mexicans reported signing a petition at 
some time in their lives, roughly concordant with the 2005 World Values Survey’s figure.  
The dependent variable is binary scored “1” for yes and “0” otherwise.  Again, I opted for 
a hierarchical logit regression to account for unobserved cluster-level (AGEB’s) 
heterogeneity.  Table 6.4 presents the results.   
The odds that a citizen who is maximally satisfied with democracy has signed a 
petition are over 40% higher (odds ratio of 1.402) than those for a citizen with average 
satisfaction.  Put another way, holding all other va iables at their means a “very satisfied” 
citizen has about a 20.2% chance of having signed a petition, compared to 16.9% for a 
citizen at the mean of the satisfaction scale.  Consistent with the Citizen Disenchantment 
findings, age and education also positively impact the likelihood of individual 
engagement in the ENCUP data.   
                                                
91 Unfortunately, for all political participation items both the 2001 and 2003 waves asked if respondents 
had engaged in a given action at any time in their lives.  This choice of question wording makes it 
impossible to tell if a “yes” answer on both occasion  refers to an isolated event in the past (before the first 
wave) or to several events (before and after the first wave) indicative of relatively sustained engagement.  
Unable to take advantage of the inter-temporality of the two-wave panel, I confined myself to a cross-
sectional analysis of the second wave.   
 171 
 
Table 6.4:  Random Effects Logit Regression of Petition-Signing on Satisfaction with 
Democracy.   
Protest 
If greater satisfaction with democracy increases institutional forms of political 
participation, it decreases contentious action.  Table 6.5 presents the results of a logistic 
regression of protest on satisfaction with democracy nd other variables.  Since 
variability across geographical clusters was negligible, I used a simple logit regression 
for this analysis rather than the random effects formulations employed in the analyses 
above.  Also, I omitted partisan identification with the National Action Party and other 
variables from the complement of independent variables; as noted above, only 16 
respondents had engaged in one of the four forms of protest included in the dependent 
variable one of the four forms of protest considere here (sit-ins, occupying public 
buildings, blocking traffic, and land invasions), which led to sparse, quasi-separated data 
in some cases.   
For Mexicans at the maximum of the satisfaction scale, the odds of involvement 
in contentious political action are about one-third (0.362) of those for citizens at the mean 
Variable B se p 
Satisfaction with Democracy 0.136 0.048 0.003*** 
Sex (Male = 1) -0.062 0.115 0.593 
Age 0.025 0.019 0.195 
Age-Squared 0.000 0.000 0.162 
Income ($10K/mo.) 0.000 0.000 0.067 
Education 0.092 0.013 0.000*** 
Employed (Yes = 1) 0.111 0.121 0.359 
Student (Yes = 1) -0.048 0.345 0.890 
Retrospective Sociotropic -0.073 0.080 0.366 
Retrospective Pocketbook 0.250 0.079 0.002*** 
Constant -3.507 0.481 0.000 
    
Rho .152   
Log-likelihood -1378.27   
Wald X2 (d.f. = 10) 98.10  .000 
N=2856    
*      p < .10    
**    p < .05     
***  p < .01    
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of the scale.  Stated in terms of estimated probabilities, maximally satisfied citizens have 
about an 0.27% chance of protesting, compared to 0.73% for citizens with average 
satisfaction.   
Other variables inclining Mexicans to protest were s x, age, partisanship, 
evaluations of government respect for rights, and the liberal view of democracy.  
Protestors were over three-and-a-half times likelier (3.68) to be male than female.  The 
propensity to protest also increases with age.  Unsurprisingly, PRD sympathizers resort to 
contentious claim-making far more often than members of other parties or those without 
party affiliation.  Those with positive assessments of the Mexican government’s record 
on upholding citizen rights protested less than more c itical citizens:  the odds of 
protesting for respondents who awarded Mexican federal and state governments the 
highest rating on rights observance were less than a third of those for respondents who 
gave an average rating.  Finally, liberal democrats were likelier to protest than their 
substantive and electoral counterparts—counter to the expectation that less satisfied,  
substantive democrats would be more inclined to radical political activity.  The 
explanation may be that substantive democrats do protest more, but that the effect of the 
substantive concept of democracy operates indirectly through satisfaction.  Liberal 
democrats defend the right to lawful protest as part of their creed, and apparently make 
use of that right on occasion, regardless of how satisfied they are with democracy.   
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Table 6.5:  Logistic Regression of Protest on Satisfaction with Democracy (with Cluster-
Adjusted Standard Errors).   
Again, ENCUP data corroborate findings based on the Citizen Disenchantment 
survey.  The 2001 ENCUP contained three protest items similar to those in my survey 
(but not included in the 2003 wave), asking respondents if they “have”, “will”, “might”, 
or “would never” attend a demonstration, occupy a public building, or block traffic.  I 
combined these three actions into a single “contentious action” dependent variable with 
three underlying, ordered categories (collapsing “might” and “will” responses into a 
single category).  Latent class modelling assigned each survey-taker a level of 
contentious participation based on her pattern of responses to the three protest items.  
 
Variable B se p 
Satisfaction with Democracy 0.313 0.161 0.052* 
Concepts of Democracy    
   Substantive 0.129 0.073 0.079* 
   Liberal -0.028 0.072 0.700 
   Electoral -0.033 0.075 0.659 
Partisanship    
   PAN -0.097 0.486 0.842 
   PRI 0.146 0.513 0.777 
   PRD 0.794 0.495 0.109 
Economic Performance 0.066 0.090 0.463 
Political Performance:  Rights -0.037 0.093 0.692 
Political Performance:  Elections 0.052 0.095 0.581 
Government Services    
    Water 0.034 0.101 0.736 
    Electricity -0.050 0.102 0.622 
    Public Education -0.258 0.099 0.009*** 
    Police -0.113 0.099 0.254 
Incumbents    
   President Fox 0.050 0.112 0.654 
   State Governor -0.234 0.096 0.014**  
   Mayor 0.162 0.105 0.121 
   Congress 0.133 0.115 0.247 
Sociodemographic Conditions    
   Sex -0.031 0.351 0.929 
   Age 0.030 0.014 0.024** 
   Income (per $1,000 pesos) 0.000 0.000 0.110 
   Education 0.126 0.049 0.011 
Constant -6.542 1.947 0.001***  
    
Rho 0.192   
Log-likelihood -440.94   
Wald X2 (d.f.=22) 36.86  .025 
N = 448    
*      p < .10    
**    p < .05     
***  p < .01    
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According to the latent class analysis, 84.6% of Mexicans “would never” resort to 
contentious political participation; 14.1% “would” or “will” do so; and 1.3% “have 
already” done so.  Table 6.6 contains the results of an ordinal logistic regression of 
contentious participation on satisfaction with democracy and other variables.   
Table 6.6:  Ordinal Logistic Regression of Contentious Participation on Satisfaction with 
Democracy and Other Variables (with Cluster-Adjusted Standard Errors).    
Satisfied citizens protest less than dissatisfied ones.  The odds that Mexicans who 
are “very satisfied” with their democracy reported involvement in contentious action (as 
opposed to possible future involvement in, or flat-ou  rejection of, protest) are almost 
20% less (odds ratio of .807) than those for citizens with aver ge satisfaction.  In other 
words, all things being equal, maximally satisfied citizens have just a 13.2% chance of 
undertaking radical political action, or manifesting an inclination to do so, compared to 
15.8% for averagely satisfied citizens.   
Variable B se p 
Satisfaction with Democracy -0.117 0.066 0.039** 
Sex (Female = 1) -0.524 0.109 0.000***  
Age 0.003 0.015 0.843 
Age-Squared 0.000 0.000 0.409 
Income ($10K/mo.) 0.000 0.000 0.563 
Education -0.011 0.013 0.401 
Employed (Yes = 1) -0.047 0.118 0.689 
Student (Yes = 1) 0.260 0.293 0.374 
Retrospective Sociotropic -0.007 0.104 0.946 
Retrospective Pocketbook 0.075 0.083 0.365 
    
Auxiliary Parameters    
   Threshold 1 0.998 0.464 0.031 
   Threshold 2 3.645 0.461 0.000 
    
Log-likelihood -1378.27   
Wald X2 (d.f. = 10) 40.93  .013 
N=3562    
*      p < .10    
**    p < .05     
***  p < .01    
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The ENCUP data also reveal that men are far likelier—almost 70% more (odds 
ratio of 1.69)—to participate contentiously than women.  Holding other variables at their 
means, the probability of men having protested radically or potentially doing so was .204, 
compared to .132 for women.   
CONCLUSIONS 
Dissatisfaction with democracy in Mexico merits increased attention on the part 
of policy-makers, political analysts, and citizens alike.  Dissatisfaction exerts important 
effects on political participation, reducing institu onal political participation (voting and 
individual engagement) while increasing contentious participation (protest).  The true 
danger of dissatisfaction in Mexico lies not in paving the road for a return to authoritarian 
rule, but in reducing the quality of democracy.  Less institutional participation is itself a 
sign of low democratic quality, but it also imperils democratic development by 
hampering vertical accountability and government responsiveness.  Contentious 
participation, for its part, indicates that mechanisms of political representation have 
become at partially dysfunctional.  Rather than progressing toward full liberal 
democracy, as consolidation theory would predict, Mexico appears to have stagnated as a 
diminished democracy.   
Whither political participation in Mexico?  Satisfaction with democracy continues 
to fall, which will probably further erode institutional participation and the already 
tenuous representative linkages between citizens and politicians.  As a result, government 
policy could distance itself further from public needs and demands, coming full circle to 
create further dissatisfaction in an ever-widening downward spiral.  It is difficult, at 
present, to perceive conditions that might reverse this trend.   
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But there may yet be solutions to the disenchantment-alienation cycle—partial, 
long-term, and difficult to implement, to be sure, but solutions nonetheless.  Two broad 
sets of remedies are procedural and policy-oriented, respectively.  The first set comprises 
institutional modifications, especially of the electoral system, designed to increase 
citizens’ voice in the decision-making process.  The second class of solutions would 
implement policy changes that address the root causes of dissatisfaction—particularly, 
social inequality.   
Scholars and policy-makers recently have proposed a variety of changes to 
electoral rules that could improve representation and vertical accountability—which 
should, in turn, redound in greater citizen participation.  Some have suggested doing 
away with the Mexican Constitution’s prohibition on re-election (Dworak 2003), 
applicable to all offices from President to mayor.  The one-term limit sharply constricts 
citizens’ ability to hold politicians accountable for their decisions taking out of their 
hands a key tool for rewarding good performance andpunishing bad performance, 
consequently reducing policy-makers incentives to take public opinion into account.92   
Others have called for abolishing the proportional representation (PR) component 
of Mexico’s mixed electoral system, which comprises 300 single-member districts 
(SMD) and 200 PR seats distributed in five districts (circunscripciones), each with a 
magnitude of 40.  Camp argues that making Mexico’s legislative elections strictly 
majoritarian would enhance representation, since “[t]wo-fifths of the lower chamber are 
not accountable to any specific constituency” (2007: 196).93  Other measures, such as 
                                                
92 The one-term limit also prevents office-holders from accumulating policy knowledge and legislative 
expertise.    
93 In my opinion, eliminating PR would be a bad idea.  Lijphart (1999) has convincingly argued that 
“pluralist” electoral systems better represent the diversity of citizen viewpoints than majoritarian systems, 
which manufacture artificial majorities that distort representation.  Moreover, a lower chamber in Mexico 
comprising solely SMD’s would probably not promote greater vertical accountability.  Bonds of 
representation between citizens and elected officials are extraordinarily weak in Mexico (a very small 
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instituting legislative primary elections, could betaken to give citizens a greater voice in 
candidate selection and deepen citizen ties to legislators.   
Finally, Mexico urgently needs mechanisms for direct democracy, such as 
referendums, plebiscites, and citizen initiatives.  The major political parties, in theory, 
support participatory democracy, but have yet to institute it in practice.  Direct 
democracy is not without pitfalls.  It is susceptible to manipulation by elites and 
sometimes produces patently bad policy (though in the long-run, this defect can be self-
correcting).  Contrary to the arguments of political elites threatened by participatory 
democracy, though, it complements rather than supplants representative democracy.  At 
all events, giving citizens a direct, binding say in decision-making would greatly enhance 
participation and help align policy outputs with public preferences.   
Tweaking the electoral system and other institutions could help arrest the 
disenchantment-alienation cycle but, alone, they will not suffice.  Policy changes are also 
necessary, especially changes that ameliorate the perennial poverty and social inequality 
afflicting Mexico.  To the extent that Mexicans are substantive democrats who view 
democracy as an instrument of economic prosperity boadly spread among the populace 
(as I showed in Chapter 4)—and to the extent Mexicans perceive that government 
economic policy disfavors most citizens—greater satisfaction with democracy depends 
on improvements in Mexicans’ material well-being.   
The latter-day PRI technocratic presidents and the two PAN administrations have 
pursued a market fundamentalism (combined, contradictorily, with favoritism in granting 
privileged accesses to policy-making and state resources) that has manifestly failed to 
better most citizens’ economic circumstances.  Paradoxically, even multi-lateral lenders 
                                                                                                                                      
percentage of Mexicans know who their federal deputy is, for example) and there is no tradition of 
constituent service.  In short, the roots of poor ve tical accountability lie elsewhere than the electoral 
system.   
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such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, vilified by the Latin 
American left as ruthless enforcers of neoliberal othodoxy, have recently recognized the 
importance of not just promoting growth, but paying attention to the distribution of its 
fruits.  Needed policy changes in Mexico include increased tax revenues and a fairer 
distribution of the fiscal burden (which presently emphasizes a regressive value added 
tax), and greatly increased public investment in infrastructure, health, and especially 
education.  All this is easier said than done, though, and efforts to bring about greater 
social equity will inevitably run up against resistance from powerful interests that benefit 
from the current distribution of resources.  Changing economic policy is, thus, a question 
of political will in addition to technical know-how.   
The cycle of disenchantment and alienation is hardly exclusive to Mexico.  In the 
concluding chapter, I suggest (and sketch preliminary evidence) that it afflicts new 
democracies worldwide.  The cycle’s causes are similar:  the gap between citizen 
socioeconomic of democracy and democratic governments’ failures to meet those 
expectations.  And its consequences are also common:  consolidation of diminished 
forms of democracy.   
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CHAPTER 7 
Do the Lessons from Mexico Generalize to New Democracies 
Worldwide? 
Using data from the Citizen Disenchantment and other surveys, the previous three 
chapters have shown that in Mexico, conceptions of democracy shape satisfaction with it.   
In particular, Mexican citizens who see democracy as greater social equality are less 
satisfied with democracy.  Satisfaction, in turn, affects both the type and amount of 
political participation.  But do Mexico’s teachings about the causes and consequences of 
political satisfaction obtain in other new or poor democracies around the world?  This 
concluding chapter asserts that they do.   
Returning to the regional opinion polls that formed the empirical backbone of 
Chapter 3’s survey of discontent in new democracies, I present analyses showing that 
how people define democracy influences how they evaluate it around the world as well as 
in Mexico.  Though these surveys measure concepts of democracy more obliquely and 
superficially than Citizen Disenchantment, he evidence they yield nonetheless suggests 
that, as in Mexico, substantive democrats are least s tisfied with democracy around the 
world.  Dissatisfaction also wreaks damage on politica  participation in fledgling 
democracies in many of the same ways it does in Mexico.  Finally, as imperfect as the 
measurements are, they allow us to glimpse something of the distribution of views of 
democracy among inhabitants of new democracies.  Significant numbers of citizens hold 
a substantive view of democracy, especially relative o the electoral view.   
I conclude this study by drawing out these findings’ implications for the future of 
democracy around the world.  Democracy’s reach is wider than it is deep.  Most newly-
democratized countries appear to be mired in low-quality, partial democracy from which 
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escape is exceedingly difficult.  Citizen demands for greater socioeconomic equality, and 
their alienation when governments fail to provide it, would seem to present an 
insurmountable challenge.  But the challenge is only seemingly insurmountable:  a  not-
insignificant minority of third wave democracies have prospered and become full 
democracies.  Both citizens and governments must act o restore faith in democracy.  
Citizens should tone down their expectations, recognizing the constraints under which 
their governments operate.  They cannot give in to discouragement; rather, they must 
continue to voice their demands using every ethical means of political participation 
available.  For their part, governments must get better at meeting citizens’ non-economic 
expectations of democracy by making elections fairer and improving respect for human 
rights.  Ultimately, they must use the policy tools they do have at hand to spread 
economic welfare and opportunity more broadly.   
BEYOND MEXICO :  CONCEPTS OF DEMOCRACY AND SATISFACTION WORLDWIDE  
In Chapter 3, I examined satisfaction with democracy in developing polities 
around the world using several surveys:  the World Values Study (WVS), 
Latinobarometer, Consolidation of Democracy in Eastern and Central Europe (CDCEE), 
AsiaBarometer, and Afrobarometer.  I now turn back to these several of these polls—and 
a new one, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)—to analyze whether 
citizens’ conceptions of democracy determine, in part, their degree of satisfaction with it 
in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa.   
The results are striking.  In all four regions, satisf ction with democracy does 
depend on one’s definition of it, even after controlling for other factors that affect 
satisfaction such as retrospective evaluations of ec nomic performance.  In all four, the 
magnitudes of the effects of democratic type on satisfaction share the same order as in 
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Mexico.  That is, substantive democrats are least stisfied, followed by liberals and then 
electoral democrats, who are most satisfied.  The differences between coefficient 
estimates for each pair of democratic types are statistic lly significant in all cases save 
one:  the difference between substantive and liberal democracy in Africa.   
These results are all the more remarkable given the vari ty across surveys of the 
ways in which respondents were asked to define democracy and, especially, the ways in 
which the answers were coded.  Three of the surveys elicited definitions of democracy 
with a single item—in marked contrast to the Citizen Disenchantment survey’s more 
thorough, multi-item probing.  LAPOP, the CDCEE, and Afrobarometer asked variations 
on the question, “What does democracy mean to you?”94  Interviewers recorded up to 
three verbatim responses, which were coded into vari us categories during post-interview 
questionnaire processing (or, in the case of the CDCEE, on the spot by the interviewers 
themselves).  The number of categories varied from eight in the CDCEE to 33 in LAPOP.  
Taking the first, “top of mind” definition offered by respondents, I combined and recoded 
these categories into binary variables for each of t e three basic types of democracy (with 
a residual, fourth category for other responses) so that each respondent belongs to one, 
and only one, category.   
Thus, in LAPOP a substantive democrat was anyone who defined democracy as 
“economic well-being or progress”, or “more job opprtunities”; a liberal democrat, 
anyone who defined democracy as “economic freedom”, “freedom of speech”, “freedom 
of transit”, “capitalism”, “free trade”, “free markets”, or just plain “freedom”; and an 
electoral democrat, anyone who defined democracy as “the right to choose leaders”, 
                                                
94 LAPOP asked, “In just a few words, what does democracy mean to you, sir?”  CDCEE had a longer 
preamble:  “There is considerable argument concerning the meaning of democracy.  What is your opinion 
about this question?  What is for you the meaning of democracy?”  Afrobarometer left open the possibility 
that democracy might hold no meaning at all for interviewees:  “What if anything does democracy mean to 
you?”   
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“voting”, or “free elections”.  In the CDCEE, substan ive democrats defined democracy 
as “social or economic democracy”; liberal democrats, as “freedom”; and electoral 
democrats, as “parties” or “elections”.  Finally, in Afrobarometer, substantive democrats 
equated democracy with “social or economic development”, “equality” or “justice”; 
liberal democrats, with “civil liberties”, “personal freedoms”, “accountability”, or the 
“rule of law”; and electoral democrats, with “voting”, “elections”, “multi-party 
competition”, or “majority rule”.   
For its part, the AsiaBarometer survey did not ask respondents directly to opine 
on the meaning of democracy.  I thus took three variables as proxies for the three basic 
democratic orientations.  The more a respondent agreed (on a five-point scale ranging 
from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) with e statement that “[i]t is desirable that 
people are equal, even if the economy is stagnant”, the higher he scored on the 
substantive democracy scale.  Liberal democracy was measured by agreement (on the 
same five-point scale) that “[p]eople who work more should get more money”, and 
electoral democracy, by agreement that “[c]itizens have a duty to vote in elections.”95  As 
in Chapter 5’s analysis of the Citizen Disenchantment data in the Mexican case—and in 
contrast to the regional surveys in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa— 
respondents could hold each conception of democracy in varying degrees rather than 
adhering to one concept of democracy and the expense of the other two.   
Table 7.1 shows the results of regression analyses of satisfaction with democracy 
on citizen conceptions in each of the four regions.  Substantive democrats are less 
satisfied with democracy.  The odds that a Latin American substantive democrat is “very 
satisfied” with democracy, as opposed to being only “fairly satisfied” with democracy or 
                                                
95 Furthermore, these proxy questions were asked only in 2005, limiting the analysis to just the four Asian 
democracies polled that year:  Bangladesh, Mongolia, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.   
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worse, are 17% less (odds ratio of .829) than those for someone in the ref rence category, 
who defines democracy as something other than one of the three main types.  In Asia, the 
odds of citizens at the maximum of the substantive f -point democracy scale being 
“very satisfied” with democracy are over 26% less than those for a countryman at the 
midpoint of the scale (the mean is 3.85).  In post-Communist Europe, substantive 
democrats are on average .221 points lesssatisfied with democracy (about 2.5% of the 
range of the 1-to-10 scale) than those in the residual reference category.   
On the other hand, electoral democrats are considerably more satisfied with 
democracy in all four regions.  In Latin America, an electoral democrat’s odds of being 
“very” satisfied with democracy are about 12.5% higher than those for citizens in the 
reference category.  The same figure in Africa is 11.3%.  An Eastern European electoral 
democrat is, on average, .399 points more satisfied with democracy (over 4.4% of the 
satisfaction scale’s range) than someone who defines democracy as something other than 
equality, freedom, or elections.  And in Asia, a citizen at the highest point (5) on the 
electoral democracy scale is almost 40% likelier to be “very” satisfied than another at the 
midpoint (3) of the electoral democracy scale.   
Finally, in all regions liberal democrats’ average level of satisfaction falls 
between that of substantive and electoral democrats.  However, in only one region—
Eastern Europe—does liberal democrats’ satisfaction with democracy differ significantly 
from satisfaction among the population in general.  There, adherents to the liberal 
conception are .212 points more satisfied with democracy (almost 2.4% of the 
satisfaction scale’s range) than their counterparts in he residual reference category.   
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Table 7.1:  Regressions of Satisfaction with Democracy on Conceptions of Democracy in 
Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa, 1998-2006.   
a Latin America:  ordinal regression on four-point sa i faction scale; cell values are logged odds ratios 
(LOR)  
b Eastern Europe:  linear regression on ten-point satisfaction scale; cell values are OLS coefficients 
c Asia:  ordinal regression on five-point satisfaction scale; cell values are LOR 
d Africa:  ordinal regression on five-point satisfaction scale; cell values are LOR 
 
Sources:  Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP, 2006), Consolidation of Democracy in Central 
and Eastern Europe (1998-2001), AsiaBarometer (2005), Afrobarometer (2006).  Regions:  Latin 
America:  Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,  Panama, Paraguay, Peru Uruguay, Venezuela; Eastern Europe:  Belarus, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Eastern Germany, Hungaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine; Asia:  Bangladesh, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Nepal;  Africa :  Benin, 
Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagasc r, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia. 
Naturally, the same sorts of political and economic evaluations, and 
sociodemographic characteristics, found to shape satisfaction in the Mexican case are at 
work elsewhere in the world.  In all four regions, citizens’ perceptions of their national 
 
  L. America a E. Europeb  Asiac Africa d 
Variable  B se p B  se p B  se p B  se p 
Concepts of Democracy              
   Substantive -.187 .059   .002***  -.221  .057   .000***  -.151 .0 35 .000***     .0 25 .055 .644 
   Liberal    .012   .031   .688   .212  .037   .000***   .0 61 .0 47 .198    .0 33  .037  .3 68  
   Electoral    .118   .060   .049**   .399  .089 .000 ***   .167 .0 62 .007 ***    .107 .055  .052 *  
Economic Performance               
   Pocketbook   .118   .022   .000***   .266  .031 .000***    .232  .029  .000***    .206 .016  .000***  
   Sociotropic    .276   .022   .000***   .248  .028 .000***  — — —   .0 66  .016  .000***
Pol. Per formance: Rights  — — —  —  — —    .223  .030  .000***  — — — 
Pol. Performance: Elections  — — —  —  — —  — — —   .227  .008 .000***  
Incumbents               
   President   .807   .016   .000***  —  — —  — —  —   .480 .021 .000***  
   Present Government — — —   .492  .009 .000***  — — — — — — 
   National Deputies — — —  —  — —  -.003 .0 49 .9 44    .177  .021 .000** *
   Government Offici als — — —  —  — —   .020 .0 49 .687  — — — 
   MPs Listen — — —  —  — —  — — —   .171  .018 .000***
Sociodemographic              
   Age   .005   .001   .000***   .001  .001  .643  -.005 .003 .0 85*    .003  .001 .018**  
   Income  —  — —   .160  .012  .000***  — —   — — — — 
   Education —  — —  -.180  .029  .000***  -.104 .024 .000***  -.040   .009 .000***
   So cial Class  —  — —   .027  .021  .187 —  —  — — —   —  
Constant      .832  .101  .000***  —  —  — — —   —  
Threshold 1   .820   .070   .000***  —  — — -.067 .443  .880   -.759   .117 .000***  
Threshold 2 3.400  .073   .000***  —  — —  1.518 .442  .000***  2.468 .093 .000***
Threshold 3 6.690  .669   .000***  —  — —  2.764 .444  .000** *  4.108 .097 .000***  
Threshold 4 — — —  —  — —  4.860 .451  .000***  6.084 .104 .000***  
             
Deviance (G2) 12497 p= 1.000 —  — — 7455 p= 1.000 33319 p= 1.000  
Pseudo-R2 (Nagelkerke) .196    —  — — .127    .317    
Adj. R2   — — —  .410   — —  — — — — 
N  20 025   9989   2687   13841   
*      p < .10             
**     p < .05               
***  p < .01              
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and own household economies had large effects on satisfaction with democracy.  
Predictably, better perceptions of economic performance meant higher satisfaction.  
Approval of incumbent politicians’ performance—of presidents, national governments, 
members of parliament—had an even greater positive effect on political satisfaction 
everywhere except Asia.  Personal characteristics also played a role, though a lesser one.  
Older citizens were more satisfied with democracy in Latin America and Africa, as were 
higher income earners in Eastern Europe.  On the otr hand, education sharpened 
criticism of democracy in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa.    Nevertheless, citizen 
concepts of democracy affect satisfaction with democracy everywhere, even after taking 
into account other factors that have a hand in forming citizens’ political evaluations.   
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN NEW 
DEMOCRACIES  
Disenchantment with democracy also brings about in new democracies worldwide 
some of the same deleterious effects on political participation that we see in Mexico.  
Dissatisfied citizens vote less, are less civically engaged, and protest more.   
Voting 
Table 7.2 synthesizes some 15 regression analyses of atisfaction with 
democracy’s effect on various forms of political participation.96  Eastern Europe, Asia, 
and Africa provide strong evidence that satisfied citizens vote more often than their 
discontent peers.  In post-Communist Europe, the odds that a maximally satisfied citizen 
(10 on a ten-point scale) reported voting in the last parliamentary elections are 21.3% 
greater than for someone at the midpoint (5.5) of the scale.  That figure is almost exactly 
the same for national elections in Africa:  21.5% (where the maximum is 4 and the 
                                                
96 The regressions control for all the independent variables in the models presented in Table 7.1; I do not 
report their coefficients here for the sake of convenience.   
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midpoint, 2.5).  In the Asian survey, respondents were asked “how often” they voted in 
national and local elections and given five ordered response categories, “never”, “rarely”, 
“sometimes”, “most of the time”, and “always”.  The odds that respondents who placed 
themselves at the top of the five-point satisfaction scale claimed to “always” vote in 
national elections (as opposed to voting only “most of he time” or less often) are over 
62% higher than the odds for respondents at the midpoint (3); the same number for local 
elections is nearly 69%.  In Latin America, the coefficient associated with satisfaction is 
positive, as expected, but statistically insignificant at conventional levels.   
Non-Electoral, Individual Participation 
There is also considerable evidence that satisfaction boosts individual forms of 
civic engagement other than voting.  In Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa, 
satisfied citizens tend to contact government officials and ask them for help more often 
than their less contented peers.  African citizens with the highest satisfaction score were 
nearly 30% likelier to ask federal legislators for help, and about 26% likelier to request 
help from local governments, than their counterparts with middling satisfaction scores.  
Satisfaction had a positive, but weaker, effect on Latin Americans’ proclivity to ask local 
government functionaries for assistance; maximally satisfied citizens were a little over 
7% likelier to do so than citizens at the midpoint.  (Satisfaction exerted a positive, but 
insignificant, effect on Latin Americans’ chances of appealing to the federal government 
for help.)  Finally, Eastern Europeans who awarded their democracies the highest 
satisfaction rating were 6.6% likelier to contact politicians than citizens who gave 
democracy only middling marks.97   
                                                
97 On the other hand, Asians who are satisfied with democracy are less likely to sign petitions demanding 
that the government improve living conditions.  This finding appears to counter the general tenor of 
satisfaction’s salutary effects on elevating civic engagement.   
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(Sources and regions same as for Table 7.2)   
Table 7.2:  Effect of Satisfaction on Political Participation in Latin American, Eastern 
Europe, Asia, and Africa, 1998-2006.   
Protest 
Finally, there is some evidence that dissatisfied citizens protest more than their 
relatively content peers.  Eastern Europeans were ask d how strongly they approved, on a 
four-point scale ranging from “strongly disapprove” to “strongly approve”, of occupying 
government buildings as a protest tactic.  Citizens who are least satisfied are about 10.4% 
likelier to approve of taking buildings than citizens at the midpoint (5.5) of the ten-point 
satisfaction scale.  Approval of a behavior is not the same as actually carrying it out 
(measures for which are unavailable in the CDCEE survey), but it is an attitudinal 
precursor.  In Asia, those who give their democracies the lowest possible score are nearly 
26% likelier to report having participated in a boyc tt than those who rate their 
democracies at the midpoint of the satisfaction scale (though the effect barely misses 
  L. America E. Europe Asia Africa 
Dependent Variable B se p B se p B se p B se p 
Voting             
   Last Presidential Election .027 .026 .156 — — — — — — — — — 
   Last Nat./Parl. Elec. — — — .043 .016 .003***  — — — .130 .025 .000***  
   How Often in National Elections — — — — — — .242 .040 . 00***  — — — 
   How Often in Local Elections — — — — — — .262 .039 .000***  — — — 
Individual Participation             
  Asked Fed. Dep. for Help .027 .043 .266 — — — — — — .130 .029 .000***  
  Asked Loc. Gov. for Help .046 .030 .063* — — — — — — .115 .021 .000***  
  Contact Politicians/Gov’t. Officials — — — .032 .013 .007***  — — — — — — 
  Sign a Petition — — — — — — -.068 .037 .035** — — — 
  Join with Others to Raise Issue — — — — — — — — — .021 .017 .125 
Protest             
   Approve of Occupying Bldgs. — — — -.022 .011 .023** — — — — — — 
   Boycott — — — — — — -.046 .038 .110 — — — 
   Protest — — — — — — — — — -.011 .019 .277 
             
*      p < .10             
**    p < .05              
***  p < .01             
(all p-values are one-tailed tests)             
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statistical significance at conventional levels.)  And Africans’ penchant for protest may 
be higher among less satisfied citizens than among those who are pleased with their 
democracies (though the p-value associated with the effect of satisfaction makes it 
impossible to assert this with certainty).   
In short, much of the evidence available is consistent with the theory that satisfied 
citizens engage more in institutional forms of political participation, while dissatisfied 
citizens turn more to contentious participation.    
HOW PREVALENT IS THE SUBSTANTIVE CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRACY ?   
That the substantive conception diminishes satisfacion with democracy is 
troublesome, but would be less so if it were not very widespread in new and poor 
democracies—especially relative to the electoral view of democracy.  Its overall effect 
would be negligible if it were offset by a larger, countervailing effect of electoral 
democracy.  This is true irrespective of the proportion of liberal democrats since, as Table 
7.1 demonstrates, the liberal view of democracy does not, on the whole, raise or lower 
satisfaction (except in Eastern Europe).     
The available evidence shows that substantive democrats outnumber their 
electoral counterparts in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa.98  Getting a handle 
on the distribution of conceptions of democracy among denizens of new democracies is 
difficult (for reasons I expound below), and the evid nce must be regarded as 
inconclusive.  Nonetheless, classifying Latin American, Eastern European, and African 
citizens into one of three democratic types (as I did for the analysis presented in Table 
7.1) shows that the substantive conception of democracy prevails over the electoral in 
these three regions.  Figure 7.1 is a bar chart that represents the percentage of substantive 
                                                
98 This does not appear to be the case in Asia.   
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relative to electoral democrats.   In Africa, substantive democrats overwhelm electoral 
democrats by a nearly 4-to-1 margin (11.4% to 4.2%)  Substantive democrats outpace 
electoral democrats by a slimmer margin in Latin America (12.2% to 11.1%, with a 
±0.615% margin of error at the 90% confidence level), while substantive democracy 
appears to enjoy a slight, though statistically insig ificant, edge in Eastern Europe (6.6% 
and 6.4%, respectively).99  So, according to these measurements, at least one of every ten 
Latin American and African citizens, and over 1 in every 20 in Eastern Europe, is a 
substantive democrat.   
There is some reason to doubt how accurately the regional surveys measure 
citizen conceptions of democracy—and, thus, the extnt o which each conception has 
permeated citizens’ ideological constructs of democracy.  Asking open-ended questions, 
and classifying respondents into mutually exclusive categories based on short, one- or 
two-word answers (as LAPOP, CDCEE, and Afrobarometer do) may not provide the best 
measures of citizen conceptions of democracy.  Thoug  there is value in recording 
impulsive answers about the meaning of democracy, failing to probe further releases 
respondents from the cognitive burden of reflecting more deeply about democracy, the 
different values it comprehends, and the relation they bear to one another.  Answers given 
from the tip of the tongue are probably at best a partial representation of answers that 
would come forth from the recesses of the brain.  For example, does someone who 
immediately associates democracy with elections believ  that elections alone are a 
sufficient condition for democracy, or is something more required?  Does an answer of 
                                                
99 For the sake of comparison, liberal democrats in the three regions constitute 44.4% (Latin America), 
55.8% (Eastern Europe), and 47.2% (Africa) of the citizenry.  In Asia, the means of the interval-level 
variables that served as proxies for conceptions of democracy are:  substantive, 3.86 (well above the 
midpoint of 3); liberal, 4.49; and electoral, 4.65.   
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“equality” mean socioeconomic equality (as many analysts assume) or could it refer to 
equality before the law or at the ballot box?   
 
Figure 7.1:  Percentages of Substantive vs. Electoral Democrats in Latin America, 
Eastern Europe, and Africa, 1998-2006.   
An open-ended question on the meaning of democracy could also underestimate 
the extent to which citizens attach social and economic desires to democratic 
government.  Associating democracy with social equality would seem less instinctual (at 
least to a U.S. citizen, as I am), and more a product of reasoned reflection, than 
associating democracy with elections or liberty.  If this is true, top-of-mind answers will 
emphasize elections and liberty, while probed respon es will invoke economic concerns 



















Finally, the regional surveys’ coding conventions unecessarily compartmentalize 
respondents into mutually exclusive categories.100  As I argue in Chapters 2 and 4, we 
may simultaneously hold several conceptions of democracy to varying degrees.  Thus, 
pigeonholing respondents into one category could distort the extent to which other views 
are present among the citizenry.  For these reasons, measuring definitions of democracy 
using an approach similar to that of Citizen Disenchantment—multi-item, guided 
deliberations—may produce higher-quality data about citizen views of democracy. 
Auxiliary evidence from the third and fourth waves of the World Values Survey 
(WVS) shows that citizens have greater socioeconomic expectations of their governments 
in new, poorer democracies than in established, wealthi r ones.  The WVS contains a 
series of four items about the proper role of government in the economy.  Respondents 
were asked to place themselves on a ten-point continuum where the lower bound (1) 
represented extreme government intervention—indicative of a substantive view of 
democracy—and the upper bound (10), extreme laissez-faire—consistent with a belief in 
economic liberalism.  The items inquired whether incomes should be more equal or 
differences larger; whether firms should be owned by the government or private parties; 
whether government or individuals should be responsible for well-being; and whether 
government regulation of firms more or greater freedom for enterprise was better.  Figure 
7.2 presents group averages over the four items for industrial, post-Communist, and 
developing countries.   
                                                
100 The AsiaBarometer analysis avoids this problem, since t uses three scales as simultaneous measures of 
respondents’ conceptions of democracy.  The problem is that the measures may not be very good 
approximations to concepts of democracy.  For example, the electoral democracy proxy asks respondents if 
they believe it is a citizen’s duty to vote.  Very few will say no, but many who say yes may not believ  that 
elections are the sole essence of democracy.  The substantive democracy proxy forces citizens into a false 
dichotomy between income equality and economic growth.  Even so, a surprising number of citizens said 
they value equality, even at the price of economic dynamism.   
 
Unsurprisingly, citizens in new, poorer democracies support greater government 
economic intervention—levelling income inequality, providing for the general welfare, 
and regulating private enterprise
of former Communist countries, on average, demand the most from their governments, 
scoring 5.24 on the substantive
developing world, at 5.35 (both below the 5.5 midpoint f the scale).  In contrast, citizens 
in the older, industrial democracies have, on average,  greater free
bent, registering 5.93 on the scale.
Figure 7.2:  Average Self-Placement on a Substantive
Communist, Developing, and Industrial Democracies, 1996
Source:  World Values Survey (third and fourth waves).  Group
Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia & Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine; 
Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, India, Indonesia, 
Mexico, Peru, Phillipines, South Africa, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela; 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, Norway, Portugal, 
Puerto Rico, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.  
Caveats notwithstanding, the evidence afforded by the 
WVS makes a reasonable prima facie
indeed prevalent enough among citizenries of new democracies to give cause for concern.  
                                            
101 All differences are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.  
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—than those in the established democracies.  Inhabitants 
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All research projects necessarily leave many stones u turned.  This one leaves at 
least four.  The first is the sources of citizen cocepts of democracy.  My main argument 
had three (sequentially) moving parts:  concepts of democracy, satisfaction with 
democracy, and political participation.  A natural initial step would be to extend the chain 
of argumentation backward and examine where concepts of democracy come from.  
Chapter 4 exploited evidence from the D sencanto Ciudadano survey, finding that party 
identification was the most important determinant of citizen concepts.  Contrary to what 
one might expect, socioeconomic indicators such as income and education appeared to 
have very little to do with the ideas one held about democracy.  This suggests that 
socialization shapes concepts of democracy more than structural factors such as social 
class.  Future research would formulate these hypoteses more rigorously, ground them 
theoretically, and test them with better data.   
A second natural step would be to extend the research fo ward, projecting the 
long-range consequences of disenchantment.  In Chapter 6, I sketch several ways in 
which disenchantment undermines the quality of democracy through its effects on 
participation.  When people fail to vote, engage, and protest, vertical accountability and 
responsiveness—two key components of democratic quality—become virtually 
impossible.  So, I would operationalize these and other indicators of quality of democracy 
better, and devise fair tests of the relationship between participation and quality of 
democracy.   
Third, the research could be extended forward in another way to explore a 
potentially huge consequence of dissatisfaction:  relapse into authoritarianism.  I hint at 
this consequence of dissatisfaction, but it deserves fuller exposition.  There are few 
countries that backslide into dictatorship, but dissatisfaction may have elevated the 
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probability of doing so in these countries.  This line of research would require assembling 
a multi-country database over many years that includes public opinion data on political 
satisfaction matched with country-year data on reversion to authoritarian rule.    
Finally, I would address a significant omission in Chapter 3:  tests of aggregate-
level causes of dissatisfaction.  I presented descriptive evidence that dissatisfaction was 
low and falling in new democracies.  Arguing inductively, I outlined several country-
level characteristics that appear to affect satisfaction.  A more thoroughgoing 
examination provided by statistical hypothesis testing would clearly benefit this analysis.   
WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?   
What has this study taught us about disenchantment with democracy?  First, it has 
shown us that ideas count.  Disenchantment with democracy depends importantly on an 
idea—how citizens conceive of democracy and what they expect of it—and not merely 
one or another indicator of economic or political performance.  In Mexico and in new 
democracies around the world, the conjunction of a belief that democracy should 
distribute the dividends of economic growth more equitably among its citizens with the 
inability—or refusal—of governments to do so is a significant cause of political 
disenchantment.   
Disenchantment, in turn, is an idea with real-world consequences.  It affects 
political participation.  As in Mexico, disenchantment discourages citizens in new 
democracies from participating through established institutions, inducing apathy in most 
and driving others to more confrontational forms of p litical activity.  Ideas do count.   
Second, champions of democracy should be concerned about growing 
disenchantment with it.  Dissatisfaction may contribute to democratic breakdown.  A 
more widespread consequence, however, is stagnant democratic quality.  To the extent 
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that improving democratic quality and making governme ts more responsive depends on 
citizen participation, the “disenchantment-alienation” cycle observed worldwide makes 
for a bleak outlook.  Most new democracies are highly flawed, partial democracies.  Of 
the 70 countries examined in Chapter 3 that became democratic during the third wave of 
democratic expansion (or were already democratic but remained poor), Freedom House 
ranked just 28—40%—as “free” in 2007.  The majority, 39 (or 56%), earned only a score 
of “partially free.”  Of course, most countries that democratize do not slip back into 
authoritarianism.  Since the 1970’s, democracy broke down outright in only 13 countries 
that had been democratic at some point during the third wave.  Most of these 
subsequently redemocratized.  But new democracies are much likelier to remain stuck in 
low-quality, semi-democracy than advance to a more r bust democracy.  Of 1,422 total 
country-years since third wave democratization in these 70 countries, 63% (890) were 
spent in the “partially free” state, and just 34% (480), in the “free” state.   
It is difficult to see how governments will hold fair elections, respect civil rights, 
enact more broadly beneficial economic policies, and otherwise elevate democratic 
quality without public pressure.  To be sure, citizen participation is no guarantee that any 
of these things will happen, but its absence is a guarantee they will not. 
The third lesson is that citizens need to temper thir expectations of democracy.  
Who is to blame for disenchantment, citizens or governments?  Some aver that citizens’ 
unrealistically high expectations—particularly of economic betterment—lead them to 
despair prematurely.  Overly demanding citizens, in th s view, ignore limits on even the 
best-intentioned governments’ ability to improve citizens’ lives and overlook incremental 
progress that is made.  They overburden governments with unreasonable claims and are 
quick to remonstrate, often contentiously, when governments inevitably fail to meet these 
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demands.  In the extreme, a restive citizenry could upend a fledgling democracy by 
enervating its institutional capacity to process demands.   
Democracy cannot solve all social ills, whatever one may feel about where blame 
for dissatisfaction with it lies.  At its best, democracy provides a framework in which 
citizens and their representatives seek solutions together.  The range of solutions 
available is subject to very real constraints imposed by national and international political 
economies.  But democratic governments will often fail to achieve even the most 
levelheaded citizen aims using means that are available.   
When this happens, citizens must not abandon hope.  The fourth lesson is that 
citizens must continue to participate, even when their governments fail.  Citizens may 
take heart from the new democracies that have flourished, few though they are.  They 
cannot relinquish the tools at their disposal to influence public decision-making, as 
ineffectual as those tools may seem—or be—at the moment.  They must vote.  They must 
lift their voices to their representatives, to makers of opinion, and to their fellow citizens 
through the many vehicles available to articulate their interests.   
Above all, citizens must organize.  They must seek out like-minded citizens and 
raise their concerns not in isolation from one another, but in unison.  If all else fails, they 
should protest—but do so peacefully.  Protest organizers should train demonstrators in 
techniques of nonviolent resistance, police their ranks and expel fringe saboteurs, and 
work with police to routinize protest.  Peaceable, cr ative dramatizations of injustice can 
be morally compelling spectacles for fellow citizens; violence alienates potential allies 
among commoners and authorities alike.   
Fifth, and most perhaps importantly, governments must also shoulder their 
responsibility for democratic disenchantment.  If some observers hold unreasonably high, 
disappointed citizen expectations responsible for disenchantment, others fault 
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governments.  If citizens are dissatisfied, it is not because their expectations are excessive 
but because their governments have done a poor job of meeting even citizens’ most 
modest demands.  As we saw in Chapter 3, many new democracies have been incapable 
of securing the most basic of democratic rights:  to choose political leadership in free, fair 
elections.  More distressingly, even when elections are reasonably clean they often 
change governments without, however, changing evils that linger from the old regime.  
Poll after poll shows that citizens in new democracies believe that legislators look out 
only for their own interests rather than the public good; that the powerful run the country 
for their own benefit; and that elected representatives do not care about or understand 
problems of people like them.  Abuse of power and corruption continue to run rampant.  
Administrations come and go, argue those who would lay the blame for disenchantment 
at the feet of governments, but elites maintain a tight grip on the state, extracting and 
hoarding resources from it.  In brief, if people dissatisfied with democracy, it is not 
because citizens aspire to too much but because democratic governments have simply not 
earned people’s good will.   
Governments may avail themselves of several strategies to assuage 
disenchantment:  reducing the number of substantive democrats in the populace, shoring 
up non-economic aspects of democracy, and, in the final instance, addressing citizens’ 
demands for a fairer economic shake.  Governments can attempt to change the 
distribution of conceptions of democracy among citizens, emphasizing the liberal and, 
especially, the electoral views while diminishing the substantive view.  They may 
promote civic education campaigns that stress the importance of voting and political 
participation generally.  These campaigns can help foster values of religious and ethnic 
tolerance, and respect for dissenting points of views.   
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Satisfaction with democracy also depends on perceptions of political 
performance, and democratic governments may undertake eform to make elections more 
trustworthy and encourage greater citizen participation.  These include electoral reform 
that balances the need for broad representation with governability; citizen participation 
laws that provide for direct democracy and public input into decision-making (such as 
Brazil’s experiment in participatory budgeting); independent election authorities; 
campaign finance and media access reform; and human rights commissions with full 
investigative and sanctioning powers, subject to independent national and international 
oversight.   
Improving elections and respect for rights will go a long way toward boosting 
faith in democracy, even where democracy does little to enhance the public’s economic 
lot.  There comes a time, though, when democratic governments must take on citizens’ 
legitimate aspirations to greater economic well-being.  This is especially so in new, 
poorer democracies, where poverty and social inequality re deeply tied to political 
inequality.  This inevitably involves tackling thorny questions of distribution.  Fostering 
economic growth is imperative, but it is not enough.  The fruits of growth must be 
disseminated more evenly, as a growing body of development thinking recognizes.  
Governments may use fiscal policy both to incentivize productive activity and 
redistribute income directly.  But beyond cash transfers, an even more crucial use of tax 
revenues is social investment in infrastructure andhuman capital—in a healthy, well-
educated population as a productive asset.  The extent to which democratic governments 
should be in the business of redistributing income (and wealth and land) is a subject of 
legitimate debate.  But they must be in the busines of redistributing opportunity.  In the 
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